On natural selection and Hume's second problem by Aranda-Anzaldo, Armando
 Evolution and Cognition:
 
 ISSN: 0938-2623   
 
Published by:
 
 Konrad Lorenz Institut für
Evolutions- und Kognitionsforschung, Adolf-Lorenz-Gasse 2, A-3422 Altenberg/Donau.
Tel.: 0043-2242-32390; Fax: 0043-2242-323904; e-mail: sec@kla.univie.ac.at; World
Wide Web: http://www.kla.univie.ac.at/  
 
Chairman:
 
 Rupert Riedl  
 
Managing Editor:
 
Manfred Wimmer  
 
Layout:
 
 Alexander Riegler  
 
Aim and Scope:
 
 “Evolution and Cogni-
tion” is an interdisciplinary forum devoted to all aspects of research on cognition in animals and humans. The major
emphasis of the journal is on evolutionary approaches to cognition, reflecting the fact that the cognitive capacities of
organisms result from biological evolution. Empirical and theoretical work from both fields, evolutionary and cognitive
science, is accepted, but particular attention is paid to interdisciplinary perspectives on the mutual relationship between
evolutionary and cognitive processes. Submissions dealing with the significance of cognitive research for the theories of
biological and sociocultural evolution are also welcome. “Evolution and Cognition” publishes both original papers and
review articles.  
 
Period of Publication:
 
 Semi-annual  
 
Price:
 
 Annuals subscription rate (2 issues): ATS 500; DEM 70, US$ 50;
SFr 60;  GBP 25. Annual subscriptions are assumed to be continued automatically unless subscription orders are cancelled
by written information.  
 
Single issue price:
 
 ATS 300; DEM 43; US$ 30; SFr 36; GBP 15  
 
Publishing House:
 
 WUV-Universitäts-
verlag/Vienna University Press, Berggasse 5, A-1090 Wien, Tel.: 0043/1/3105356-0, Fax: 0043/1/3197050  
 
Bank:
 
 Erste öster-
reichische  Spar-Casse, Acct.No. 073-08191 (Bank Code 20111)  
 
Advertising:
 
 Vienna University Press, Berggasse 5, A-1090
Wien.  
 
Supported by Cultural Office of the City of Vienna, Austrian Federal Ministry of Science/ Transportation and the
Section Culture and Science of the Lower Austrian State Government.
Impressum
 
Contents
 
K. Lorenz/K. Okawa/K. Kotrschal 
 
108
 
Non-anonymous, Collective Territoriality in a Fish, the 
Moorish Idol (Zanclus cornutus): Agonistic and 
Appeasement Behaviours. Unpublished manuscript by 
Konrad Lorenz from February 1979 
 
Anthony Chemero 
 
136
 
Teleosemantics and the Critique of Adaptationism 
 
Helena Knyazeva 
 
145
 
The Synergetic View of Human Creativity 
 
Armando Aranda-Anzaldo 
 
156
 
On Natural Selection and Hume’s Second Problem 
 
Marie-France Chevron
 
173
 
Man’s Special Position in Nature. The Relationship 
between Biological and Cultural Development 
 
Simon Winter
 
185
 
Evolution, Categorization and Values
 
197
 
Zusammenfassungen der Artikel
 Evolution and Cognition
 
❘
 
108
 
❘
 
1998, Vol. 4, No. 2
 
About this text
 
This is an unusual paper,
based on an unpublished
manuscript by late Kon-
rad L
 
ORENZ
 
 (1979) on the
relationships between
behavioral and social
organization in 
 
Zanclus
cornutus
 
 (Zanclinae, Per-
ciformes), the Moorish
idol or, in Hawaiian, the
Kihikihi. This fragment
describes the results of
observations during 1976
and 1977 in his large (4 
 
×
 
4 
 
×
 
 2m) reef tank. At the
time of L
 
ORENZ
 
’ death in
1989, these observations
were left in the drawer as
were his plans to con-
dense his lifelong obser-
vations into a book on
“The Biology, notably
Ethology of Perciform
Fishes”. It seemed appro-
priate to introduce, dis-
cuss, and summarize this
long text. The approach
and results are genuine
L
 
ORENZ
 
, with some addi-
tions and comments by
O
 
KAWA
 
, whereas the
interpretation is by K
 
OTRSCHAL
 
, who is also to blame
for potential errors.
Publication seems worthwile, because the text is
both, scientifically and historically remarkable. If a
fragment by late Ludwig 
 
VAN
 
 B
 
EETHOVEN
 
 would be
discovered, it’s publication would be unquestion-
able. Konrad L
 
ORENZ
 
 was,
in a way, the Beethoven of
early ethology. The text
shows, that he carried his
workstyle, his passion for
keen and long-term obser-
vations well into an ad-
vanced age (he was 74
when he started this
project in 1976). 
Second, and even more
important, these observa-
tions by L
 
ORENZ
 
 are scienti-
fially relevant. Biologists
and ecologists interested
in community organiza-
tion and social structures
of tropical reef fishes, gen-
erally do not report behav-
ioral mechanisms (but
comp. references in R
 
EESE
 
,
1991), mainly because
these are extremely diffi-
cult to observe in the field.
This is particularly true for
fish such as 
 
Zanclus
 
, which
may roam large areas and
where infreqent behaviors
may still be of crucial im-
portance. As usual for
L
 
ORENZ
 
, results are prima-
rily observational and
qualitative, but in the
present case, he quantified interactions and per-
formed a few experimental confrontations as well. His
accurate descriptions allow a number of conclusions
to be drawn. Specific and persistent dyadic relation-
ships, for example, leave hardly an alternative expla-
nation to individual recognition in these fish. 
 
K. Lorenz/K. Okawa/K. Kotrschal
 
Non-anonymous, Collective Territoriality in a 
Fish, the Moorish Idol
 
 (Zanclus cornutus)
 
: 
Agonistic and Appeasement behaviors
 
Unpublished manuscript by Konrad Lorenz from February 1979
 
Observations in aquarium and field indicated that the
Indo-Pacific coral reef fish Zanclus cornutus (Z), the
Moorish idol (Zanclidae), is territorial after recruit-
ment, but later roams a common territory together with
conspecifics. The behaviors associated with this onto-
genetic change were observed between April 1976 and
July 1978 in a 4 
 
× 
 
4 
 
× 
 
2 m reef tank at Konrad
L
 
ORENZ
 
’ home in Altenberg, Austria. A detailed de-
scription of these events in German by L
 
ORENZ
 
 from
February 1979 was condensed into an extended En-
glish summary by K. K
 
OTRSCHAL
 
, who, with the help of
late L
 
ORENZ
 
’ masters student K. O
 
KAWA
 
, also added
the English framework of this paper. After introduction
into the aquarium in February 1977, 5 postlarval fish
first established territories at the bottom and walls of
the tank, but during the following months, dyads start-
ed fusing their territories. Finally, fish roamed the tank
together as an individualized group. Not reported so far
from perciform fishes was a spectrum of “appease-
ment” behaviors, which were dyadically performed
during and after breakdown of territorial borders. A few
of these behaviors, such as “benthic pseuospawning”
and “eel-like-swimming” may have been ritualized
from sexual behaviors. “Appeasement” behaviors are
usually attributed to species with considerable social
cognitive abilities. Therefore, their presence in a fish is
most remarkable. 
Aquarium observations, coral reef fish, dyadic interac-
tions, ethology, social behavior, territoriality, ontogeny.
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L
 
ORENZ
 
’ passion for fish can be traced back to
childhood. His obsession with reef fish began in the
late 1950ies at the MPI-Seewiesen where he had the
resources to keep these splendid, colorful fishes in
relatively large tanks. His interest in aggression pro-
vided the major scientific motive. In his book “On
aggression” (1963), fish indeed play major roles.
L
 
ORENZ
 
 quickly learned, that most agonistic interac-
tions between reef fishes occurred among members
of the same species (Z
 
UMPE
 
 1965). On that basis he
developed a hypothesis that the ultimate function
of what he called “poster colours” in the highly vi-
sual tropical reef fishes was to signal the occupation
of a territory. On the proximate level, he interpreted
these colours as sign stimuli triggering aggression
(L
 
ORENZ
 
 1962). Even though much research was sub-
sequently provoked by this controversial paper, the
question of the function(s) of poster colors remained
a topic of research interest (Brockmann 1973; N
 
EU-
DECKER
 
 1989) and evidence was found for, as well as
against L
 
ORENZ
 
’ hypothesis (F
 
RICKE
 
 1966; N
 
EUDECKER
 
1989).
L
 
ORENZ
 
 interest for the Moorish idol began during
this period. This beautiful fish is partly territorial af-
ter recruitment, but may change to schooling during
certain phases of its life history in response to eco-
logical conditions. This pattern is not unusual
among reef fishes (B
 
ARLOW
 
 1984; E
 
HRLICH
 
 1975;
L
 
OWE
 
-M
 
C
 
C
 
ONNEL
 
 1987; R
 
EESE
 
 1991; R
 
OBERTSON
 
/G
 
AI-
NES
 
 1986). From preliminary aquarium observations
in Seewiesen, the idea emerged, that these fish may
recognize each others individually. L
 
ORENZ
 
 went to
Hawaii in 1967, where he performed the observa-
tions and field experiments mentioned in his text.
Following his retirement from Seewiesen, in 1973,
L
 
ORENZ
 
 turned his share of the money of the Nobel
Price into a huge reef tank, which he stocked with
different tropical reef fishes, including Zanclus.
L
 
ORENZ
 
’s original Text is in German and is pre-
sented here as it was found, except for corrected typ-
ing errors. Replacement of missing words as well as
a few comments by KK were marked by []. Judged by
the usual style and language standards of L
 
ORENZ
 
’s
publications, this is probably an early draft from his
original protocols. To preserve authenticy, no at-
tempt was made to alter style, remove redundancies,
etc. Instead of a literal translation of this text, an
extended English summary (by KK) is provided. Ac-
cording to L
 
ORENZ
 
’s correspondence with friends
and colleagues, this manscript was probably in-
tended for publication in the “MPG-Spiegel” or in
the “Naturwissenschaften”, but, for unknown rea-
sons, was never finished.  
The original manuscript by L
 
ORENZ
 
 covers some
preliminary observations from Seewiesen and from
fieldwork in Hawaii, but it mainly reports in detail
the complicated social dynamics among a number
of 
 
Zanclus
 
 in his huge Altenberg reef tank, between
April 1976 and August 1977. Observations and ex-
periments were continued by L
 
ORENZ
 
 and coworkers,
notably by his masters student Keiko O
 
KAWA
 
 into the
early 1980s. Parts of these results are included into
the extended English summary (below). 
 
Life history changes in social 
organization of tropical reef fishes
 
Virtually all marine reef fishes face the problem of a
major change in lifestyle when metamorphosing
from planktontic larvae into substrate-orientated
juveniles (J
 
ONES
 
 1991; S
 
MITH
 
 1982). Small and there-
fore, highly vulnerable to predators, recruits must
squeeze into whatever spaces are available at the
reef, between or even within adult territories or they
recruit to lagoon habitat nurseries and change to
the forereef later (S
 
ALE
 
 1969). Striking differences in
poster coloration between juveniles and conspecific
adults (Pomacentridae, Pomacanthidae) are com-
mon in the tropical reef fishes and may ease settle-
ment. 
Among the discussed functions of poster colora-
tion, crypsis (L
 
ONGLEY
 
 1917), territoriality (L
 
ORENZ
 
1962), species recognition (Z
 
UMPE
 
 1965), signalling to
predators is certainly among the better-supported hy-
potheses (G
 
OSLINE
 
 1965; N
 
EUDECKER
 
 1989), even
though it certainly does not exclude the others.
Avoidance of predation in these conspicuous fishes
seems to be crucially dependent on their knowledge
of the local topography, which may even be adver-
tised to potential predators by their aposematic
(poster) colours (E
 
HRLICH
 
 et al. 1977; G
 
OSLINE
 
 1965;
K
 
OTRSCHAL
 
 1987). Field observations indeed suggest
that Chaetodontids, for example, may form cognitive
maps of their territories (R
 
EESE
 
 1989). One may well
assume that this is an ability common in fish with
similar lifestyles. This crucial learning of topography
can only be achieved by post-recruits by expanding
their radius of action from their initial shelters.
Whether fish stay territorial, solitary, or as monog-
amous pair, or switch to temporary or permanent
schooling, seems to depend mainly on food densities
or the need to overcome the defence of competing
territory holders (B
 
ARLOW
 
 1984; F
 
OSTER
 
 1985; R
 
OBERT-
SON
 
 et al. 1976, 1979; T
 
RICAS
 
 1989). Some species,
such as the algivores among the relatively small dam-
selfish (Pomacentridae) stay on their moderately
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sized and vigorously defended territories throughout
life. Others, such as butterflyfish and angelfish (Cha-
etodontidae and Pomacanthidae) occupy more ex-
tended territories, probably because they feed on
low-energy items, such as coral tissue, sponges and
even calcareous algae (RANDALL 1967, HOBSON 1974).
Long-term  monogamy is common in fish, which de-
fend feeding territories, such as many surgeonfish
and butterflyfish (BARLOW 1984, REESE 1991, ROBERT-
SON/GAINES 1986). In surgeonfish it seems, that post-
recruits are first territorial, but later school (EHRLICH
1975). Also LOWE-MCCONNEL (1987) mention that,
for example, some surgeonfish and damselfish, begin
as territorial post-recruits, but tend to school later on,
when they roam comparatively large “…home
ranges…” which are “…defended against intruding
conspecifics and heterospecifics…” (defended home
range are, by definition, territories). 
Thus, poster-coloured reef fishes may be able to
switch from territoriality to schooling. In terms of
LORENZ’ ethological theory (1978), this means that
the same sign stimulus (i.e. poster colors) may trigger
different behaviors, depending on ecological and
motivational context. Even when LORENZ’s poster co-
louration hypothesis is basically correct (LORENZ
1962: poster colours are sign stimuli, triggering ag-
gression in territorial fish), this adaptive flexibility of
individuals may provide one explanation, why field
work led to contradicting conclusions (EHRLICH et al.
1977, EHRLICH/EHRLICH 1982, FRICKE 1966). Whereas
the ecology of territoriality and schooling received
broad attention by scientists (for example, JONES
1968, SALE 1980, 1991), reports on behavioral mech-
anisms remained scarce, (EHRLICH 1977; EHRLICH/
EHRLICH 1982; ERLACH 1986; MOTTA 1983; MOYERS et
al. 1983; REESE 1975, 1991; ROBERTSON et al. 1976,
1979; SALE 1969; SCHOBER 1988; ZUMPE 1965).   
LORENZ intended to describe the behavioral mech-
anisms involved in this switch from territoriality to
group swimming in Z and how they form individual-
ized schools which roam common territories. Predic-
tions are, that small or unfamiliar individuals should
be more aggressive and territorial than large or famil-
iar ones. Also, within equally sized cohorts more ag-
gressive interactions should be found than between
such cohorts, because competition potentially in-
creases with similarity in size. LORENZ’ aquarium ob-
servations reveal a potential of Z to form a surprisingly
complex social organization, reminiscent to what pri-
matologists would call a fission-fusion system (e.g. DE
WAAL 1989). Clearly, field investigations are needed
to thest the working hypotheses obtained from these
aquarium observations.
Materials and methods
Observations on Zanclus cornutus were performed
by LORENZ  in his big reef tank in Altenberg (North-
west of Vienna) on 760 days, mainly in the after-
noons, from April 1976 to September 1980.
LORENZ’s manuscript covers April 1976 to August
1977. The 1978 experimental introductions of new
fish were reported by OKAWA (unpubl.) and are
inclued in the summary. A conservative estimate of
total observation time during the period relevant
for this paper (April 1976 to July 1978) is 1000
hours. Fish were kept in a 32 000 l reef-tank (4 × 4 ×
2m), with artificial coral skeletons. A stone reef at
the bottom and styrofoam decorations disguising
corners and walls provided abundant shelters. The
entire bottom of the tank was covered with layers of
coral rubble and sand, serving as a filter through
which water was forced from the top to a clear-
water-chamber at the bottom at a rate of 14 000 l per
hour. The direction of flow was occasionally
reversed and the suspended ooze resulting from this
procedure was removed by a fast filtering system.
Water from the bottom clear-water-chamber was
also drawn into a foamer (35 cm in diameter, 115
cm height) at a rate of 12 000 l per hour to remove
peptides from the water, it’s discharge of which was
returned to the tank via an oblique and illuminated
plastic panel, from where the quickly growing algae
were occasionally removed. Every month, 1000 l of
the tank’s content were replaced by freshly mixed
seawater. The tank was illuminated via the roof of
the aquarium building, which was tilted south-
wards and covered with a transparent plastic panel
allowing also UV to pass. Additional lightning was
provided at least 12 hours by 4 1000-Watt halogen
bulbs, arranged in a way that they did not shade the
skylight. Fish were fed the “LORENZIAN” way, fre-
quently, richly and diverse.
Preceding observations were performed 1954–
1973 in reef tanks at the Max PLANCK für Verhaltens-
physiologie in Seewiesen, Germany and 1967 on the
coral reefs of Kaneehoe Bay, Hawaii, where LORENZ
spent 6 weeks at the Hawaii Institute of Marine Biol-
ogy of the University of Hawaii, Oahu, Hawaii.
Shortly after filling the tank with seawater, the
first two  Zanclus, one small, one large, were intro-
duced in April 1976. In June 1976, 8 medium-sized
(6 cm) individuals followed. Fish did not seem to be
healthy from the onset and there were problems
with feeding (in nature, Zanclus are relatively spe-
cialized sponge and algae feeders, HOBSON 1974, RUSS
1984), so all initial 10 fish were dead by December
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1976. A new group of 5 small, post-larval Zanclus,
accustomed to take aquarium food, was introduced
February 1977, another medium- sized fish May
1977 and another 2, one small, one medium-sized in
June 1977, The smallest of the newcomers was
quickly killed by the others, so the tank contained 8
Zanclus in August 1977, when LORENZ’s report ends.
Five of those (4 from the post-larval batch and the
individual from May 1977) grew to an adult size (ap-
prox. 13 cm body length) and roamed the tank as a
group, when 1978, 5 new Zanclus of approx. 5 cm
body length were introduced (4 in May, one in June).
Another medium-sized fish (7 cm) was introduced in
July 1978. Thus the tank contained one cohort of 5
Zanclus older than 2 years and another cohort of 6
smaller Zanclus by the middle of 1978.    
Despite its size, LORENZ’s oservation tank was still a
tiny fraction of a reef, or even of a territory of some
reef fishes. Therefore, caution is appropriate to relate
observations in captivity with behavior the wild.
LORENZ used to argue that captivity may cause behav-
ioral deficits, but never additions of behaviors not
shown in the wild. Limited space in an aquarium,
regular food supply and a lack of predation undoubt-
edly increases frequencies and, possibly, intensities of
interactions, but certainly could not produce behav-
iors which were not part of the species inventory of
action patterns. This is the case for all captive animals,
including monkeys and apes (DE WAAL 1982). He ex-
cluded, of course, behavioral stereotypies caused by
severely limited space, as described by HOLZAPFEL
(1939). In the present case, this increased intensity is
a benefit rather than a drawback. One reason for the
lack of field data on this topic may be that interactions
of this kind are hard to observe. Thus, there is at
present no alternative to Aquarium observations,
which provide a source of hypotheses on processes in
the wild rather than being their exact representation.
Results
Original text by Konrad Lorenz from 1979
ÄHREND DES JAHRES 1963 HIELT ICH AM MAX-
PLANCK-Institut für Verhaltensphysiologie
Seewiesen 7 Jungfische von Zanclus canescens[now
Zanclus curnutus] (Acanthuridae, Percomorpha) in
einem Becken von 1 mal 1,8 m Grundfläche und 1,5
m Wassertiefe. Die Fische verteidigten zunächst Ein-
zelreviere, schwammen aber später im Schwarm.
Der Übergang von dem Einen zum Anderen wurde
damals nicht näher beobachtet. Bei den bereits
gemeinsam im ganzen Becken umherschwimmen-
den Fischen war jeweils derjenige dominant, in des-
sen früherem Revier sich der Schwarm gerade
aufhielt. Bemerkenswerterweise besagt dies, daß
nicht nur jeder der 7 Fische jeden der übrigen 6 indi-
viduell kannte, sondern auch, daß er wußte, an wel-
cher Stelle dieses Individuum besonders zu fürchten
war. 
In diesem Becken waren die Reviere der Fische
begreiflicherweise unnatürlich klein und lagen zum
Teil in der Lotrechten übereinander. Bei Grenzstrei-
tigkeiten zeigen Zanclus wie viele andere territoriale
Fische Parallelimponieren, bei dem jeder der beiden
seinen Körper räumlich so einstellt, daß die auf seine
Seitenfläche errichtete senkrecht nach dem Revier-
mittelpunkt zeigt, mit anderen Worten, die Ebene
des abgeflachten Körpers liegt genau in derjenigen
der Reviergrenze. Besonders deutlich wurde dieser
Effekt, wenn Territorien zweier Fische übereinaner
lagen, sodaß ihre Besitzer beim Breitseitsimponieren
flach wie Flundern im Wasser standen. Kommt es
zum Kampf, so flieht der Besiegte. Unter natürlichen
Umständen liegen die Reviergrenzen ziemlich genau
lotrecht, wie auch bei den zur Zeit beobachteten
Zanclus in einem Becken von 4 mal 4 m Grundflä-
che. 
Die erwähnten Fische lebten nur einige Monate
und es war daher nicht zu erwarten, daß ihr Verhal-
ten genau dem des Freilebens entsprach. Nach dem
Prinzip, daß die Gefangenhaltung nur Ausfälle, nie-
mals aber ein das natürliche Verhalten an Differen-
ziertheit übertreffendes hervorrufen kann, schien
mir das individuelle Sich-Erkennen und der kollek-
tive, nicht-anonyme Revierbesitz untersuchenswert.
Als ich im Frühjahr 1964 einige Wochen als Gast
des [Ernst REESE, Marine Biology Laboratory der Uni-
versity of Hawaii at Manoa], Oahu verbringen
durfte, galten meine Beobachtungen in erster Linie
Zanclus canescens. Die Fische erwiesen sich als
schwer zu fangen und ich verdanke Mr. L. ZUKARAN
5 Stück etwa … mm langer und gleichgroßer Zanclus.
Freiwasserbeobachtungen auf Coconut Island,  erga-
ben, daß in Kanehoe Bay, wo die  meeresbiologische
W
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Station der Universität Honolulu gelegen ist, Zanclus
dieser Größe in Scharen von etwa 20 bis 30 Indivi-
duen herumstreichen. Im gleichen Areal begegnete
ich immer Scharen von etwa gleicher Stückzahl und
hatte den Eindruck, daß sie immer aus den gleichen
Individuen bestanden, was allerdings unbewiesen
bleibt. In Riffnähe sah ich immer nur einzelne, sehr
viel kleinere, etwa 6 cm lange Tiere. Ich versuchte
zunächst, meine an Aquarien gewohnten und nicht
gegen die Scheiben tobenden Exemplare in allseits
geschlossenen Plastikbecken am Riff zu versenken,
um die Reaktion der dort lebenden kleineren Zanclus
zu beobachten. Ich selbst hielt mich mit Atemgerät
etwa 6 m entfernt auf. Die freien, ortsbeständigen
Fische scheuten aber so sehr vor den Becken, daß sie
zwar aufmerksam wurden, aber an die eingeschlos-
senen Fische nie näher als 2 bis 3 m herankamen,
wobei sie bei den Gefangenen keine Reaktionen aus-
lösten. Ich ging nun dazu über, an den Becken einen
aufklappbaren Deckel anzubringen, den ich, wenn
ein freilebender Zanclus in die Nähe kam, den Gefan-
genen durch Zug an einer Nylonschnur freisetzen
konnte. Wenn ich dies tat, schwamm der Freigelas-
sene sofort auf den Artgenossen zu. Fische, die man
in eine ihnen fremde Umgebung setzt, schließen
sich immer mit Artgenossen zu einer geschlossenen
Schar zusammen, das tun auch Arten, die normaler-
weise nie in Scharen schwimmen, sondern Reviere
bilden und solitär leben. Der Fremde [schwamm auf
den freien Zanclus] zu. Dieser wich vor dem viel grö-
ßeren Artgenossen und schwamm regelmäßig land-
einwärts, d.h. also dem Riff und seinem Revier zu.
Dort angekommen, machte er plötzlich kehrt und
griff den Eindringling heftig an und verjagte ihn
auch. Diese Folge von Verhaltensweisen wiederholte
sich bei jeder Wiederholung meines Versuches, nur
wurde der zweite und der dritte freigelassene  Zanclus
nicht nur von einem, sondern gleichzeitig von zwei
kleinen Zanclus angegriffen, der 4. gar von dreien.
Das mir erstaunliche war, daß die kleinen, offen-
sichtlich revierbesitzenden Fische bei höchster
Kampferregung nicht untereinander in Streit gerieten,
sondern im Getümmel immer nur den fremden, grö-
ßeren Artgenossen rammten, und nach seiner [Ver-
treibung] kampflos auseinandergingen. Dies scheint
meine Annahme einer individuellen Bekanntschaft
und eines gemeinsamen Revierbesitzes zu bestäti-
gen. Das 5. Versuchstier ließ ich [hier bricht der Text
ab].
Als ich in Altenberg ein Seaquarium von 4.4 m2
Bodenfläche und 1.5 m Wassertiefe zur Verfügung
hatte, versuchte ich, diese Annahme weiter zu prü-
fen. Ich erwarb im April 1976 kurz intereinander
einen großen und einen kleinen Zanclus (Gra und
Kla), die einander zunächst nicht beachteten. Beide
waren gut an Kunstfutter gewöhnt, als ich am 7. VI.
[?] 8 frisch importierte kleine 6 cm lange Zanclus
kaufte und sofort in das Becken setzte, in der
Annahme sie fänden im reichen Algenwuchs genü-
gend natürliche Nahrung. Gra beachtete die neuen
kleinen Zanclus so wenig wie Kla. Dieser griff aber
[dann] die Neuen pausenlos an und drängte sie in der
rechten vorderen Ecke des Beckens zusammen, wo sie
verschüchtert und z.T. nahe an der Oberfläche stan-
den. Am 8. VI. begannen zwei der Neuen ihrerseits
den Kla anzugreifen, ohne indessen je die anderen
Neuen, mit denen sie gezwungenermaßen eng bei-
sammen schwammen, je zu bekämpfen. Sie vertei-
digten also ein gemeinsames Revier gegen einen Ein-
zigen Gegner. Dieses Revier breitete sich ganz
langsam von der rechten lotrechten Kante des Bek-
kens entlang der unteren Vorder-und rechten Seiten-
kante des Bekkens aus. Obwohl gerade zu dieser Zeit
ein Copepode [Spaltfußkrebs] der Gattung Thisbe im
Becken auftrat, wurden die neuen 8 Zanclus schnell
magerer, einer starb am 13. VI., ein weiterer am 17.
VI. Am gleichen Tag kam es zum höchst intensiven
Kampf zwischen dem schneidigsten Neuen (Zef) und
Kla, Zef floh danach zwar in die rechte vordere Kante,
Kla wagte es zum erstenmal nicht, ihm dorthin zu
folgen. Das Revier der 6 Neuen wurde von jetzt ab
“anerkannt”. Gleichzeitig aber begannen die gegen-
einander zu kämpfen. Am 26. VI. hatten sie feste
Reviergrenzen gegeneinander festgelegt, diejenigen,
die am schlechtesten dabei wegkamen, starben bald
Hungers, da sie immer noch kein schwebendes
Ersatzfutter annahmen. Ihre Reviere funktionierten
also als echte Nahrungsterritorien. Am 27. VI. griff
einer der Neuen den großen Kla an, der vorher von
den kleineren so wenig beachtet wurde, wie diese von
ihm. Von den Territorien der Neuen, von denen am
28. VI. noch 3, darunter ein Todeskandidat am Leben
waren, breitete sich das von Zef weiter und weiter aus,
gleichzeitig mehrten sich seine Kämpfe mit den
wenigen überlebenden zugleich mit ihm angekom-
menen Zanclus. Einem am 29. VI. hinzugesetzter wei-
terer Zanclus (Neu) gelang es, wohl weil die meisten
seiner Gegner mager und schwach waren, ein Revier
in der rechten vorderen Ecke zu besetzen. Er wurde
also in dieselbe Richtung gedrängt, in die seinerzeit
der ansässige Kla die Neuankömmlinge verdrängt
hatte. Kla, der ältestansässige Fisch war gegen Neu
deutlich aggressiver [als gegen andere]. Am gleichen
Tag wurde erstmalig gesehen, daß Kla und Zef fried-
lich miteinander schwammen. “Schooling” ist am
besten mit Scharschwimmen zu übersetzen und
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danach zu definieren, daß mindestens 2 Individuen
durch Rektionen aufeinander zusammengehalten
werden. Die Aggressivität zwischen Kla und Zef
nahm in den folgenden Tagen rasch ab. 
Drei Karten der Reviere vom 3., 8., 15. und 22. VII.
1976. [nicht abgebildet]
Am 23. VII. starb einer der 3 noch überlebenden
Neuen, einer verlor sein Revier aus dem Grund und
nur der erst am 22. hinzugesetzte Fisch konnte ein
in der rechten unteren Raumecke liegendes Revier
gegen das Andrängen von Kla und Zef halten. Diese
beiden hielten nun immer mehr zusammen, jeder
drang immer öfter ungestraft ins Revier des anderen
ein. Wenn sie aneinandergerieten fand dies immer
an der Grenze statt und nahm mehr und mehr die
Form ritualisierter Angriffe an: Der anschwimmende
Fisch drehte in runder Kurve aus dem “Kollisions-
kurs” ab, schon mehrere cm ehe er an den anderen
herangekommen war. Das betonte Abwenden aus
der auf den Partner gerichteten Geraden ist eine
Befriedungsgeste, die analog bei vielen Tieren vor-
kommt, auch bei Säugern, zum Beispiel Rindern
(Zeeb[?]). Am 1. IX. verschwand Neu, der letzte, der
am 4. VIII. sein Territorium verloren hatte und nur
durch gezielte Fütterung aus einer in Oberflächen-
nähe aufgehängten Schale am Leben erhalten wor-
den war. [Er] verschwand spurlos (umgebracht, von
Krabben aufgefressen). Zef und Kla wurden gegen-
einander immer friedlicher, agonistisches Verhalten
milder Art wurde vom Partner meist durch die Befrie-
dungsgeste des Flachlegens beantwortet. 
Bis dahin hatte keiner der kleineren Zanclus dem
Großen (Gra) irgendwelche Beachtung geschenkt,
nicht mehr als irgend einem andersartigen Fisch.
Am 25. VII. griff Zef den Gra mitten im freien Was-
ser [an], dieser flunderte und floh widerstandslos in
Deckung. Ab 4. VIII. kam es zwischen Zef und Kla
nie mehr zu Revierkämpfen, kleine Angriffe, die
mitten im Revier des einen oder anderen vorkamen,
endeten immer mit Demutstellung des Angegriffe-
nen friedlich. In deutlicher Korrelation zur Hem-
mung agonistischen Verhaltens zwischen Zef und
Kla wurden beide gegen den größeren Zanclus Gra
aggressiv, und zwar am 11. und 12. VIII., als einige
andere Zanclus noch lebten. In der Interaktion zwi-
schen den beiden wurden Befriedunsgesten (beton-
tes Abwenden, flundern) immer häufiger, agonisti-
sches Verhalten seltener und weniger intensiv. Nur
a, 14. VIII. sah ich noch einmal einen bis zum
Rammstoßwechsel und Kreiseln intensiven Kampf
zwischen den beiden, nach welchem sich Zef, dann
aber beide auf Gra stürzten. Bei den folgenden
Angriffen auf den größeren Fisch war immer noch
deutlich, daß Zef in der linken Beckenhälfte und Kla
in der rechten, also in ihren früheren Territorien
aggressiver waren. In der folgenden Woche wurde
Gra von den beiden dauernd umhergejagt, ohne
sich je zum Kampf zu stellen. Am 20. [VIII.] hatte er
Risse in der weichen Rücken-und Afterflosse,
Abends war er völlig zerfetzt. Am nächsten Tag
stellte er sich, in die Ecke getrieben zum Kampfe.
Bisher war nur von Säugetieren bekannt, daß sich
jemals der Unterdrückte dem artgleichen Unter-
drücker zu einem Verzweiflungskampf stellt, und
zwar von Wölfen (Zimen) und Hyänenhunden (van
Lavik). Am gleichen Tag sah ich zum ersten mal
eine besondere Form des ritualisierten Kampfes, die
allein Zanclus canescens zueigen ist, das sogenannte
Wettschwimmen. Die beiden Gegner schwimmen,
so schnell sie können, dicht nebeneinander her, im
freien Wasser wahrscheinlich sehr weit, in meinem
Becken in Kurven. W. Beebe beschrieb dieses Ver-
halten, indem er sagte, die Fische schwenken so
gleichzeitig, als ob sie nur ein Zanclus wären. Auch
beim Schnellschwimmen ist die Brustflosse das fast
einzige Lokomotionsorgan, die Caudale bleibt wie
alle anderen Flossen gefaltet. Nur in scharfen Kur-
ven, in denen der äußere Fisch den weiteren Weg
zu drchmessen hat, benutzt [er] manchmal sekun-
denlang die Schwanzflosse. Der Wettstreit wird
dadurch beendet, daß der Unterlegene, d.h. früher
Ermüdete [aufgibt]. An diesem Wettschwimmen
waren 3 Zanclus beteiligt, da Kla ebenso wie Zef mit-
schwammen. Da Gra kein von den beiden anderen
respektiertes Revier besaß—bis dahin hatte es zwi-
schen ihm und den Kleineren keine territorialen
Auseinandersetzungen gegeben—wurde er mit-
leidslos weiter verfolgt und war am Abend völlig
zerzaust, alle Flossenhäute der weichen Rücken-
und Afterflossen waren zerrissen. Da wendete sich
plötzlich Gra zum Gegenangriff, um 18 20 sah ich
ihn erstmals Zef ernstlich und mit Erfolg rammen.
Am 21. [VII.] besiegte er Zef und schon am Abend
dieses Tages waren seine zerkämmten Flossen teil-
weise geheilt. Am 23. VII. wurde er zwar noch gele-
gentlich von den beiden Kleinen gejagt, kehrte aber
regelmäßig plötzlich um und griff seinerseits an.
Am 24. [VII.] floh er nicht mehr, sondern stellte sich
dem Angriff Zefs durch Breitseits-Imponieren. Von
da ab verfolgte Gra die beiden Kleineren fast pau-
senlos, im Laufe des VIII. war Kla verschwunden,
am 17. IX. fehlte auch Zef, der zwar von den dau-
ernden Verfolgungen etwas mager, aber sonst
gesund war, offenbar von Gra getötet (Das Töten
eines Artgenossen geht bei Zanclus sehr schnell,
nachdem einmal die Flossen eines Unterlegenen bis
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zur Behinderung der Flucht zerschlissen sind.
Regelmäßig reißt der Sieger dann die Branchioste-
galhaut auf, sodaß das Atmen des Opfers behindert
wird). Gra starb am 9. XII. 1976 unter zentralnervö-
sen Symptomen, er zeigte am Tage Nachtfärbung
und wurde blind.
Die obigen Beobachtungen regen zwar interes-
sante Vermutungen an, verlieren jedoch dadurch an
Wert, daß alle beteiligten Fische nicht ganz gesund
waren.
Erst am 18. I. 1977 konnte ich 5 sehr kleine, offe-
nichtlich eben erst aus dem Acronurus[Larven]-Sta-
dium metamorphosierte Zanclus kaufen. Alle trugen
noch den larvalen Präoperculardorn. Ich setzte sie
einzeln, mit anderen Fischen vergesellschaftet, in
große, alteingereichtete, veralgte Becken und bot
ihnen an weißen Porzellanschalen angetrocknetes
Mischfutter (Muschel-, Tintenfisch- und Krebs-
fleisch, vermischt mit Tetramin Trockenfutter) an.
Alle 5 sind heute, 10. II. 1979 gesund und am Leben.
Sie waren an Verschiedenheiten der Rückenflosse
gut kenntlich [und werden als] Gl, Ba, Kn, Ku und Fr
[bezeichnet]. Als sie verläßlich Ersatzfutter, auch
freischwebendes annahmen, setzte ich sie alle
zugleich am 6. II. 1977 [ein]. Gleich nach dem Ein-
setzen schammen alle 5 in dicht geschlossener Schar
umher. Um 18 00 kam es zum ersten Wettschwimm-
Duell zwischen Gl und Fr. Gl ist bei weiten am
aggressivsten. Danach Ba gegen Fr. Am 7. II. Vormit-
tags [ist es] friedlich, nachmittags mehrmals regel-
lose Kämpfe, Gl ist der Stärkste, Ku der am wenigsten
Aggressive. Um 17 35 langes Wettschwimmn zwi-
schen Gl und Fr, kurz darauf zwischen Ba und Fr,
dann auswegsuchendes Auf-und Abschwimmen an
der Vorderscheibe. Am 8. II. sind Gl und Fr oft
zugleich im Hintergrund des Beckens, kommen
manchmals nach vorn und greifen dann die vorn
schwimmenden heftig an. Um 18 00 nimmt Ku in
der rechten Vorderecke bodennahe Stellung, ver-
treibt Fr. Um 18 10 [findet sich] Gl an derselben
Stelle. Er zeigt dabei den grauen Schläfenstrich, der
defensive Kampfbereitschaft bedeutet. Etwas später
schwimmt Fr aus der rechten hinteren Ecke kom-
mend, gerade auf Gl, der frei mitten im Becken steht
zu, wendet dicht vor ihm und geht zurück nach
rechts hinten. Aus dieser betonten Abwendung ist
bei Zanclus die wichtigste Befriedungs-Gebärde
geworden. Die Ritualisierung beteht nur in der Bin-
dung dreier Bewegungselemente zu einer Einheit, in
einer Intensivierung des Zuschwimmens auf den
Partner, in der Plötzlichkeit des Abbremsens und
dem sofortigen Übergang in eine elegante, bogenför-
mige Abwendung. Beim “unritualisierten Vorbild”
wüde auf ein so heftiges Hinschwimmen zu einem
Artgenossen unbedingt ein Rammstoß folgen. Das
noch nicht ritualisierte Abwenden vom Gegner
geschieht fast nur an der Reviergrenze. Befriedungs-
geste und unritulisiertes Vorbild sind durch alle
denkbaren Übergänge miteinander verbunden.
Am 8. II. [sind] Gl und Fr oft allein im Hinter-
grund, beide bedrängen die drei anderen an die
Vorderscheibe gedrängten. Im Laufe des Tages
[ver]teilen sich nach einigen Grenzkämpfen Gl und
Ba in die linke und rechte Hälte des Beckens. Um 18
00 stellt sich Kuna erstmalig mit grauer Schläfe
(Defensiv-Färbung) dem Angriff Gls, es kommt zum
Kreiseln (gegenseitiges Rammen), wonach Gl
weicht, kurz darauf dasselbe [wieder]. Gegen Abend
kommen Gl und Fr nicht mehr an die Vorder-
scheibe, [um] 18 45 [ein] echter Grenzkampf zwi-
schen Kuna und Fris. [Um] 18 55 Wettschwimmen
[zwischen] Gl und Fr, wonach sich Fr ganz in die
rechte hintere Ecke, Gl an die linke Wand begibt. Fr
steht meist im rechten hinteren Winkel, obwohl
ihn niemand dorthin gedrängt hat. Die Wahl eines
Platzes, der als Zentrum des Reviers fungiert und
den wir mit G. Allen als Focus bezeichnen, ist für
Zanclus typisch. Abb.[1] zeigt die Reviere abends
[am] 8. II. Kn hatte sich bis dahin nicht verteidigt.
Während der nächsten Tage waren die 3 nach vorne
gedrängten Zanclus auffallend tolerant gegen [?], in
dem Maße aber, in dem Gl und Fr an einer bestimm-
ten Grenze halt machten, begannen sie untereinan-
der zu kämpfen. Ba drängte zunächst Kuna in die
rechte Ecke und dehnte sein Revier nach hinten
gegen Fr aus, Kn kam an schlechtesten weg und
verteidigte ein Revier mit 3 Fronten (siehe Abb. [1]).
Bajo drängte Knopf von links her gegen die Wand,
diese aber wird von Kuna verteidigt. Am 11. [II.]
wird Kn aus diesem ungünstigen Revier vertrieben
und im ganzen Becken umhergehetzt. Dabei gehen
die einzelnen Zanclus nicht aus ihrem Revier her-
aus, achten aber an der Grenze darauf, daß der
Flüchtling aus dem Revier des Nachbarn nicht in
das ihre getrieben wird. Schließlich geht Kn in Dek-
kung hinter einer die linke hintere Kante abschir-
mende Styroporkulisse. Zwischen deren Rand und
der Hinterwand ist nur ein schmaler Spalt, den Kn
hinfort gegen Gl verteidigt. Dieser “patroulliert”
fortan wachsam vor diesem Ausgang und erlaubt
nicht, daß Kn hervorkommt. Dieser wird hinter der
Kulisse gefüttert, am 14. III. wagt er sich in extremer
Defensiv-Färbung zur Fütterung kurz aus der Spalte,
in der er sofort wieder verschwindet. Am 19. III. sah
ich Gl am unteren Vorderrand der Kulisse drohen
und schloß daraus, daß dort ein Loch entstanden
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sei, aus dem Knopf seinerseits heraus drohte. Im
nächsten Augenblick schoß dieser aus dem Loch
heraus, griff Gl intensiv an, nach heftigem Kreiseln
floh er, aber nicht ins Loch zurück, sondern um den
Hinterrand der Kulisse herum in die gewohnte
Spalte. Gl patroulliert fortan abwechselnd vor dem
Loch und der Spalte. [Am] 28. III. greift Kn hinter
der Kulisse heraus Gl an. Von da an wurde Kn nicht
mehr hinter der linken Eck-Kulisse gefüttert, [am]
30. III. greift Kn den Gl aktiv an.
Die vom 10. III. wiedergegebene Geographie der
Territorien bleibt in groben Zügen bis 22. III. erhal-
ten, nur Kuna wird allmählich an an die rechte
Wand gedrängt, sodaß Bajos Revier nunmehr
unmittelbar an das von Fris grenzt. Später wird Kuna,
der auch im Wachstum zurückbleibt, langsam der
Wand entlang in die rechte hintere Ecke und von da
hinter einen Felsaufbau gedrängt, der sich vor der
Mitte der Hinterwand erhebt. Fortan hält er sich mit
knapper Not, wie aus der nunmehr dauernd getrage-
nen Defensiv-Färbung mit grauen Schläfen hervor-
geht. Am 22. III. wird die Reviergrenze zwischen
Glubsch und Fris aufgehoben. Schon seit einigen
Tagen hatten die Begegnungen an der Reviergrenze
mehr und mehr die schon beschriebene Form der
Befriedungsgeste mit bogenförmiger, betonter
Abwendun angenommen, doch hatte es zwischen
ihnen noch ein Duell mit Kreiseln und ernsten
Rammstößen gegeben, danach aber nie mehr (???
Protokolle genau durchschauen [Anm. LORENZ]).
Wenn einer schnell auf den anderen zuschwimmt,
stellt sich dieser quer und imponiert breitseits, wor-
auf der Ankommende mit betont scharfer Kurve
abbiegt. Diese Zeremonie, früher nur für die Begeg-
nungen an der Grenze angewendet, wurde allmäh-
lich ort-unabhängig und die Fische begrüßten ein-
ander in dieser Weise wann und wo immer sie
zufällig aufeinander trafen.
Im Lichte diese Nichtangriffspaktes erscheinen
einige frühere Beobachtungen erwähnenswert. Wie
die Revierdiagramme zeigen, hatten Gl und Fr schon
durch lange Zeit die längste gemeinsame Grenze.
Dementsprechend sind in der Zeit vom 9. II.—dem
Tag nach dem Einsetzen der Jungfische—bis zum 22.
III. mehr Kämpfe zwischen Gl und Fr verzeichnet, als
zwischen irgendwelchen anderen Individuen.
Schon am 13. II. hatten Ku, Kn und Ba allerseits
“anerkannte” Reviere und damit schwand auch die
verhältnismäßige Verträglichkeit von Gl und Fr.
Schon am 11. II. weideten Gl und Fr manchmal fried-
lich nebeneinander an ihrer späteren Reviergrenze.
Ihre Kampf-Schwelle. [diese] Distanz ab der sie ein-
ander angriffen, war deutlich kleiner, als die allen
anderen Zanclus gegenüber. Andererseits waren die
3 anderen, solange sie gemeinsam ins rechte vordere
Eck gedrängt waren, gegeneinander toleranter als
gegen die beiden Besitzer der großen hinteren Terri-
torien. Im Diagramm vom 13. II. geben die Pfeile die
Richtung auf den jeweils passiv angegriffenen an.
Ihre Zahl entspricht (mit geringen Fehlern) derjeni-
gen der von 18 bis 19 Uhr protokollierten Angriffe,
mit Ausnahme derjenigen zwischen Gl und Fr, die
zu schnell aufeinanderfolgten, um zählbar zu sein.
In der gößeren Zahl der Fälle war Gl der Angreifer.
Man beachte auch die Zahl seiner Angriffe auf den
meist unsichtbar hinter der Kulisse in der rechten
hinteren Ecke stehenden Knopf, ebenso die geringe
Zahl der Angriffe von Gl und Fr gegen Ba und die
verhältnismäßig große Zahl der Auseinandersetzun-
gen zwischen Ba und Ku. (Vom Standpunkt des auf-
geschobenen Handelns (“delayed response”). Ku
wird von Bajo mehr und mehr nach hinten
gedrängt, Fris ist weniger aggressiv gegen Ku und Ba.
m 19. II. schien es, als ob Fris und Kuna friedlich
miteinander die rechte hintere Ecke bewohnten, sie
schwammen oft reaktionslos dicht nebeneinander,
doch schon am 20. griff der größere Fris den Kuna
wütend an und er verschwand hinter der rechten
hinteren Kulisse. Knopf und Kuna sind von nun ab
kaum mehr zu sehen, man entnimmt ihr Vorhan-
densein nur daraus, daß Fris von Zeit zu Zeit hinter
die rechten hinteren Kulisse droht, Glu dagegen hin-
ter die linke. Beide bleiben mehr und mehr im
Wachstum zurück. Knopf kann hinter der linken
hinteren Kulisse gefüttert werden, das Revier Kunas
ist schwer zugänglich. Er wird von Fris allmählich
aus der rechten hinteren Ecke verdrängt und wohnt
nun in der Deckung hinter einigen großen Felsblök-
ken in der Mitte der Hinterwand—was nur aus den
Angriffen und dem Drohen von Fris geschlossen
werden kann. Von Friedlichkeit zwischen Glu und
Fris kann schon lange keine Rede sein, besonders
nahe der Hinterwand geraten sie wiederholt in hef-
tigen Kreiselkämpfen aneinander, während bei
ihrem Zusammentreffen nahe der Vorderscheibe
immer nur die Reviergrenz-Zeremonie verzeichnet
wird. Die Reviergrenzen bleiben bis 1. III. unverän-
dert.
Am 2. III. geht um 17 Uhr zufällig das Licht aus
und bald darauf schwimmen alle 5 Zanclus in dicht
geschlossener “anonymer” Schar, es wird deutlich,
wie sehr Knopf und Kuna im Wachstum zurückge-
blieben sind. Als das Licht wieder angeht, beginnen
beide gierig Algen zu weiden, sie haben ja, in ihre
Höhlen gebannt, nur Kunstfutter bekommen. Nach
5 Minuten beginnt Bajo erst den Kuna, dann den
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Knopf und dann den Glu anzugreifen. Kuna flieht
anstatt in sein Versteck, unorientiert gegen die Vor-
derscheibe und bekommt ein paar Rammstöße von
Ba, ehe er sich hinter die Felsen Mitte hinten zurück-
zieht. Die drei dominanten Fische schwimmen
danach noch einige Zeit im Schwarm, gehen zwi-
schendurch in ihr Revier zurück, um sich dann
nochmals zusammenzufinden. Das Scharschwim-
men (schooling) im Dämmerlicht ist eine regelmä-
ßige Erscheinung. Es kann ebenso durch grobe Ver-
änderungen im Becken, wie Einführen einer neuen
Dekoration oder Hineinspringen eines Menschen
verursacht werden. Um 1910 ist das normale Revier-
verhalten wiederhergestellt. 
8. III. Sowohl Banjo wie Fris haben ihr Revier auf
Kosten von Glu merklich erweitert. Kuna ist etwas
mutiger geworden und wird manchmal im freien
Wasser oberhalb seines Verstecks futtersuchend
gesehen, meist aber sofort von Glu oder Fris oder
beiden zurückgejagt. In diesem Fall geraten die bei-
den oft lotrecht über dem kleinen Revier von Kuna
aneinander.  
13. III. Glu ist deutlich aggressiver gegen Kuna, der
jetzt fast dauernd oberhalb seines Verstecks frei im
Wasser steht. Meist ist er defensiv gefärbt. Einmal,
als Fris ihm in sein Versteck zu folgen wagt, kommt
es doch zum Kreiseln. Fris und Glu wechseln darin
ab, Ku zum Verharren in seinem Versteck zu zwin-
gen, wobei Glu aber mehr Zeit damit verbringt, den
Knopf am Hervorkommen hinter der linken Eck-
Kulisse zu verhindern. Dabei hat er zwei Stellen zu
bewachen, nämlich den die ganze Beckenhöhe ein-
nehmenden Spalt zwischen Kulisse und Hinter-
wand, und zweitens das schon erwähnte Loch.
   Am 20. III. 17 30 stößt Glu 3 mal hintereinan-
der in das Loch hinein, auf den dem Beobachter
unsichtbaren Kn. [Um] 18 00 stößt dieser im wil-
den Angriff aus seinem Loch hervor auf Glu und
flieht erst nach intensivem Kreiseln, nicht ins Loch
zurück, sondern nach außen um die Kulisse herum
in den Spalt an der Hinterwand. Dies wiederholt
sich, Knopf schießt in Defensivfärbung aus dem
Loch und flieht nach kurzem Angriff auf Glu in die
Spalte. [Um] 18 35 schalte ich wieder das Licht aus
und nach einigen Minuten wieder an. Alle 5 Zan-
clus schwimmen in dichter Schar. Als es wieder hell
wird, begibt sich Knopf ohne angegriffen worden
zu sein in sein Revier, Bajo greift als erster die ande-
ren an, als die Schar nahe der Vorderscheibe in
seinem Revier ist. Dann kommt Knopf noch ein-
mal hervor und es setzt einen intensiven Kreisel-
kampf zwischen ihm und Glu. Am nächsten Tag ist
Knopf unsichtbar, Glu droht mehrmals ins Loch.
Dagegen ist Kuna oft sichtbar, kämpft einmal mit
Fris.
22. III. 1977 haben Glu und Fris die Grenze zwi-
schen ihren Revieren aufgelöst. Noch Tage vorher
gab es einen Kreiselkampf, also immerhin eine
hochintensive agonistische Auseinandersetzung
zwischen ihnen, wiewohl im Allgemeinen ihre
Begegnungen mehr und mehr zur Befriedungsge-
ste wurden, die allerdings bisher nur an ihrer
Gebietsgrenze ausgeführt wurde. Nun aber ist diese
Zermonie vom Ort unabhängig geworden, wo
immer sich beide begegnen, schießt einer—meist
Glu—scharf auf den anderen zu, der sich dann
querstellt und breitseit imponiert, worauf der Her-
anschwimmende in überbetontem scharfem
Bogen abwendet. Keinerlei Unterwürfigkeitsge-
sten, wie sie bei nahezu allen anderen mir bekann-
ten Percomorphen (Cichliden, Grammiden,
Pomacentriden, Pomacanthiden u.a.) in homolo-
ger Weise vorkommen. Nach einem solchen
Zusammentreffen bleiben beide dicht beisammen
und weiden häufig. Weiden als ritualisierte Über-
sprungbewegung wirkt bei grasfressenden Säuge-
tieren nicht selten als Befriedungsgeste, so nach
Walter bei…
Nach der Fusion der Reviere wurden Glu und Fris
paradoxerweise weniger aggressiv als die drei ande-
ren. Kuna kommt nun viel weiter aus seinem Ver-
steck hervor und weidet ruhig an der Vorderseite
seiner bisherigen Deckung. Bajo hat sein Revier
weiter nach links ausgedehnt. Das kam wahr-
scheinlich dadurch zustande, daß Bajo regelmäßig
den Fris angriff, wenn er ihn links vorne an einer
Stelle sah, an der er nur den Glu zu sehen gewohnt
war. Für diese Interpretation spricht, daß sowohl
Glu als auch Fris Bajo gegenüber deutlich ängstli-
cher waren, wenn sie sich just in dem Ihnen neuen,
bisher nur dem Partner gehörigen Revier befanden.
An den Grenzen, an denen sie schon seit langem
dem Bajo gegenüberstanden waren sie viel mutiger
ihm gegenüber.
Am 23. III. schwamm nach einem kurzen Grenz-
Geplänkel mit den beiden anderen Bajo in eigen-
tümlich schlängelnder Bahn ins Revier der beiden
anderen, die ihm nichts tun und alle 3 schwimmen
in dichter Schar bis an die Hinterwand, wo sie dann
plötzlich doch zu raufen beginnen. Dieses Schlän-
gelschwimmen wurde später oft gesehen, es steckt
an und führt dazu, daß plötzlich alle anwesenden
Zanclus in einem dicht gedrängten Haufen durch-
einanderwimmeln. Die Teleonomie [die Funktion]
dieser sehr eindrucksvollen Verhaltensweise ist
unklar.
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Am 25. III. vollführten Glu und Fri zusammen
eine Folge von Bewegungsweisen, die bei Cichliden
[Buntbarschen] die des Ablaichens sind. Es wird
zuerst ein Stein mit schabenden Bissen gereinigt,
dann streichen die Fische mit angehobenem
Schwanz und nach unten gedrückter Genitalregion
über die geputzte Stelle, wobei das Weibchen Eier
ablegt, das Männchen diese befruchtet. Häufig voll-
führen Zanclus die Bewegungsfolge vor dem Ablai-
chen “leer” = Scheinablaichen. J. und G. BAERENDS,
die diese Bewegungsweise als erste beschrieben,
nannten sie “skimming”. Laich wurde von den Zan-
clus dabei nicht produziert, oft vollführte nach dem
Steinputzen nur einer der beiden Bewegungen. Am
27. III. sah ich Glu und Fris noch einmal scheinab-
laichen, und zwar an genau derselben Stelle. Diese
Beobachtung bestärkte mich in dem irrigen Glau-
ben, daß die Zeremonie zur Paarbildung gehöre,
doch sah ich sie am 31. III. von Glu mit Bajo, und
das war an dem Tag, an dem Glu und Fri die Revier-
grenze gegen Bajo auflösten und diesen fortan im
gemeinsamen Revier duldeten.
Am 14. IV. sah ich noch einmal Glu und Fri die-
selben wenigen Quadratzentimeter Stein putzen,
während Bajo aufmerksam danebenstand, worauf
dann dieser die Scheinablaichbewegung vollführte.
15. III. Bajo mit Fris, nachdem sie gleichen Tags [?].
25, 26. V. noamoi [noch einmal] Fris mit Bajo.
Die 3 großen Zanclus waren ab 31. III. untereinan-
der recht friedlich, bei gelegentlichen kleinen Reibe-
reien dominierte vorraussagegmäß immer derjenige,
in dessen früheren Revier sie stattfand. Sehr unter-
schiedlich aber war das Verhalten der 3 zu den bei-
den “Außenseitern”, die inzwischen im Wachstum
noch mehr hinter den [anderen] dreien zurückge-
blieben waren. Knopf, der in dem dreieckigen Raum
hinter seiner Kulisse (s. Abb. [1]) ein abgesondertes
Leben führt, wurde nach wie vor von allen dreien
angegriffen, sowie er sich hervorwagte. Ich sehe ihn
immer nur sekundenlang, wenn er seinerseits auf
einen der 3 Großen vorstößt, um sofort wieder in
seiner Spalte zu verschwinden. Mit Kuna hat Knopf
zu dieser Zeit keine gemeinsame Grenze!
Schon am 26. III. floh Kuna vor Glu auf viel grö-
ßerem Abstand als vor Fris, am 27. kam es zwar noch
zu einem kurzen Kreselkampf, als Fris ganz in Kunas
Gebiet engedrungen war, am gleichen Tag etwas spä-
ter auch zu den ersten deutlichen Befriedungsgebär-
den zwischen diesen Beiden an der Reviergrenze.
Kunas Revier dehnt sich unter dem verminderten
Außendruck allmählich aus. Die Grenzen werden
jetzt auch von Glu respektiert, mit Fris tauscht Kuna
wiederholt an der Grenze Befriedungsgebärden aus,
beide auch dicht nebeneinander und Fris geht oft
unangefochten tief in Kunas Revier. Auch Glu ist
etwas duldsamer gegen Kuna, nicht aber gegen
Knopf.
Bajo, der oft unangefochten in das bisher nur Glu
und Fris gehörige Revier einschwimmt, ist dennoch
gegen die beiden anderen etwas aggressiv, wenn sie
ihrerseits in sein Revier kommen, immerhin tauscht
er im eigenen Gebiet mit Fris Befriedungsgebärden
aus, wonach sie um 17 15 an derselben Stelle schein-
ablaichen wie Glu und Fris am 25. III. und 27. III.,
also tief im früheren Revier von Glubsch. Am 5. IV.
und 6. IV., 14. IV Bajo mit Fris, 26. IV. nochmals
Scheinablaichen Fris mit Glu an gleicher Stelle.
30. III. Knopf wird mutiger und greift, in Defen-
sivfärbung mit grauen Schläfen, aber intensivst den
Glubsch an. Am gleichen Tag um 18 25 greifen Fris
und Glu rechts hinter Deckung an, gleich darauf in
gleicher Richtung Kuna und aus der Deckung in der
in der rechten hinteren Ecke, kommt Knopf heraus-
geschossen, den ich in dieser Gegend nie vorher sah.
Knopf verteidigt etwas später seinen neuen Revier-
besitz, hat also jetzt zwei Reviere, zwischen denen
etwa 3 m Feindesland liegen. Glu vertreibt Kno, der
flieht in sein früheres Revier links hinten, Kuna greift
ihn an und er flieht nach rechts hinten oben. Kuna
trachtet, sich friedlich an die 3 Dominanten anzu-
schließen, wird aber stets von Glu vertrieben, Bajo
und Fris würden ihn dulden. Seinerseits war Kuna ab
31. III. sehr aggressiv gegen Knopf, sowie dieser sein
neues Revier rechts hinten oben bezog. Ab 1. IV.
patroulliert Kuna aber auch an der linken Kulisse,
manchmal sogar mit Glu, der ihm dann merkwürdi-
gerweise nichts tut. Am 4. IV. fällt mir erstmalig auf,
daß nicht nur Kuna den Fris in seinem Revier duldet,
sondern auch umgekehrt dieser ihn. Am 5. IV. hat
Glu das Loch in der linken Kulisse dauernd im Auge
und kommt von weither angebraust, wenn Knopf
auch nur den Kopf herausstreckt. Das Paroullieren
an der Grenze eines nur in langen Intervallen sicht-
baren Gegners ist ein bemerkenswertes Beispiel eines
sehr langdauernden “aufgeschobenen Handelns”
(delayed reaction). 
10. IV. Kuna weist wiederholt Glubsch zurück, der
in sein Revier einzudringen versucht. Befindet sich
Kuna aber weiter vorne, d.h. im Revier von Fris so
verschwindet er sofort, wenn Glu von weitem her-
ankommt.
13. IV. wird ein Kreiselduell zwischen Kuna und
Knopf protokolliert, mit der Erweiterung ihrer
Reviere kommen diese beiden Außenseiter erst jetzt
miteinander in Berührung. Am 14. langes intensives
Wettschwimmen zwischen Kuna und Knopf, das vor
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Knopfs Versteck endet, wo ihn Glu angreift und in
die Deckung treibt. 15. IV. Knopf kommt, von Glu
ungesehen aus seinem Loch und wird sofort von
Kuna angegriffen und zurückgetrieben. Glu “respek-
tiert” Kunas Revier, greift ihn auch selten an, wenn
er im Gebiet von Fris ist, wiewohl nie gesehen wurde,
daß Fris ihn etwa gegen Glu verteidigt hätte. Als am
16. IV. alle 4 friedlich in Fris Revier schwimmen,
droht Glu ins Loch, in dem er den Knopf sieht.
Am 18. IV. wird in der rechten vorderen Ecke des
Beckens eine Kiste aus PVC versenkt, die nach der
Mitte des Beckens zu eine Sichtscheibe hat und einen
kleinen Zanclus von der ungefähren Größe Knopfs
und Kunas enthält. Zu meinem Erstaunen reagiert
zunächst keiner der Zanclus auf den Neuen. Erst um
17 05 steht Kuna vor der Kiste, also mitten im Revier
Bajos. Dieser erlaubt Kuna, bis an die Vorderscheibe
zu kommen. Erst später bekommt Bajo graue Schlä-
fen (Defensiv-Färbung!) und greift Kuna an, der
Widerstand leistet und sich hinter der Kiste in der
rechten vorderen Ecke verschanzt. Bajo wird darauf
allmählich immer aggressiver gegen Kuna, treibt ihn
nach hinten und greift ihn schließlich in der rechten
hinteren Ecke, im Revier von Fris an, wo er ihn seit
vielen Tagen geduldet hatte. Bajo patroulliert nun
fast dauernd die rechte Wand, um zu verhindern,
daß Kuna nach vorne kommt. Dennoch kommt er
abends bis an die Vorderscheibe der Kiste und
tauscht mit dem Eingeschlossenen Drohgebärden
aus. Die drei großen Zanclus sind immer noch völlig
reaktionslos gegen die Kiste und ihren Inhalt. Erst
am 19. IV. wird Glu aggressiv gegen Kuna, den er an
ungewohnter Stelle sieht, noch dazu in Drohstel-
lung. Er vertreibt ihn immer wieder und reagiert nun
plötzlich stark auf den Eingeschlossenen, den er ja
in der Stellung des Breitseitsimponierens durch die
Klarscheibe zu sehen bekommt, und versucht diesen
zu rammen.
Kleindruck: Das lange Nicht-Reagieren auf einen
Artgenossen, der zwar in fester Umrahmung, aber
doch klar sichtbar im Revier eines sonst höchst
aggressiven Fisches steht, bedarf einer besonderen
Erklärung. Schon bei meinen Freilandversuchen (S.)
wunderte ich mich darüber. Der große individuelle
Unterschied ist merkwürdig. Bajo, in dessen Focus
die Kiste steht, reagiert überhaupt nicht, Kuna
kommt von weitem herbei und Glubsch reagiert erst,
als er diesseits der Scheibe Drohgebärden Kunas
sieht.
Im Laufe des 19. [IV.] wird Glubsch immer böser
gegen Kuna und trachtet ihn aus seinem neuerober-
ten Gebiet längs der rechten Wand zurück nach hin-
ten zu treiben. Dabei gerät er zunächst nicht mit Bajo
aneinander, der gleiches tut. Trotz der doppelten
Gegnerschaft versucht Kuna immer wieder an die
Sichtscheibe der Kiste zu gelangen, liefert sogar dort
ein Kreiselduell mit Bajo, in das Glu eingreift und
Kuna gründlich verjagt, Glu ist von nun an fast
ununterbrochen an der Kiste. Bajo, in dessen Revier-
focus sich das alles abspielt, wird allmählich aggres-
siver gegen Gl, der auf seinen ziemlich milden Vor-
stoß widerstandslos weicht. Dieser [Glu] ist aber weit
aggressiver geworden und liefert Bajo am 20. IV. 19
15 ein Kreiselduell, in dem Bajo schließlich Defen-
siv-Färbung (graue Schläfen) bekommt und weicht.
In der Folge greift Bajo nur Kuna an, der immer wie-
der längs der Wand von hinten heranschleicht. Nur
Glubsch reagiert intensiv auf den Eingesperrten und
richtet am 20. IV. Rammstöße gegen die Sicht-
scheibe. Kuna kommt immer wieder vor die Kiste
und rammt auch gegen die Sichtscheibe und als
Glubsch ihn angreift, wehr er sich und es kommt
mehrmals zu intensivsten Kreiselduellen, einmal
gelingt es Kuna den viel größeren Glub zu besiegen,
wohl nur deshalb, weil dieser dem Eingesperrten
mehr Beachtung [schenkt]. Glub “klebt” auch von
nun an an der Kiste, ist kaum je woanders als vor der
Sichtscheibe. Der Eingeschlossene ist nun genügend
eingewöhnt, um das Agonistische Verhalten der
aneren durch die Sichtscheibe hindurch zu erwi-
dern. 
Durch diese Geschehnisse bekommt Knopf genü-
gend Ruhe, um sich von seiner Einschüchterung zu
erholen. Am 20. IV. 18 35 stoßen Knopf und Kuna
an der Mitte der Hinterwand, also weit von der bis-
herigen Reviergrenze Knopfs aufeinander und es
setzt ein wildes Kreiseln, das in Wettschwimmen
ausklingt. Kuna reagiert von nun ab überhaupt
nicht mehr auf den in der Kiste Eingeschlossenen.
Er jagt dauernd Knopf, doch gelingt es ihm nicht,
diesen in seinem früheres Versteck hinter der
Kulisse im linken hinteren Eck zurückzudrängen.
Knopf bleibt dauernd sichtbar und das Jagen geht
immer öfters in echtes Wettschwimmen über. Am
21. IV. sehe ich zum ersten Mal die höchst intensive
Form des Kampfes bei Zanclus, das auf S.. beschrie-
bene [fehlt] Nasenkringeln und gegenseitige Sich-
Verbeißen. Am 22. IV. gibt es Vormittags noch meh-
rere Kreisel-und einige Nasenkringelkämpfe zwi-
schen Knopf und Kuna, Knopf geht nie mehr hinter
die Kulisse, sondern weidet mit Bajo und Fris vor
dieser im Freien, wobei diese ihm gegenüber zwar
etwas gespannt wirken, aber deutlich Friedensge-
sten andeuten. [Um] 18 40 (nach Akademiesitzung)
schwimmt Knopf völlig frei im gmeinsamen Revier
der 3 Großen, Kuna aber ist verschwunden, wie sich
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später herausstellt, schwer verletzt rechts hinten
unter Felsen versteckt.
Glu bekämpft in den nächsten Tagen buchstäb-
lich pausenlos den Eingeschlossenen. Knopf
gewinnt rasch an Mut und bewegt sich, nachdem er
geringe Widerstände seitens Bajos und Fris überwun-
den hat, frei im ganzen Becken. Knopf also ab 30. IV.
1977 Mitglied des Revierbesitzerkollektivs. Glu igno-
rier ihn völlig, bis am 23. IV. 1977, 11 20 Knopf sei-
nerseits den vor der Kiste patroullierenden Glu
angreift. Dann setzt es Kreiselkämpfe, in denen Glu
den Knopf zwar besiegt, aber nie weit vertreibt, da er
völlig auf den Eingeschlossenen konzentriert ist.
Bajo, der sonst erfahrungsgemäß viel weniger
aggressiv ist als Glu, verjagt den Knopf intensiver als
dieser, wohl weil die Kiste genau im Focus seines
Reviers steht. Knopf wird daraufhin äußerst angriffs-
lustig und es setzt zwischen 10 30 und 11 40 nicht
weniger als 17 ernste Kämpfe zwischn Knopf und
Glu. Bajo, in dessen Focus sich Glu bei Belagerung
des Eingesperrten ja befindet, greift Glu mehrmals
an. Dieser Zustand bleibt bis 30. IV. unverändert,
Bajo greift von Zeit zu Zeit Glu an, einmal tut das
auch Fris, da Glu auf den Eingesperrten konzentriert
ist, und die anderen auf ihn, der an ungewohnter
Stelle steht, kann Knopf völlig frei im ganzen Becken
umherstreifen. Am 1. IV. kämpft er nochmals heftig
mit Glu, der schließlich flieht und von Kno durchs
ganze Becken gejagt wird. Interessanterweise
betrachtet Glu jetzt den Platz vor seiner Kiste als sei-
nen Focus, zu dem er zurückflieht, wenn er geschla-
gen ist.
Am 3. V. ist Kuna plötzlich wieder sichtbar, mit
zerfetzten Rücken- After-und Schwanzflosse und nur
einem Auge. Er verbirgt sich alsbald wieder hinter
einem Gestrüpp veralgter Gorgonienskelette an der
rechten Beckenwand, später hinter der Styroporlei-
ste rechts oben. Daß der sich dauernd dort aufhält,
geht aus dem dorthin gerichteten Drohen Knopfs
hervor, der sich jetzt frei an der rechten Wand, nahe
dem Focus Bajos und auch nahe dem dauernd von
Glubsch eingenommenen Platz vor der Kiste. Kuna
gewinnt in den ersten Maitagen langsam an Raum,
Knopf bekommt graue Schläfen, wenn der hinter die
Deckung Kunas vordringt, d.h. er “erkennt das
Revier an, mit anderen Worten, er verhält sich ängst-
lich, als Fisch im fremden Revier. Einmal geraten Glu
und Knopf aneinander, als sie beide zugleich Kuna
angreifen wollen.
Am 7. V. wird der Zanclus aus der Kiste entlassen.
Wegen eines Knicks in der Dorsalis erhält er den
Namen Knick. Längere Zeit geschieht gar nichts,
dann Kreiseln Glu und Knick. Fris wird hellgrau und
geht wütend auf Knick los, dann Knopf, dann wieder
Glubsch, dann Bajo. Alle 4 jagen den Neuen,
zunächst ohne je aneinanderzugeraten. Der Ort, an
dem jeder angreift, steht in deutlicher Beziehung zu
seinem Focus. Die Angriffe auf Knick erreichen die
Intensität des Nasenkringelns, d.h. des ungehemm-
ten Zubeißens und Festhaltens. Um 16 30 ver-
schwindet Knick. Glu, Bajo, Fris und Knopf patroul-
lieren vor der Deckung in der er verschwand,
zwischendurch aber auch vor der Stelle, an der Kuna
verborgen sitzt, d.h. rechts oben an der Wand. Um
16 50 wurde Knick nochmals sichtbar, mit total zer-
fetzten, kurz abgebissenen Flossen. Er sah so hoff-
nungslos aus, daß ich versuchte, ihn herauszufan-
gen, dazu war er aber noch zu flink und zu gut
orientiert.
8. V. Es gelingt, Kuna an der rechten Wand zu
füttern, indem ich Futter an der algenbewachsenen
Wand verreibe. Kuna gewinnt so weit an Mut, daß
er sich unterhalb seiner nicht ganz bis zum Becken-
boden reichenden Deckung zeigt und sich sogar
dort in einem Kreiselduell gegen Glubsch behaup-
tet, später greift er von oben herab aus seiner Dek-
kung vorstoßend, einmal den Glubsch, einmal den
Bajo an. Gegen Abend paroulliert er offen die
Grenze seines neuen Kleinreviers, macht Ausfälle
bis zu 50 cm gegen Glubsch. Einmal stößt er gegen
Fris vor, stoppt dicht vor ihm und wendet in Befrie-
dungsgeste von ihm ab, gleich darauf saust er in
“Schwalbenstellung” [?] dicht an Fris vorbei gegen
Knopf vor, liefert mit diesem ein Kreiselduell und
kehrt dann nicht von Knopf verfolgt, in sein Revier
in der oberen rechten Ecke zurück. Die zahlreichen
Ausfälle, die Kuna in nächster Zeit aus seiner eige-
nen Deckung heraus macht, richten sich sämtlich
gegen Glubsch und noch intensiver gegen Knopf,
kein einziger gegen Fris. Er besiegt in Kreiselduellen
mehrmals Glu, der zur Zeit mindestens doppelt so
schwer ist und er vergrößert dabei sein Revier all-
mählich. Dieses wird von Glu und Knopf gemieden,
Fris darf hinein.
9. V. 1977. Hier Diskontinuum im Revierbesitz.
19 10 kommt Fris diagonal durchs ganze Becken
gerade auf Kuna los, der ruhig im Freien grast, hält
dicht vor ihm ruckartig an, wendet um 90% und
schwimmt ganz langsam weg. Kuna, der kurz vor-
her einen bösen Ausfall gegen Knopf gemacht
hatte, reagiert überhaupt nicht und grast weiter.
Kuna hat also am 9. V. abends ein Revier, das rechts
vorne vom Styroporwulst bis zum Boden reicht und
das von Glu und Knopf respektiert wird, während
Fris es unbestraft betreten darf. Beobachtungsun-
terbrechung (Grünau).
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Bis 16. V. hat sich dieses Gebiet längs der Vorder-
scheibe nach links um etwa 50 cm erweitert, Kuna
vertreibt aus dem neuerworbenen Gelände den Bajo,
obwohl dieser dort seinem Focus nahe ist. Knick ist
wieder sichtbar, er steht im Schatten es Überhangs
der rechten hinteren Kulisse, die die Ecke abschrägt.
Er ist dort nicht sehr auffällig, da er im Schatten
steht, er ist mutig genug, um sich durch den heran-
kommenden Knopf nicht in die Deckung (hinter der
Kulisse) treiben zu lassen, sondern liefert ihm ein
Kreiselduell. Er beherrscht während der nächsten
Zeit die Vorderseite der rechten Eckenkulisse, aber
nicht ganz bis zum Boden.
Es muß klar gemacht werden, daß zu dieser Zeit
Glubsch, Fris, Bajo und Knopf das ganze Becken bis
auf die Kleinreviere der Außenseiter Knick und Kuna
beherrschen, alle Kämpfe zwischen diesen 4 Domi-
nanten sind mehr oder weniger Focus-bezogen und
gehen ohne Folgen aus. Keiner von ihnen verteidigt
eine Grenze gegen einen anderen, dies tut nur Kuna
gegen Glubsch und Knopf, schon weniger gegen
Bajo und gar nicht mehr gegen den “befreundeten”
Fris. Es fällt auf, daß es die ganze Zeit nicht eine ago-
nistische Auseinandersetzung zwischen Glubsch
und Fris gegeben hat!
Am 18. V. von 18 14 bis 18 50 (Schluß der Beob-
achtung) nicht weniger als 18 Angriffe Knopfs auf
den in seinem Kleinrevier stehenden Kuna, arg
genug, um zum Kreiseln zu führen. Kuna wird von
dem deutlich stärkeren Knopf allmählich weiter und
weiter in sein Revier rechts oben im Eck zurückge-
drängt, kommt allerdings, sowie Knopf sich
anschickt, wegzuschwimmen, wieder hervorge-
schossen und verfolgt ihn. Knopf greift dauernd mit
delayed response den unsichtbaren Kuna an, nicht
aber den vor der rechten hinteren Kulisse sichtbaren
Knick.
Im Laufe der nächsten Tage kommt Kuna immer
weiter aus seiner Ecke heraus. Auch Knick wird all-
mählich weniger bekämpft, anstelle von Rammstö-
ßen und Kreiseln sieht man mehr und mehr Breit-
seitsimponieren und Schwanzschlag. 26. V. 1977. 19
10 weidet Kuna friedlich dicht bei den 4 dominanten
Zanclus am Boden, macht hintereinander eine
betont friedliche Abwendung vor Knopf, anschlie-
ßend eine etwas ängstliche vor Bajo. Etwas später
schwimmt Fris ungehemmt ins Revier von Knick,
der kommt ihm entgegen und wendet betont fried-
lich ab (ev. Kleindruck). Knick ist aber noch nicht
ganz Mitglied der revierbesitzenden Gruppe, denn
am 19. V. um 17 50 bekämpft er, wenn auch wenig
intensiv den Knopf an dessen früherer Grenze und
treibt etwas später auch die 3 Großen von seinem
Focus Mitte der Hinterwand. Später sind alle 4 bei
Kuna in dessen Revier. Kuna macht qualitativ und
quantitativ verschiedene Bewegungen gegen Knopf
und gegen Fris. Gegen ersteren vollführt er eine
Superposition von Scheinrammstoß und Abwen-
den, gegen Fris typisch befriedende Abwendungen.
Noch am 22. V. verteidigt Knick sein Gebiet gegen
die 4 anderen, richtet seine Angriffe besonders gegen
Knopf, doch werden bald auch halb-freundliche
Abwendungen Kuna vor Knopf verzeichnet. Am
gleichen Tag geraten Kuna und Knick in der Mitte
der rechten Wand zum erstenmal aneinander und
bekämpfen einander wütend, Kreiseln. Da beide ihre
Reviere allmählich ausdehnen, wird die Grenze zwi-
schen beiden länger. Knicks Revier reicht nun vom
oberen Teil der rechten hinteren Ecke bis zum
Boden. Zwischen diesen beiden Fischen kommt es zu
einer Form der Auseinandersetzung, die ich bisher
nicht gesehen hatte. Sie stehen fast 1 m voneinander
entfernt und vollführen abwechselnd scharfe Vor-
stöße gegeneinander, ohne sich dabei je näher als 20
cm zu kommen. Offensichtlich ein Konflikt aus
hoher aggressiver Motivation und ebenso hoher
Furcht [=Fluchtbeitschaft]. Ein solches Hin-und-Her
wiederholen die beiden in der Folge oft, am 26. V.
kommt es zwischen ihnen zu einem sehr intensiven
Kreiselduell, an das sich beidseitiger Rückzug mit
Hin-Her anschließt. Von den Kollektivbesitzern darf
nur Fris in das Revier Kunas eindringen und wird
dort mit Abwendung “begrüßt”. Gegen Glu und Bajo
ist er zurückhaltender, doch kann es vorkommen,
daß Kuna dicht an einem der neben ihm stehenden
Großen vorüberschwimmend, den Knopf angreift.
Die Grenzauseinandersetzungen Kuna—Knick dau-
ern an. Knick dehnt sein Revier an die Hinterwand
aus, 18 45 vollführt er ein Vorstoß-Wende-Duell aus
dem “Tunnel” heraus mit dem von vorne angreifen-
den Knopf. Fris schwimmt ungehindert in Knicks
Revier rechts hinten, dieser kommt ihm entgegen
und wendet ab, stößt aber unmittelbar darauf
wütend auf den von ferne links sich nähernden
Knopf.
27. V. Knick darf sich in der hinteren Beckenhälfte
frei bewegen, wird also von Glubsch und Fris tole-
riert, nur als er ganz nach vorne, in den Focus von
Bajo kam, trieb ihn dieser ziemlich milde fort. Mit-
tags schwimmen alle 3 unangefochten in Knicks
Revier rechts hinten, an der Grenze zu Kuna tritt ihm
dieser entgegen, es bleibt aber bei friedlicher Abwen-
dung und Rückzug beider in ihre Reviere. Etwas spä-
ter Bogenschwimmen beider an der gleichen
Grenze, beide mit grauen Schläfen (defensiv!). 12 00
Bajo und Fries Scheinablaichen an genau derselben
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Stelle wie […]. 12 45 Fries schwimmt im freien Was-
ser auf Knick zu, der spreizt breitseits [imponieren].
Fris wendet ab, gleich darauf ebenso friedlich enden-
des Breitseitsimponieren zwischen Knick und Kuna
an der Reviergrenze. Abends, 18 Uhr schwimmen
alle 6 Zanclus friedlich an der Vorderscheibe. Dies ist
eine Scharbildung, die immer dann erfolgt, wenn die
Fische weg wollen. Die Vorderscheibe mit dem dunk-
len Beobachtungsraum wirkt offenbar wie das tiefe
Wasser des offenen Meeres. Nach einiger Zeit wieder
Breitseitsimponieren, einmal stößt Knopf nach
Knick, der ohne Erregeung nach hinten (Richtung
seines früheren Revieres) ausweicht.
Am 28. V. ist der kleinere Zanclus Knick wie aus-
gewechselt. Schon vormittags sehe ich einen wilden
Kreiselkampf zwischen Kuna und Knick, mitten in
Kunas Revier, in das sich Knick gestern noch nicht
hineinwagte, Knick sitzt heute im früheren Revier
Kunas. Dieser hat eine große, dreieckige Rißwunde
über die Analis bis auf den Bauch. Knick patroulliert
pausenlos am Boden unter unter Kunas Styropor-
falte und obwohl Kuna von oben her wiederholt auf
ihn hinabstößt, wird er von Knick mehr und mehr
zurückgedrängt. Dieser zeigt hochintensive Bewe-
gungsweisen des Kämpfens, die ich bis dahin an Zan-
clus nie gesehen hatte. Er verbeißt sich einmal in
Kunas Maul, sodaß ein Maulzerren wie bei Cichliden
zustandekommt, ein anderes mal packt er den in
seine Deckung fliehenden Kuna an der Schwanz-
flosse und zieht ihn wieder hervor. Knick greift
Knopf fast ebenso heftig an wie Kuna und zwingt
ihn, sich aus dem Kollektivrevier vorläufig in sein
früheres Versteck hinter der linken hinteren Kulisse
zurückzuziehen. Die 3 großen Zanclus sind von die-
sen Umwälzungen im Gebiet der Kleinen kaum
betroffen. Bajo und Fris scheinlaichen einmal an der
alten Stelle, Bajo vertreibt einmal milde Knick, als
der an ungewohnter Stelle steht. 
Am 29. V. ist die Fehde Knick-Kuna etwas abge-
klungen, Kuna kann recht vorne am Boden weiden,
geht aber doch nach oben in seine Deckung, als
Knick naht. Dieser seinerseits muß es sich aber (in
nicht beobachteter Zeit) mit dem Kollektiv Glubsch,
Fris und Bajo verdorben haben, denn während er
sich vorher frei im ganzen Becken bewegen durfte,
wagt er sich jetzt nicht mehr aus seinem—allerdings
recht groß gewordenem—Gebiet an der rechten
Wand heraus, jedenfalls nie bis über die Beckenmitte
nach links und wird auch dort nie von den 3 Großen
besucht. Ich sagte morgens: “Wenn Kuna gescheit
wäre, würde er ein Revier links vorne etablieren”.
Um 12 50 hat er genau dies getan und schwamm
unangefochten unter den Dominanten, auch Knopf
durfte sich nun diesen anschließen, wenn sie sich
links im Becken befanden, rechts durfte er und Kuna
sich von Knick nicht sehen lassen, dieser seinerseits
durfte nicht in die linke Beckenhälfte. Knopf und
Kuna begegneten sich nun nach kurzer Pause wie-
der, Kuna ist erheblich kleiner als Knopf und bedeu-
tend kleiner als die 3 Großen. Alle 5 weiden friedlich
dicht nebeneinander. Als sie dabei weit nach rechts
kommen, kommt es zum Kreiselduell Knopf-Knick,
gleich darauf greift Kuna Knick an, Knik wird an der
rechten Wand etwas zurückgedrängt und verliert das
Gebiet, in dem er noch gestern Kuna so hart
bedrängte. Knopf und Kuna sind nun viel friedlicher
gegeneinander, mehrmals Abwendungen beobach-
tet. Knick wagt sich nict einmal in die Mitte des Bek-
kens, geschweige denn nach links. Einmal, als er
ziemlich frei im Wasser steht, kommt Bajo von der
Beckenmitte her auf ihn zu—ohne Angriffsintentio-
nen—Knick verschwindet in seiner Deckung rechts
an der Wand. Doch zeigt Knick “Grenzverhalten” in
Bezug auf das in der Abb.[fehlt]. skizzierte Gebiet.
Hin-Her rammstoßen um 18 55 am Eingang in den
“Tunnel”, den Knick verteidigt und in dessen Ein-
gang er kurz darauf nach einem Kreiselduell gegen
Knopf flieht (am 2. VI. 10 55 greifen Knopf und Kuna
zugleich den Knick an derselben Stelle an). 
1. VI. 1977 (zurück von Grünau) Kuna ist sehr viel
freier geworden, er darf bis fast an die linke Wand,
seine 2 getrennten Reviere sind nunmehr durch eine
Brücke Verbunden. Knick dagegen ist wie vorher auf
die rechte Beckenhälfte beschränkt. Von den 3 Gro-
ßen kein Angriff, nur einmal wird Bajo andeutungs-
weise aggressiv gegen Knopf, als dieser ganz an die
Vorderscheibe kommt. Knick seinerseits beginnt
immer deutlicher, sein Revier abzugrenzen, es
kommt zum Kreiseln mit Knopf, der ihn in Deckung
zurücktreibt. In den nächten Tagen, vom 2. bis 9. VI.
ist Knick immer einer der Kampfespartner, sei es als
Angreifer oder als Angegriffener. Die einzigen sonsti-
gen agonistischen Auseinandersetzungen bestehen
im Wettschwimmen von Fris und Bajo. Wett-
schwimmen ist die intensivste Form des Kampfes
zwischen Kollektivrevierbesitzern und endet typi-
scherweise darin, daß am Ende jeder der beiden sei-
nen Focus aufsucht. Zwischen Knick und den 3 Gro-
ßen entwickelt sich ein assymmetrisches
Grenzverhalten: Sie dürfen in sein Gebiet hinein,
aber er nicht heraus. Knopf und Kuna werden von
Knick als vollwertige Reviernachbarn bekämpft und
vertrieben. Im Kollektivrevier von Bajo, Glubsch
und Fris werden sie geduldet. Besonders eindrucks-
voll ist es, wenn Knopf und Kuna in nächster Nähe
eines oder mehrerer der 3 Großen weiden und aus
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tiefstem Frieden heraus den Knick anreifen, der es
wagt, aus seinen Reviergrenzen herauszukommen.
In der Woche vom 2. bis 9. VI. werden 15 agonisti-
sche Auseinandersetzungen zwischen einem der bei-
den Kleinen und Knick verzeichnet und nur 9 zwi-
schen Knick und einem Großen. Zwischen 4. und 8.
VI. wurde nicht beobachtet, in dieser Zeit muß einer
der Zanclus heftigst gegen Kuna gekämpft haben,
dieser ist bei meiner Rückkehr völlig zerfetzt und in
seiner sowieso leeren Augenhöhle ist eine frische
rote Wunde, es muß also zum Nasenkringeln gekom-
men sein. Knopf ist zunächst unsichtbar, wird aber
anschließend in seinem alten Versteck hinter der lin-
ken hinteren Kulisse entdeckt, also vom Kollektiv-
Mitglied zum “Außenseiter” degradiert. Kuna fürch-
tet sich nicht vor Fris, sondern weidet dicht neben
ihm, verschwindet aber hinter seiner Deckung
rechts vorne oben, als Knick von weitem heran-
kommt. Er ist körperlich nicht merklich geschädigt
und macht Vorstöße von oben er gegen Knick. Ein-
mal kreiseln die beiden sogar, wonach Knopf wieder
[Rest des Satzes fehlt, soll wahrscheinlich heißen:
seine Deckung aufsucht].
Am 15. VI. 1977 setze ich 2 weitere Zanclus cane-
scens, einen von der Größe von Bajo, Glu und Fris,
sowie einen kleineren von der Größe Kunas ein. Sie
werden von allen alten Zanclus wütend gejagt, auch
von Kuna und Knopf, die zu diesem Zweck weit aus
ihrer Deckung vorstoßen. Da die beiden Neuen
zunächst nur fliehen und nach Deckung suchen,
geraten sie besonders häufig an die vielverspre-
chende Deckung der linken hinteren Dekoration,
die aber von Knopf erbittert verteidigt wird. Schließ-
lich finden sie hinter dem zylindrischen Topf der
Turbelle Ruhe, und zwar beide, ohne zunächst
aneinanderzugeraten. Sie sitzen also jetzt innerhalb
des linken Teilreviers von Kuna. Dieses Gebiet wird
durch sie ein wenig aus der [Ebene?] heraus nach
rechts und nach hinten gedrängt, was dadurch
begünstigt wird, daß Kuna vom “Revierdruck” der 3
großen entlastet ist, die durch die beiden neuen
Fische abgelenkt werden. Als am nächsten Tag Bim
sich allmählich längs der Vorderscheibe aus der Ecke
hervorwagt, greift [er?] ihn an und jagt ihn zurück.
Keine Anzeichen agonistischen Verhaltens zwi-
schen Bim und Kleinneu. Bajo wird allmählich
immer aggressiver und patroulliert schließlich die
linke vordere Ecke dauernd. In den nächsten 3 Tagen
werden 35 agonistische Auseinandersetzungen zwi-
schen alteingesetzten Zanclus und den beiden
Neuen beobachtet, ein einziges Kreiseln zwischen
Knopf und Kuna verdirbt die Satistik, zu dem gesagt
werden muß, daß die beiden aneinander gerieten,
als sie von 2 Seiten her den kleinen Neuen jagten und
dieser vor ihnen in einer Spalte verschwand. Befrie-
dungszeremonien und dichtes Beisammenstehen
der beiden Neuen wurde am 16., 18. und 19. VI. gese-
hen, danach nicht mehr und am 19. griff Bim den
Kleinen zum ersten Mal an. Der kleine Neue versucht
längs der linken Wand nach hinten zu explorieren,
wird aber immer wieder zurückgejagt, seine Versu-
che, das Gebiet Knopfs hinter der linken Kulisse zu
erobern, scheitern immer wieder. Knopf wagt sich
dabei immer weiter hinter der Deckung hervor.
Wenn das geschieht, stößt Kleinneu weit aus der lin-
ken Ecke heraus vor und greift Knopf an, wird aber
durch die Einmischung Knicks sofort zurückge-
scheucht. Dieser Vorgang wird viermal beobachtet,
bis es am 21. VI. 9 25 dem Kleinneu gelingt, bei
Knopf einzudringen. In der Deckung der Kulisse
muß sich ein wilder Kampf abgespielt haben, dann
kam Klein herausgeschossen und wurde sofort von
Knick weiter und in die linke Ecke gejagt. Am 22. VI.
wiederholt sich dasselbe; als Kleinneu von Knopf
hinter der Kulisse herausgetrieben wird, sind Knick
und Kuna sofort hinter ihm her “wie Hunde hinter
einem Hasen”. Schließlich beteiligt sich auch
Glubsch und Kuna. Die Kämpfe erreichen den höch-
sten Intensitätsgrad, das sogenannte Nasenkringeln,
und irgendwann im Laufe dieser Auseinanderset-
zung hat Knopf sein linkes Auge eingebüßt.
Bemerkenswert an den Beobachtungen jener Tage
ist das Fehlen von Auseinandersetzungen zwischen
den alteingesessenen Fischen, die in der Verfolgung
der beiden Neuen, vor allem des Kleinen, oft in gro-
ßer Aggression räumlich dicht zusammenkommen,
ohne einander etwas zu tun. Ebenso bemerkenswert
ist das immer wieder gezeigte aufgeschobene Han-
deln (delayed response), wenn sie, oft nach längerer
Pause, den in Deckung befindlichen und ganz sicher
keinem von ihnen sichtbaren Gegner suchen und
schließlich ins Freie treiben.
Ab nun jagen alle alteingesessenen Fische den
Kleinneu, auch Bim greift ihn nunmehr wütend an,
wenn er in das bisher gemeinsame Gebiet eindrin-
gen will und kommt dabei weit heraus. Der Gejagte
ermattet rasch, zu Mittag kämpft er dennoch mit
Nasenkringeln gegen Kuna, 15 00 wird er tot in der
Spalte des Filters gefunden. Kuna versucht, in sein
früheres Teilgebiet in der linken vorderen Ecke ein-
zudringen, wird aber von Bim daran gehindert. Am
23. und 25. VI. (am 24. nicht beobachtet) zählte ich
14 agonistische Auseinandersetzungen zwischen
den alteingesessenen Fischen, 3 Kämpfe von
Glubsch, 2 von Knick und einen von Kuna gegen
Bim. Schon am 26. VI. wird Bim weitgehend toleriert
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und schwimmt im ganzen Becken frei herum, weidet
z.B. dicht neben Glubsch am freien Boden, wendet
sich aber abwehrend gegen diesen, als er ihm in sein
früheres Territorium in der linken vorderen Ecke
folgt. Am 27. VI. wagt er sich so weit nach hinten,
daß er in die Nähe von Knopfs Revier kommt, der
sich inzwischen nicht mehr nr hinter, sondern auch
an der Vorderseite der linken hinteren Kulisse auf-
hält. Es kommt zu ganz besonders wütenden Kämp-
fen, die beiden kennen sich ja bisher nicht und es
kommt in den nächsten Tagen zu heftigen Kämpfen
zwischen beiden. Am 30. [VI.] besteht zwischen Bim
und den 3 dominanten Zanclus das schon einmal
bestehende einseitige Verhältnis, d.h. sie tolerierten
ihn in ihrem kollektiven Revier, während er sie sei-
nerseits nicht in sein Gebiet eindringen läßt. Durch
die teilweise erfolgreichen Angriffe auf Bim gewinnt
Knopf an Mut und wagt sich immer weiter aus seiner
Ecke. Am 1. VII. greift Knopf den Knick von Weitem
an, später kommt es zum Kreiselkampf zwischen den
beiden. In den nächsten Tagen wird Knick zuneh-
mend aggressiver gegen Knopf, doch bleibt ihm der
Einäugige nichts schuldig, besiegt ihn und verfolgt
ihn am 2. VII. 19 00 bis weit nach rechts hinten. In
den nächsten Tagen ändert sich im Revierverhalten
der Fische wenig, zwischen den drei Dominanten
gibt es die üblichen [ein unleserliches Wort] Reibe-
reien, zwischen Fris und Bajo kommt es wiederholt
zum Wettschwimmen, an dessen Ende aber beide
friedlich nebeneinander stehen bleiben, zwischen
ihnen sieht man auch wiederholt Befriedungsgesten
und dichtes Zusammenschwimmen. Knopf greift
manchmal heftig den Bim an, wagt sich weit vor und
imponiert breitseits, es kommt zum Wettschwim-
men, in das aber Knick eingreift, der beide auseinan-
der und Knopf zurück in seine Deckung treibt. Knopf
steht am Abend des 8. VII. im Eingang zu seiner Dek-
kung, sieht den Knick von weitem und bekommt
daraufhin, ohne sich sonst zu bewegen, graue Schlä-
fen. Um Knopf zu schützen, stellen wir eine große
Fächerkoralle vor den Eingang zu seiner Deckung.
Knopf gewinnt durch diese Maßnahme tatsächlich
an Mut und greift wiederholt in raschen Vorstößen
andere Fische an. Besonders heftig aber Bim, obwohl
er dabei entlang der linken Wand besonders weit aus
seinem Versteck hervor muß. Er hat meßbar am mei-
sten Angst vor Knick, bei dessen Herankommen er
graue Schläfen bekommt, was er bei gleicher Annä-
herung der weniger aggressiven Bajo und Fris nicht
tut. Eine vorübergehende Erkrankung von Knick
und Glubsch hat wahrscheinlich mit einer Erweite-
rung von Knopfs Territorium zu tun. Glubsch
magert merklich ab, frißt nicht und schwimmt
müde, ohne zu fixieren und ohne jemals aggressiv
zu werden im Becken umher. Niemand greift ihn an,
niemand wird durch die offensichtliche Verände-
rung seines Verhaltens im individuellen Erkennen
gestört. Erst am  21. VII. greift er erstmalig wieder an
und zwar den Knick. Fris und Bajo liefern sich
manchmal Wettschwimmen, die friedlich enden.
Der noch etwas kranke Glubsch greift am Abend des
21. in heftigem Ansturm den Fris an, stoppt jählings
und wendet in Befriedungsgeste ab. Man kann sich
der Interpretation nicht entziehen, daß der noch
etwas kranke Fisch sich “geirrt” hat. Im nächsten
Augenblick greift er Kuna an und vertreibt ihn.
Knopf erweitert in der Folge sein Territorium, beson-
ders auf die Vorderscheibe zu und die 3 alten Großen
beginnen toleranter gegen ihn zu werden. Es kommt
nun wiederholt folgendes Verhalten vor: alle vier
großen Fische, die 3 Alten und Knick, weiden an der
Grenze zu Knopfs Territorium, Knopf schießt hervor
und greift Knick an, auch wenn dieser ihm am Fern-
sten ist und er dicht an Glubsch, Fris und Bajo vor-
überschwimmen muß. Umgekehrt wird am 23. VII.
beobachtet, wie alle 7 Fische, also einschließlich
Knopf am Vorderrande von Knopfs gegenwärtigem
Revier (Abb. [fehlt]) am Boden weiden, als Knick
unvermittelt auf Knopf losfährt und ihn hinter die
linke Kulisse zurücktreibt. Wie das Auszählen der
agonistischen Auseinandersetzungen ergibt, besteht
die größte Feindschaft [hier fehlt eine Zeile im
Manuskript mit dem Ende dieses Satzes und den
Beginn des nächsten… wahrscheinlich “zwischen
Knick und Knopf”] …sowie ein Ansteigen der Aus-
einandersetzungen zwischen Knopf und Kuna. Am
4. VIII. [1977] wird erstmalig Wettschwimmen zwi-
schen den beiden beobachtet, am 5. VIII. plötzlich
intensivste Kämpfe, die zu wiederholtem Nasenkrin-
geln führten. Knick mischt sich nicht ein, das eine
noch vorhandene Auge Kunas ist nach den Kämpfen
stark getrübt, man hat den Eindruck, daß beim
Nasenkringeln nach dem Auge des Gegners gebissen
wird und daß die beiden Einäugigen es beim Nasen-
kringeln verloren haben. Am 6. VIII. gibt es immer
noch heftige Kämpfe und Wettschwimmen zwi-
schen Knopf und Kuna, diesmal mischt sich Knick
ein, worauf Kuna “flundert” und sogar nach rück-
wärts schwimmt. Nach diesen Ereignissen steht
Knopf meist an einem großen Gorgonienskelett
rechts im Hintergrund des Beckens. Er toleriert Fris
und Bajo, stößt jedoch wild gegen Bajo vor und jagt
ihn bis in das linke vordere Eck, dort stellt sich Kuna
und es kommt zm Wettschwimmen, nach welchem
sich Knopf an die Mitte der Hinterwand begibt.    
  — Here, KL’s original text ends —
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Summarized results
An abbreviated translation of Lorenz’ original German text by Kotrschal
Chronology of events
Konrad LORENZ reports, that in Seewiesen, in the
early 1960ies, 7 juvenile Zanclus (Z) first defended
individual territories after introduction into a big
reef tank tank of 1.8 × 1 × 1.5 m (l × w × h), but later
schooled. However, the behavioral interactions dur-
ing this transition were not observed. While school-
ing, indivduals were still dominant near the centers
of their former territories. 
In 1967, LORENZ observed on Hawaiian reefs that
adult Z (12–16 cm body length) schooled in groups
of 20–30 individuals, whereas close to the reef sub-
strate, the spaced-out juveniles were territorial. As a
confrontation experiment, 5 Z were released, one at
a time, at the reef close to juvenile, territorial Z from
transparent containers. Initially, each resident Z fled
from the new one, which attempted to join, but
turned, probably at the centers of their territories,
attacked and chased the intruder. Up to 3 neighbour-
ing, territorial Z joined the chase without ever show-
ing agonistic behaviors towards each others.
  Observations and experiments in the big Alten-
berg reef tank started in April 1976 (see Materials and
Methods). Only the smaller of the two first Z at-
tacked the 8 Z, introduced shortly thereafter; these
matched his own size (approx 6 cm). Within hours
and days, the novel individuals established small ter-
ritories, but starved to death within months, because
they were not trained to take artificial food prior to
introduction. In June 1976, the remaining 3 new Z
had firmly established territories of fluctuating sizes.
By the end of June 1976, the small Z started
schooling together with one of the later introduced
Z. Agonistic interactions along territorial borders de-
creased and were replaced by increasingly ritualized
“(pseudo-)attacks” (approach-ram to approach-and-
turn, Tab. 1), which was later interpreted by LORENZ
as a “greeting”-“appeasement”-ceremony within in-
dividual dyads. Both Z were increasingly aggressive
against the original, large Z, which showed submis-
sion by “floundering” (Tab. 1). Fights with this large
Z often assumed the ritualized form of tight and fast
parallel swimming (“racing”, Tab. 1). Till September
1976, the large Z gradually became dominant over
the two smaller ones, which both disappeared by
September 17., probably killed by the large Z. The
latter died in December 1976, diseased and blind.
End of January 1976, 8 very small, postlarval Z were
purchased and trained to take artificial food, before 5
of them were introduced into the large reef tank on
February 10, 1976. Within the first few hours, they
formed a dense school, started dyadic “racing” (Tab.
1) the same evening and engaged in territorial fights
the other day; the first “pseudo-attacks” (Tab. 1) were
observed between particular dyads.
In the following months, LORENZ observed a spec-
trum of social behaviors listed in Table 1. The five Z
defended territories of different sizes, their borders
fluctuating,  along the bottom and walls of the tank.
In March 1976, three dominant Z each defended ap-
proximately one third of the surface, the two others
were subdominant, confined by attacks of the others,
to shelters which formed the foci of small territories.
March 22, two of the dominant Z ceased to be aggres-
sive towards each others, showed “pseudo-attacks”
(Tab. 1) and soon patrolled a common territory,
formed by fusion of their original territories, which
they defended against the three others. No submissive
behaviors, such as raising of the head by the subdom-
inant in many other percomorph fishes were ob-
served, except for “floundering” (Tab. 1). Natural
dawn and dusk, but also disturbances, such as some-
body jumping into the tank or sudden, untimely dim-
ming of the light, caused all 5 Z to form a dense
school. Afterwards, individuals returned to their ter-
ritories and resumed specific dyadic interactions. 
After fusion of their territories, the two Z were less
aggressive against the three others than before. Till
the end of March 1977, the third Z with an initially
large territory was accepted by the former two within
the common territory, which covered now three
quarters of the tank. Before that, the newly accepted
individual approached the others in a conspicuous
“eel-like” mode of swimming (Tab. 1). In occasional
agonistic interactions between these three individu-
als, each was dominant close to the former center of
its territory. These three Z were also largest now (ap-
prox. 6 cm) and the remaining two subdominants
were growing more slowly. Following fusion of ter-
ritories, dyads occasionally engaged in benthic
“pseudospawning” (Tab. 1).
Agonistic interactions between the three domi-
nant holders of the common territory and the other
two remaining small, territorial Z remained dyadi-
cally distinct, which is shown by a summary of dy-
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German name by 
Lorenz
English 
translation
Definition
agonistic context
Breitseits-
imponieren
lateral display Opponents parallel to each others, head-to-tail or head- to-head,
dosal, anal and caudal fins fully spread
Schwanzschlag tailbeat Follows lateral display, slow, high-amplitude tailbeats sends waves
towards the head of the opponent.
Kreiseln circling Starting from a parallel, head-to-tail-position, two opponents
swim after each others, which results in a quick rotation at the spot
around a common axis in the center between the two bodies. May
merge into chases in asymmetric, and “racing” in more symmetric
dyads.
Wett(Parallel-) 
schwimmen
“racing”, 
fast parallel 
swimming
Fish swim very fast head-to-head, in parallel and in a close distance
to each others over quite a distance of reef, as usual, only propelled
by their pectoral fins. The limited space of a tank forces fish to
swim wide circles. Only at sharp turns, the outer fish may use it’s
caudal fin for seconds. LORENZ quotes W. BEEBES, that during this
ceremony synchronized turning gives the impression of a single
fish. May occur only in Z and is the most severe form of agonistic
interactions within Z holding a common territory and typically
ends with each of the opponents approaching the foci of their
former territories.
Schwalben-
stellung
attack-approach No description found in LORENZ’ notes.
Rammstoßen ram-attacks Dominant fish first slowly approaches the other with body slightly
tilted downwards along its longitudinal axis, the followed by a
quick ram-attack, usually directed towards the flanks of the oppo-
nents; biting may be involved. 
Schein-
rammstoßen
ram-pseudo-
attacks
As above, but the ram strike is stopped well before the opponent’s
body is reached.
vor–zurück ram-display 
at a distance
Opponents face each others at their territorial border at 0.2–1 m
distance and direct short ram-bursts towards the other, after which
this individual slowly backs until approximately it’s initial attack
position is reached.
Maulzerren mouth-lock Fish interlocked at each others jaws in a very cichlid-like way, vig-
orously pushing and pulling each other. 
“Nasenkringeln” frontal lock Opponents interlock their fronts, or push towards sides and heads
of each others, pulling, circling, trying to bite each other, preferen-
tially towards the opponent’s eyes, a form of escalated biting.
Beschädigungs-
beißen
escalated biting May result from “frontal lock” or other agonistic behaviors. No rit-
ualized elements are shown, the opponent is chased and bitten
towards fins, belly and other parts of the body.
Flucht und 
Verfolgung
flight and chase Rapid escape swimming towards shelter. The fleeing individual
may be chased by one or more dominant individuals towrds or
even within its selter; may be in sequence with escalated biting.
Table 1: The following social interaction behaviors were reported for Zanclus by LORENZ
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adic agonistic and “appeasement” interactions (Tab.
2). Against one of the two subdominant Z, two, but
not the third of the holders of the common territory
ceased to be aggressive.  “Pseudospawning” (Tab. 1)
also occasionally followed relatively rare dyadic ag-
onistic interactions between the three dominant
and schooling fish. The two subdominant Z ex-
panded their territories at the rear of the tank and
performed intense agonistic behaviors (“circling”,
“racing”, Tab. 1) with each others at their new, com-
mon border.   
April 18, 1977: As a confrontation experiment, a
small tank of opaque plastic with a transparent glass
front containing a new Z of approximately the size
of the two subdominant fish, was positioned at the
right, frontal corner of the tank. This triggered ag-
gressive actions, notably between of the dominants
and one particular subdominant, which frequently
left its territory at the rear of the tank and ap-
proached the box to perform “lateral displays” there
(Tab. 2). Initially, there was hardly any agonistic be-
havior shown by the three dominant Z towards the
newcomer, but the agonistic displays of the subdom-
inant Z in front of the box seemed to “spark over” to
the dominant Z, which increasingly showed “lateral
displays” and “ram”-attempts towards the fish
within the enclosure after they initially ignored it for
days. The frequency of agonistic displays towards
“submission, appeasement”
graue Schläfen grey sides 
of the head
A broad, vertical streak behind the eyes with blurred contours
fades from dark-blue to gray. May indicate defensive readyness to
fight back in subdominant individuals.
flundern “floundering” Subdominant individual tilts, with the front towards the domi-
nant, partially to one of its sides.
Schlängel-
schwimmen
“eel-like 
swimming”
Individual swims on a conspicuous wave-like path towards other
Z. These may join, resulting in a whirling ball of fish, swimming in
and out. Was rare, context unclear, maybe “appeasement” cere-
mony; the initiating fish was sometimes just on the brink of being
accepted by the common territory holders. 
Steinputzen–
Scheinablaichen
substrate-
cleaning, 
pseudo-spawning
Two individuals first clean a rock surface in a cichlid-like manner
and afterwards perform the belly-to-substrate gliding movements
with backwars folded and shivering fins, typical for percomorph
benthic spawning, but no gametes are released. Initially inter-
preted by LORENZ as a pairbond ceremony, but when it came clear,
that it is performed with changing partners, was re-interpreted as
dyadic appeasement, ritualized from sexual behavior. Was always
shown by all dyads at the same place. 
zuschwimmen–
abwenden
approach-
and-turn 
(“pseudo-attack”) 
One fish approaches the other at some distance directly and fast,
in a way, an attack is initiated, but performs a sharp turn in front of
the approached fish, which does not flee, shortly presenting its lat-
eral side. Within dyads this evolves from attacks upon each others,
which may involve ramming after approach and “floundering” of
the attacked. Turning of the approaching individual first occurs at
territorial borders, but becomes increasingly site-independent.
Approach-and-turn is often followed by grazing closely side-to-
side. Interpreted as a dyad-specific “greeting ceremony”.
nahes Grasen grazing side-
to-side
Grazing with parallel bodies in a few cm distance to each others,
often following “appeasement” ceremonies, in itself interpreted
by LORENZ as an expression of closeness.
German name by 
Lorenz
English 
translation
Definition
Table 1: The following social interaction behaviors were reported for Zanclus by LORENZ
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the box increased over the next days and the Z
within its enclosure replied by “lateral display” (Tab.
1). The attention of the 3 dominant Z towards the
new individual released some pressure from the two
subdominant Z at the rear of the tank, which en-
gaged into intense agonistic interactions against
each others (“circling”, “racing”, “frontal lock”, “bit-
ing”, Tab. 1). Frequencies of dyadic agonistic and
“appeasement” behavior the week before and the
week after introduction of the caged Z are summa-
rized in Table 2. 
Starting with April 22, one of the two remaining
subdominant Z was accepted as a fourth member
within the common territory. The remaining sub-
dominant was confined to a crevice between rocks,
badly wounded after a severe fight, with torn fins
and one eye missing; it again expanded its territory
from there during May. It seems from the frequent
attacks directed to the eyes, as reported by LORENZ
also in later agonistic encounters between Z, that
during escalated fighting, Z direct their bites (during
frontal-lock-fights and escalated biting, Tab. 1) pre-
dominately towards the eyes; the branchiostegal
membranes of the opponent are targeted following
destruction of the unpaired soft fins, which may
cause quick death. There were increased agonistic
interactions also between the four dominant Z
(though non-escalating and in a dyade-specific man-
ner, “racing” being the most severe form of agonistic
interaction observed within the holders of the com-
mon territory), when crowding in front of the intro-
duced enclosure.
May 7, 1977: Release of the new Z from its enclo-
sure. Four of the old Z, but not the recently wounded,
engaged in intense agonistic interactions against the
newcomer, including “chases” (Tab. 1). Its fins were
torn until it managed to establish within a shelter at
the rear of the tank. Agonistic interactions between
the 4 dominant holders of the common territory and
the two subordinates (now the one-eyed original Z
and the newcomer) were dyadically distinct. One-eye
had severe agonistic interactions with only one of the
4 dominants (the one which was accepted last within
the group), moderate with two and none at all with
the fourth (Tab. 2). Still, occasional agonistic behavior
also observed within the 4 dominant Z, related to the
focal points of their former territories, but no borders
were defended against each other. 
May 20, 1977 and following days (Tab. 2): The
newly introduced Z was temporarily allowed to join
the 4 dominants within their territory. Occasionally,
all 6 Z peacefully schooled along the front glass of
the aquarium. Till the end of May, most agonistic
interactions occurred between the three smallest,
subdominant Z. Occasional aggressions between the
dominant territorial holders may have assumed the
form of “racing”, but never escalated any further.
The dominant Z were allowed to enter the territory
of the newly introduced Z as a group or individually,
but the newcomer was not allowed to enter the com-
mon territory. 
June 15, 1977 (Tab. 2): Two more Z were intro-
duced, one large in the size of the dominant resident
Z, another one small, in the size of the small subordi-
nates. They were immediately and intensely chased
by all of the prior 7 residents and took refuge within
a tight crevice at the rear surface of the tank. The small
new fish was attacked by large new the fish for first
time on June 19. Both were frequent targets of esca-
lated attacks by the established residents at any of
their strays from shelter. “Frontal locks” and “biting”
occurred. On such an occasion, another one of the
prior residents lost one eye. When the small new Z
sheltered within a crevice out of sight of the others,
the latter often “looked for” the opponent, tried to get
it out and chase it “as a rabbit is chased by dogs”, as
LORENZ remarked. It was finally killed June 21. This
kind of “delayed response”, the search for a subdom-
inant opponent which may have been out of sight for
a considerable amount of time, followed by an attack
when found, was repeatedly mentioned. 
In contrast to the small one, the newly intro-
duced, big Z was quickly accepted by the holders of
the collective territory, but, in turn, did not allow
them to enter his own territory. The introduction
from June 15 seemingly triggered a new wave of ag-
onistic behavior between the old Z (Tab. 2) The same
effect was reported by OKAWA for the 1978 introduc-
tions. Not directly related to this, one of the old,
large Z was sick for nearly one month, stopped feed-
ing and swam slowly high above ground and, was
neither joined nor attacked by any of the others. It
resumed feeding and active participation in agonis-
tic interactions by end of July. Again, an injured
(later recovered) eye was reported after a dyadic ag-
onistic interaction.
What happened after August 1977? 
The temporary social climax reached between the 7
surviving Z in summer 1977 is summarized in Table
2. Later, observations and experiments continued
with occasional introductions of new individuals.
LORENZ’s protocols continued till summer 1980 and,
less regularly, till spring 1984. Tables with system-
atic interaction data extracted by LORENZ from his
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notes continue to March 24, 1979. This allows the
assumption, that LORENZ intended to proceed
with the description much further, but was hin-
dered by circumstances, such as high-priority
book projects and health problems. These obser-
vations (summer 1977 to 1984) revealed a few
more details, but the major results seemed
unchanged. No attempt was made (by KK) to con-
tinue this report beyond summer 1977, because
only LORENZ himself could have possibly distilled
crucial results from his notes. 
Four of the 5 post-larval Z introduced in January
1977 (Baj, Fri, Glu and Kun) and the single Z re-
leased from the confrontation box (Kni) were still
alive in May 1978 and had grown to a body length
of approx. 13 cm, thus being more than 2 years old.
May 30 and June 1 1978, a total of 5 new Z, all
approximately 5 cm in body length, probably more
than 1 year old, were introduced in the tank. All of
the  5 older Z schooled together since summer 1977.
The younger Z first interacted agonistically within
their cohort, but quickly formed a school of their
Agonistic interactions 
Percentage of interactions 
agonistic appeasement
Kun Kno Baj Fri Glu
Appeasement Kun — 10 4 10 10 22 21
Kno 0 — 1 1 28 26 7
Baj 0 1 — 6 5 10 14
Fri 3 0 1 — 3 6 43
Glu 0 0 0 2 — 30 14
Table 2: Interaction matrices (left) between individual Zanclus at different stages of social development and percentage of agonistic
and appeasing behaviors (right) to underline the presence of specific dyadic relationships. Frequencies of agonistic interactions
(lateral display, chases, ram-display, rams, circling, frontal locks, racing); bottom-left: “appeasement” behaviors (mainly approach-
and-turn). As total observation effort was unequal between the 5 examples shown, the numbers of the interaction matrix (left) are
directly comparable only within an observation period, whereas the percentages (right) are comparable within and between
periods.
a: March 8 to April 8, 1977: During this period, individual fish named Glub and Fris, later Bajo join on a common territory (compare
Fig.1). Note the high number of agonistic interactions between Glub (dominant) and Knopf (subdominant).
Agonistic interactions
Percentage of interactions
agonistic appeasement
Kun Kno Baj Fri Glu
Appeasement Kun — 11 3 0 8 26 33
Kno 0 — 1 1 10 27 0
Baj 1 0 — 3 4 13 22
Fri 2 0 1 — 2 7 33
Glu 0 0 0 1 — 28 11
Table 2b: April 9 to 16, 1977: Bajo, Fris and Glub have established a common territory, Kuna and Knopf are confined to small
territories in the rear of the tank. This is particlarly reflected in dyadic agonistic interactions.
Agonistic interactions
Percentage of interactions 
agonistic appeasement
Kun Kno Baj Fri Glu Kni
Appeasement Kun — 6 1 0 12 18 29 44
Kno 8 — 0 1 1 15 18 13
Baj 8 0 — 0 1 7 7 12
Fri 6 0 0 — 0 1 2 12
Glu 5 0 0 0 — 1 12 9
Kni 4 2 1 3 2 — 33 15
Table 2c: May 21 to 28, 1977: Bajo, Fris, Glub and Knick patrol a common territory, Kuna and Knopf are still confined to small
territories in the rear of the tank. Note that particularly Knick, who joined the group last, is aggressive towards Kuna and Knopf.
Evolution and Cognition ❘ 129 ❘ 1998, Vol. 4, No. 2
Non-anonymous, Collective Territoriality in a Fish, the Moorish Idol (Zanclus cornutus)
own. Remarkably, there were hardly any interac-
tions between the two age cohorts. At the begin-
ning, they ignored each others as if they would be-
long to different species.
July 17, 1978, a single, middle-sized individual
(approx. 7 cm) was introduced in late morning. The
events of this day were recorded in detail by OKAWA
(unpubl.). The newcomer was immediately attacked
by the younger cohort; in the older group, this in-
duced enhanced swimming. Thirty minutes follow-
ing this introduction, the first attacks of the older Z
towards the newcomer occurred, and also sudden
fights errupted between the two established cohorts.
Ten minutes later, serial chases developed, where the
newcomer was permanently attacked from 1–4 indi-
viduals of both cohorts. The individuals of both co-
horts preferably started attacks from the centers of
their former territories. Two hours after introduc-
tion, the newcomer had found a shelter, but agonis-
tic interactions, mainly between the two cohorts of
Z continued and only decreased in the afternoon,
another two hours later. The newcomer finally died
August 8, 1978 from torn branchiostegal mem-
branes. Thus, this intermediately-sized fish did not
match body size in either group, was not able to join
a group and was attacked by both groups. Remark-
ably, this also triggered long-lasting agonistic inter-
actions between the two cohorts. 
Conclusions and discussion
The lack of field observations on the behavioral
events following recruitment in tropical reef fishes
underlines the importance of LORENZ’s aquarium
observations. Some Pomacentridae, Acanthuridae
and Zanclus are territorial after recruitment but
school later on (LOWE-MCCONNEL 1987). LORENZ
has documented the behavioral interactions of Z in
territorial disputes and during changes, from indi-
vidual territoriality to schooling in a common ter-
ritory. An astonishingly rich repertoire of
escalatory and de-escalatory behaviors in dyadic
interaction emerged (Tab. 1). Fish are highly orien-
tated in space (comp. REESE 1989), recognize each
others individually (which was shown for other
reef fish before, FRICKE 1973), as peculiar dyadic
Agonistic interactions
Percentage of interactions
agonistic appeasement
Kun Kno Baj Fri Glu Kni L S
Appeasement Kun — 7 0 0 0 0 4 12 11 17
Kno 0 — 0 0 0 0 1 11 9 0
Baj 0 0 — 0 0 0 7 9 9 0
Fri 0 0 0 — 0 1 8 9 8 0
Glu 0 0 0 0 — 0 5 6 5 0
Kni 1 0 0 0 0 — 5 16 10 4
L 3 0 0 0 0 0 — 7 17 38
S 0 0 4 0 0 0 6 — 32 42
Table 2d: June 15 to 22, 1977: As May 21 to 28, but two new Zanclus, one as large as territorial residents (L), the other one smaller
(S) were introduced. The new small Z was killed by the end of this week. Most members of the group were relatively aggressive
towards S, but there was also a series of appeasments (approach-and-turn) between Bajo and S.
Agonistic interactions
Percentaqe of interactions
agonistic appeasement
Kun Kno Baj Fri Glu Kni L
Appeasement Kun — 7 0 0 0 0 4 16 29
Kno 0 — 0 0 0 0 1 13 0
Baj 0 0 — 0 0 0 7 12 0
Fri 0 0 0 — 0 1 8 12 0
Glu 0 0 0 0 — 0 5 7 0
Kni 1 0 0 0 0 — 5 15 7
L 3 0 0 0 0 0 — 25 6
Table 2e: July 23 to August 5, 1977: A stable “social climax” was reached. Bajo, Fris, Glub, Knick and the new L roam their common
territory, Kun and Kno, by and large, remain excluded and stay on their small territories. From the frequencies of agonistic
interactions and also appeasements, it is still evident that L was last to join the group.
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Figure 1b: March 9, 1977. Glub, Bajo and Fris partition the entire bottom of the tank into three individual territories. Knopf is
confined to its hole (back left) and Kuna starts expanding its small territory from the rear wall towards the center.
Figure 1: Examples of original sketches by Konrad LORENZ showing territorial boundaries and, by arrows, directions and intensities
of dyadic interactions, mapped onto the bottom, at the rear and lateral walls of the tank (l × w × h: 4 × 4 × 2 m).
a: February 12, 1977. Individuals Glub and Fris hold a common territory as indicated by the central circle. Other territories are held
by Bajo (front right) and Kuna (behind Ba, right). Knopf is confined to the rear wall of the tank, frequently chased and occasionally
defends either of two shelters.
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relationships are retained for a long time, indepen-
dent of site, and because dominant fish may search
for a subdominant opponent where they expect to
find it to engage in agonistic interactions. This
points at an “appetence for aggression” (RASA
1971), albeit directed at peculiar individuals. Also,
dyadic relationships remain within the school.
Thus, individual Z may be able judge their own
position and also of the others within the social
structure of the school. Such abilities of social cog-
nition were recently attributed to birds and mam-
mals, notably apes (for example, WHITEN/BYRNE
1997; KOTRSCHAL 1995; MARLER 1994; DE WAAL
1982) but are still surprising for fish, even though
FRICKE (1975) has shown
remarkable problem-solving
capacities in a triggerfish.
Initial territories of postlar-
val Z are first fused within dy-
ads. Even thereafter, individu-
als tended to remain
dominant close to the centers
of their former territories.
Such group territories are eas-
ily formed between Z of simi-
lar size, resulting in a homogenous school. Most ag-
onistic behaviors are indeed directed towards odd or
unknown Z. This agrees with observations, that
schooling fish match themselves according to size
(PITCHER 1986). Also, the possibility to induce
schooling by disturbances is consistent with the
anti-predator function of groups (EIBL-EIBESFELDT
1962, PITCHER 1986) and on the proximate level is
also consistent with LORENZ “hierarchy of instincts”–
theory (1978). The causal, evolutionary linkage of
peculiarities of Z, which deviate from the usual per-
ciform and acanthurid pattern, such as individual-
ized group territoriality (surgeonfish come as territo-
rial singles or pairs, as “colonies” or as large schools,
EHRLICH 1975; FOSTER 1985;
ROBERTSON/GAINES 1986);
sponge feeding (HOBSON 1974;
RUSS 1984) and the absence of
a scalpel at their caudal pe-
duncle, remains debatable.
Another case of group territo-
riality was recently described
by LUDLOW/ITZKOWITZ (1997).
Territorial conflicts may in-
volve a number of behavioral
Figure 1c: March 22, 1977. Glub and Fris fused their individual territories, but still exclude Bajo (front), which selectively either
attacks Glub or Fris, when either of the two appears in the “wrong” place (the former territory border of the other). Kuna gradually
manages to expand its territory from the rear wall towards the center and Kn is still confined to its shelter at the left lateral wall.
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elements which are ritualized to a differing degree.
Lateral displays at territorial borders, tail-beats, ram-
attacks, mouth-locks, escalated biting and chasing
are present in most species of percomorphs (BAER-
ENDS/BAERENDS VAN ROON 1950; ERLACH 1986; KALAS
1975; OEHLERT 1958; OHM 1958; SCHOBER 1988; SEITZ
1940, 1941; WICKLER 1967). Other agonistic interac-
tions, however, such as circling, racing, frontal locks
and, to some extent, aiming bites preferentially at
branchiostegal membranes and eyes, may be more
specific for Z, even though this is hard to judge,
because data on behavioral repertoires of other reef
fishes are still comparatively rare (SCHOBER 1988).
Severe agonistic interactions, such as frontal locks
and escalated biting may be exceedingly rare in the
wild due to the absence of spatial constraints, and
probably due to the fact that high predation pres-
sure may dampen aggression (LORENZ 1978, ERLACH
1986) in the field. In fact, these agonistic (even dam-
aging) behaviors are much more frequently ob-
served in the aquarium than in the wild. This shows,
that these behaviors are part of the species’ reper-
toire, available upon demand; the aquarium “arte-
fact” is not the behavior itself, but probably its fre-
quency of occurrence.
Still more remarkable than the agonistic behav-
iors of territorial disputes are behaviors, which evi-
dently allow socializing and schooling between in-
dividually known dyads of former territorial
neighbours. Preliminary field observations by
LORENZ and others indicate that this transition from
postrecruitment territoriality to schooling also oc-
curs in nature. Responses of territorial Z in Hawaii
to the release of strangers (return to a certain spot
on the reef, from there attacks at the strangers) in-
dicate, that also in the wild, former territorial foci
may still function to reassure individual domi-
nance status. Also in the wild, neighbours did not
attack each others. These schools do not always
contain the same individuals (REESE, pers. comm.),
which may mean that individual Z possibly roam
extended home ranges in fission-fusion-groups,
which dynamically split and fuse according to the
position of the individuals relative to their former
territories. 
Aside from fission-fusion grouping by fish which
recognize each others individually, another parallel
to primates is the presence of “appeasement” be-
haviors (WHITEN/BYRNE 1997, DE WAAL 1989). These
are by no means necessary attributes of individual-
ized groups; in greylag geese, for example, the ma-
jor “appeasement”–behavior, “greeting”, is only
performed by members of triumph-ceremony-
groups, notably within long-term mongamous
mates and within families (LORENZ 1988). The rep-
ertoire of such behaviors in Z seems greater than in
geese and, even though dyadic characteristics re-
main, their exchange is not exclusive. “Appease-
ment” in Z may follow agonistic “racing” within a
dyad of territorial neighbours, but also submission
of one individual by “floundering”. 
“Side-to-side-grazing”, initially along the com-
mon borders may first indicate a decrease in the
dyadic aggressive potential. In this state of break-
down of territorial borders, dyadic and benhic
“pseudo-spawning” may tighten the bond. It re-
mains an open question, whether or not rare “eel-
like swimming”, which may be derived from pe-
lagic spawning, may be interpreted as an applica-
tion of the initiating individual to be accepted
within the group.  Individuals, which accept each
others within the common territory, regularly per-
form “approach-and-turn” behavior after tempo-
rary separation, which thus can be interpreted as a
“greeting” ceremony, which mutually reassures the
non-aggressive nature of the dyadic relationship.
Remarkably, approach-and-turn seems to be a ritu-
alized form of attack. The other “appeasing” behav-
iors originate from the repertoires of feeding and
sexuality. 
Occasional agonistic interactions between
school members center around former territorial
foci and consist mainly of “lateral display” and
“tailbeats” with “racing” being the most severe
form of agonistic interaction observed within a
group of common territory holders. This repertoire
of “appeasement” only in part parallels such behav-
iors in mammals, where they may also be ritualized
from agonistic and sexual origins, but frequently
involve grooming or elements of infantile origin,
such as licking the corner of the mouth in canids,
which has ist roots in the food-begging of pups. It
remains to be investigated, whether, and how, this
repertoire of agonistic and “appeasing” behaviors
of Z is used in the field.
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Figure 2: Drawings by Kurt KOTRSCHAL from bw-photographs by Keiko OKAWA showing a number of behaviors defined in Table 1.
a: Relatively peaceful tail-to-body, with some fin-erect dominance display of the frontal fish. b: Head-to-head lateral display.
c: Fast parallel swimming (“racing”). d, e: Scenes of frontal lock and escalated biting. f: Chase. g: Peaceful grazing side-to-side.
h: Peaceful standing side-by-side. i: “Substrate-cleaning”, a sexual behavior which preceds benthic spawning in many perciform
fishes. Has probably ritualized in a rare “appeasement” ceremony after fusion of territories in Zanclus, which  is a pelagic spawner.
Gender of the two participating individuals unknown.
i.
h.
d. e. f.
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Evolution and Cognition ❘ 134 ❘ 1998, Vol. 4, No. 2
K. Lorenz/K. Okawa/K. Kotrschal
References
Baerends, G. P./Baerends van Roon, J. M. (1950) An intro-
duction to the study of the ethology of cichlid fishes. be-
havior, Suppl. 1: 1–243.
Barlow, G. W. (1984) Patterns of monogamy among teleost
fishes. Archiv für  Fischereiwissenschaften 35: 75–123.
Brockman, H. J. (1973) The function of poster-coloration in
the beaugregory, Eupomacentrus leucostictus (Pomacen-
tridae, Pisces). Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie 33: 13–34
Ehrlich, P. R. (1975) The population biology of coral reef fish-
es. Annual Reviews of Ecology and Systematics 6: 211–247.
Ehrlich, P. R./Ehrlich, A. H. (1982) Social behavior of butterfly
and surgeonfishes on coral reefs: some mirror experiment.
Oecologia 54: 138–140.
Ehrlich, P. R./Talbot, F. H./ Russell, B. C./ Anderson, G. R. V
(1977) The behavior of chaetodontid fishes with special
reference to Lorenz’s “poster colouration” hypothesis.
Journal of  Zoology 183: 213–228.
Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. (1962) Freiwasserbeobachtungen zur Deu-
tung des Schwarmverhaltens verschiedener Fische.
Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie 19: 165–182.
Erlach, A. (1986) Beobachtungen und experimente zu den
Grundlagen des Sozialverhaltens von Fischen der Gattung
Dascyllus L. PhD Thesis, Univ. Vienna
Foster, S. A. (1985) Group foraging by coral reef fish: a mech-
anism for gaining access to defended resources. Animal be-
havior 33: 782–792.
Fricke, H. (1966) Atrappenversuche mit einigen plakatfarbig-
en Korallenfische am Roten Meer. Zeitschrift für Tierpsy-
chologie 23: 4–7.
Fricke, H. (1973) Individual partner recognition in fish. Field
studies in Amphiprion bicinctus. Naturwissenschaften 4:
204–205.
Fricke, H. (1975) Lösen einfacher Probleme bei einem Fisch.
Zeitschrift für Tierpsycholgie 38: 18–33.
Gosline, W. A. (1965) Thoughts on systematic working in
outlaying areas. Systematic Zoology 14: 59–61.
Hobson, E. S. (1974)  Feeding relationships of teleostean fish-
es on coral reefs in Kona, Hawaii. Fishery Bulletin 72: 915–
1031.
Holzapfel, M. (1939) Die Entstehung einiger Bewegungsste-
reotypien bei gehaltenen Säugern und Vögeln. Revue  Su-
isse Zoologie 46: 567–580.
Jones, G. P. (1991) Postrecruitment processes in the ecology
of coral reef fish populations: A multifactorial perspective.
In: Sale, P.F. (ed) The ecology of fishes on coral reefs. Aca-
demic Press: San Diego, pp294–328.
Jones, R. S. (1968) Ecological relationships in Hawaiian and
Johnston Island Acanthuridae (surgeonfishes). Micronesia
4: 309–361. 
Kalas, K. (1975) Zur Ethologie von Lamprologus brichardi (Pi-
sces; Cichlidae) Trewavas & Poll 1952 unter besonderer
Berücksichtigung des Sozialverhaltens. Masters Thesis, Jus-
tus Liebig University, Giessen.
Kotrschal, K. (1987) Evolutionary patterns in tropical marine
reef fish feeding. Zeitschrift für zoologische Systematik
und Evolutionsforschung 26: 51–64.
Kotrschal, K. (1995) Im Egoismus vereint? Tiere und Men-
schentiere—das neue Weltbild der Verhaltensforschung.
Piper-Verlag, München.
Longley, W. H. (1917) Studies upon the biological signifi-
cance of animal coloration. I: The colors and color changes
of West Indian reef-fishes. Zeitschrift für experimentelle
Zoologie 23: 533–601.
Lorenz, K. (1962) The function of colour in coral reef fishes.
Proceedings of the Royal Institute of Great Britain 39: 282–
296.
Lorenz, K. (1963) Das sogenannte Böse. Zur Naturgeschichte
der Aggression. Borotha-Schoeler-Verlag: Wien.
Lorenz, K. (1978) Vergleichende Verhaltensforschung. Grund-
lagen der Ethologie. Springer-Verlag: Wien.
Lorenz, K. (1988) Hier bin ich – wo bist du? Ethologie der
Graugans. Piper-Verlag: München.
Lowe-McConnell, R. H. (1987) Ecological studies in tropical
fish communities. Cambridge University Press: Cam-
bridge.
Ludlow, A./Itzkowitz, M. (1997) Group territory in a damself-
ish. Unpublished abstract. XXV. IEC.
Marler, P. (1994) Social cognition: are primates smarter than
birds? Journal of Ornithology 135: 455.
Motta, P. J. (1983) Response by potential prey to coral reef
fish predators. Animal behavior 31: 1257–1259.
Moyer, J. T./Thresher, R.E./Colin, P.L. (1983) Courtship,
spawning and inferred social organization of American an-
gelfishes (Genera Pomacanthus, Holacanthus and Centro-
pyge; Pomacanthidae). Environmental Biology of  Fishes 9:
25–39.
Neudecker, S. (1989) Eye camouflage and false eyespots: cha-
etodontid responses to predators. Environmental Biology
of  Fishes 25: 143–157.
Oehlert, B. (1958) Kampf und Paarbildung einiger Cichliden.
Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie 15: 141–174.
Ohm, D. (1958) Die ontogenetische Entwicklung des Ka-
mpfverhaltens bei Aequidens portalegrensis Hensel and
Ae. latiftons Steindacher (Cichlidae). Verhandlungen der
Deutschen Zoologischen Gesellschaft, 1958, pp. 182–194
Pitcher, T. J. (1986) Functions of shoaling behavior in teleo-
sts. In: Pitcher, T.J. (ed) The behavior of teleost fishes.
Croom Helm, London & Sidney. 
Randall, J. E. (1967) Food habits of reef fishes of the West In-
dies. Studies in Tropical Oceanography (Miami) 5: 665–
847.
Rasa, A. O. E. (1971) Appetence for aggression in juvenile
damsel fish. Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie.
Reese, E. S. (1989) Orientation behavior of butterflyfishes
(family Chaetodontidae) on coral reefs: spatial learning of
route specific landmarks and cognitive maps. Environ-
mental Biology of Fishes 25: 79–86.
Reese, E. S. (1991) How behavior influences community
structure of butterflyfishes (Family Chaetodontidae) on Pa-
cific coral reefs. Ecological International Bulletin 19: 29–41.
Robertson, D. R./Sweatman, H. P. A./Fletcher, E. A./Cleland,
M. G. (1976) Schooling as a mechanism for circumventing
the territoriality of copetitors. Ecology 57: 1208–1220.
Robertson, D. R./Polunin, N. V. C./Leighton, K. (1979) The
behavioral ecology of three Indian Ocean surgeonfishes
(Acanthurus lineatus, A. Leucosternon and Zebrasoma sco-
pas): their feeding strategies and social and mating sys-
tems. Environmental Biology of Fishes 4: 125–170.
Robertson, D. R./Gaines, S. D. (1986) Interference competi-
tion structures habitat use in a local assemblage of coral
reef surgeonfishes. Ecology 67: 1372–1383.
Russ, G. (1984) Distribution and abundance of herbivorous
grazing fishes in the central Great Barrier Reef. I. Levels of
variability across the entire continental shelf. Marine Ecol-
ogy—Progress Series 20: 23–34.
Sale, P. F. (1969) A suggested mechanism for habitat selec-
tion by the juvenile manini, Acanthurus triostegus sandvi-
censis. behavior 35: 27–44.
Sale, P. F. (1980) The ecology of fishes on coral reefs. Ocean-
ography and Marine Biology Annual Reviews 18: 367–421.
Evolution and Cognition ❘ 135 ❘ 1998, Vol. 4, No. 2
Non-anonymous, Collective Territoriality in a Fish, the Moorish Idol (Zanclus cornutus)
Sale, P. F. (ed 1991) The ecology of fishes on coral reefs. Aca-
demic Press: San Diego.
Schober, U. M. (1988) Zum agonistischen Verhalten von
Acanthurus leucosternon BENNET ud Paracanthurus
hepatus LINNE (Acanthuridae, Teleostei). PhD Thesis, Uni-
versity of Vienna.
Seitz, A. (1940) Die Paarbildung bei einigen Cichliden I.
Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie 4: 40–84.
Seitz, A. (1941) Die Paarbildung bei einigen Cichliden II.
Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie 5: 74–100. 
Smith, C.L. (1982) Patterns of reproduction in coral reef fish-
es. In: Huntsman, G.R/Nicholson/W.R. Fox, W.W. Jr. (eds)
The biological bases for reef fishery management. NOAA
Technical Memorandum NMFS-SECF-80, Beaufort NC.
Tricas, T. (1989) Determinants of feeding territory size in the
corallivorous butterflyfish, Chaetodon multicinctus. Ani-
mal behavior 37: 830–841.
Waal, F. B. M. (1982) Chimpanzee politics. Jonathan Cape:
London.
Waal, F. B. M. (1989) Peacemaking among primates. Harvard
University Press: Cambridge, MA.
Whiten, A./Byrne, R. W. (eds) (1997) Machiavellian In-
teligence II. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Wickler, W. (1967) Vergleich des Ablaichverhaltens einiger
paarbildender Pomacentriden und Cichliden (Pisces, Per-
ciformes). Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie 24: 457–475.
Zumpe, D. (1965) Laboratory observations on the aggressive
behavior of some butterfly fishes. Zeitschrift für Tierpy-
chologie 22: 226–236.
Evolution and Cognition ❘ 136 ❘ 1998, Vol. 4, No. 2
HAS LONG BEEN AS-
sumed that there is
some (presumably strong)
connection between tele-
ological theories of repre-
sentation and adaptation-
ism in evolutionary biol-
ogy, but just what that
connection is has never
been clearly explained.
Thus, it is often assumed
that any attacks on adap-
tationism also constitute
attacks on teleological
theories of representation
(or teleosemantics, for
short). Determining ex-
actly what the connection
between these two things
is will be the burden of
this paper. Before even be-
ginning to try to see what
the relationship between
adaptationism and teleo-
semantics is, it will be
helpful to get a rough idea of what the relata are. So,
roughly, teleosemantics is a teleofunctional account
of what determines the content of linguistic and
mental representations. Thus, teleosemantics deter-
mines the content of a representation by determin-
ing the representation’s function—what it is “sup-
posed to” represent, where the “supposed to” is a bi-
ological “supposed to”. An object’s teleofunction is
what it has been selected to do, what is has been “de-
signed for”. So, the teleofunction of an object is a
function that does not rest on current properties, but
instead depends upon that object’s history, in partic-
ular, its selective history. The most sophisticated ver-
sion of teleosemantics is found in MILLIKAN 1984, see
also MILLIKAN 1993, PAPINEAU 1987, and DENNETT
1995. Adaptationism, unlike teleosemantics, has been
defined and characterized primarily by those who
wish to criticize it. Adapta-
tionism, sometimes also
called “functionalism”
(see GOULD 1991), is,
again roughly, the ten-
dency of theorists in evo-
lutionary biology to con-
sider organisms as sets of
traits, each of which has
been optimally designed
by natural selection to
serve its function. This
tendency has been fa-
mously ridiculed by
GOULD/LEWONTIN 1979 as
the “Panglossian para-
digm”, see also GOULD/
VRBA 1982, KITCHER 1985,
and for a defense of adap-
tationism DENNETT 1983,
1995. 
The connection be-
tween teleosemantics and
adaptationism can be
brought somewhat into
focus now. Here it is in a first, rough pass: “Adapta-
tionism is the tendency to assume that all of the
individual parts of an organism were selected for,
and so have biological functions. If, as some have
claimed recently, adaptationism is bad methodol-
ogy, then many parts of living organisms might not
have functions. The parts of humans that underly
their linguistic and cognitive skills may be among
those that do not have functions. So teleosemantics,
which determines the content of linguistic and men-
tal representations according to their functions,
could be a misguided enterprise.”
Notice that this attempt at spelling out the con-
nection is littered with ‘might’s and ‘could’s. In what
follows, I will try to replace these modal words with
ones that are more straightforwardly assertoric. To
do so, of course, will require considering teleose-
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mantics, adaptationism and a few prominent cri-
tiques of it in some detail. Here, then, is the plan.
First we will consider the occasionally hairy details
of teleosemantics, and then, more briefly, what ad-
aptationism amounts to, with the goal of answering
the question: 
(1) How correct does adaptationism need to be for
teleosemantics to be possible?
Next, we will examine some of the more promi-
nent lines of criticism of adaptationism and attempt
to determine whether adaptationism is as true as is
deemed necessary by our answer to question (1).
Question (2), then, is: 
(2) And is adaptationism that correct?
Before beginning to try to answer these two ques-
tions, however, it is worth pointing out that philo-
sophical considerations that might cause problems
for teleosemantics, like those raised in FODOR 1990,
will not be considered here. There are two reasons
for this: first, if it turns out that teleosemantics does
not survive the empirical challenges posed by the foes
of adaptationism, any philosophical considerations
in its favor are moot; second, FODOR’s criticisms have
been fairly decisively rebutted by the proponents of
teleosemantics (see MILLIKAN 1993 and DENNETT
1995) and so are not really worth considering here.
We shall begin our consideration of question (1)
by examining MILLIKAN’s teleosemantic theory. Put
very roughly, according to MILLIKAN, a thing A has a
proper function1 F only if it meets one of the two fol-
lowing conditions: 
(1) A originated as a reproduction of some prior
item or items that, due in part to possession of prop-
erties reproduced, have actually performed F in the
past, and A exists because of this performance, or (2)
A originated as the product of some prior device that,
given its circumstances, had performance of F as a
proper function and that, under those circum-
stances, normally causes F to be performed by means
of producing an item like A. (1993, pp13–14). 
So, basically, an object has a proper function only
if it has been copied because of something it can do
(satisfying the first clause) or is produced by some-
thing with a proper function (satisfying the second
clause). MILLIKAN’s term reproductively established
family covers both these cases (1984, pp23–25) So
from now on, I will refer to things that were copied
or produced by something copied as members of re-
productively established families. By claiming that to
have a function an object must be a member of a
reproductively established family, MILLIKAN makes
her definition of function different than those of
WRIGHT 1973, CUMMINS 1975 and BIGELOW/PARGET-
TER 1987. This is the case because the fact that to have
a function something must be a member of such a
family makes it the case that an object’s functions
cannot be determined by merely examining that ob-
ject’s current dispositional properties. Instead, the
item’s function depends upon how and from what
it was reproduced, that is, its history. In particular, an
item depends upon its selective history, for otherwise,
items which are copied but do not intuitively have
functions will count as members of reproductively
established families. As MILLIKAN puts it, “Only if an
item or trait has been selected for reproduction, as
over against other traits, because it sometimes has a
certain effect does that effect count as a function.”
(1993, pp35–36) So, for example, full (or half or new)
moons do not have a function, even though they are
members of a reproductively established family, be-
cause they were not selected for—the moon does not
become full (or half or new) because it is somehow
better for the moon to be full (or half or new) than
to be in another phase. Finally, then, an object has
a proper function if and only if it is a member of a
reproductively established family and has been se-
lected for. MILLIKAN claims that this definition covers
bodily organs, instinctive behaviors, learned behav-
iors, reasoned behaviors, customs, language devices,
as well as conscious intentions and purposes. (1993,
p14)2 
Now if the critiques of adaptationism to be con-
sidered were able to show that nothing has a func-
tion in MILLIKAN’s sense, we would need delve no
further into teleosemantics. They do not, however,
and do not even purport to do so3. We will, therefore,
press on into the details of MILLIKAN’s account. The
goal of teleosemantics is to determine the content of
representations via analysis of their teleofunctions.
Thus we must now consider MILLIKAN’s theory of rep-
resentations. Representations are a variety of what
she calls intentional icons, which, she claims, are dis-
tinguished by the following four characteristics: 
(1) An intentional icon is a member of a reproduc-
tively established family and was selected for, thus it
has proper functions.
(2) In biologically normal cases (cases similar to
those in which the icon has historically fulfilled its
function), an intentional icon stands between two
cooperating devices, one which produces the icon
and one which consumes it. These two devices are
designed or standardized to fit one another.
(3) In biologically normal cases, the intentional
icon serves to adapt the consumer device to condi-
tions such that functions of that device can be per-
formed under those conditions. 
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(4) It is a proper function of the intentional icon
to make changes in the consumer in accordance
with certain mapping rules. It is the way that the
environment must be in order to accord with these
mapping rules that determines the content of the in-
tentional icon. (1984, pp96–97)4 
These four features of intentional icons are such
that they can be fulfilled separately by both linguistic
objects, such as sentences of a public language, and
mental representations. In other words, it could be
the case that sentences of a public language are rep-
resentations that can be given a teleosemantic ac-
count, while mental representations cannot have a
teleosemantic account, or vice versa. Furthermore, it
could be that both can receive such an account, but
not the same account. 
This is a crucial feature of teleological theories of
content. In all such theories, the meaning of sen-
tences is not dependent upon any relation that sen-
tences might have to mental representations. As
MILLIKAN puts it, “Thus the intentionality of a pub-
lic–language sentence is not derived from the inten-
tionality of the inner representations that it [biolog-
ically n]ormally produces or expresses. Sentences are
basic intentional items. And they are intentional for
reasons that can be described without raising or an-
swering any questions about what the mental is as
such.” (1984, p90) 
DENNETT, one of the other main proponents of
teleosemantics, has made the same claim in many
different venues, for example in his disagreements
with John SEARLE’s contention that artifacts such as
computers can only have derived intentionality. DEN-
NETT claims that there is no good distinction be-
tween real meaning or intentionality and derived
meaning or intentionality. See DENNETT 1995, ch.14
for an example of the denial of this distinction in
connection to teleosemantics. 
Because sentences and other language devices do
not derive their content from mental representa-
tions, it is at least a conceptual possibility that sen-
tences are intentional icons for reasons indepen-
dent of the reasons that mental representations are
intentional icons. This point is somewhat surpris-
ing and crucial for the purposes of this paper. It is
surprising because it leads to the fact that the mean-
ing of sentences we utter is not necessarily present
to consciousness, nor can we know for certain that
our sentences mean anything at all. The claim is
crucial to the purposes of this paper for reasons that
will be demonstrated below. So rather than just
claim that it is the case that the meaning of lan-
guage devices can be separated from the meaning
of mental representations, I will prove that it is so.
To do so, I will now give an independent teleose-
mantic account of, first, sentences, and then, men-
tal representations.
Consider a sentence S, “I’d like some pancakes.”
(1s) A token of S is reproduced (that is, repeated)
by individual speakers because it causes certain re-
sponses in hearers. Namely, the hearers are led to
believe that the speaker is in a pancake–desiring state
and/or brings it about that the speaker gets some
pancakes. Thus S is a member of a reproductively
established family (via the first part of the defini-
tion). Furthermore, S was selected for, as against
other sentences such as S’, “That house is on fire”,
because of certain effects that S produces in hearers,
which S’ does not. Thus S has a function. So, the first
clause of the definition of intentional icons is satis-
fied. 
(2s) The sentence, in normal situations, stands be-
tween a speaker and a hearer, who are standardized
to fit one another—they speak the same language.
This satisfies clause (2).
(3s) The sentence, in normal cases, serves to adapt
the hearer so that the hearer can perform some of his
or her functions. In the case of S, the hearer may be
caused to believe that the speaker desires pancakes
or, if the speaker is a waiter or waitress, he or she may
bring the speaker some pancakes. This satisfies
clause (3)5
(4s) The speaker learns to reproduce tokens of the
sentence S in certain situations, those in which she
or he wishes to produce beliefs or actions in the
hearer that correspond to the content of S. That is, S
has as its function the production of certain states or
actions in the hearer, such that those states corre-
spond to the speaker’s actually wanting some pan-
cakes. Thus S’s function is to map certain environ-
mental conditions, in particular, those that corre-
spond to its content.
Because it satisfies these four clauses, S is an inten-
tional icon. Notice, again, that the story told to show
that S fulfills these conditions, and so has content,
makes no reference to mental representations. A
similar story can, of course, be told for any sentence
S. Thus, it could be that sentences have teleoseman-
tic content, while mental representations do not. 
The story for mental representations is exactly
parallel, but it occurs entirely within the head. Con-
sider the mental representation M whose content is
“There’s food over there”.
(1m) M is produced by a representation producer,
whose function it is to produce mental representa-
tions. The representation producer is part of an or-
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ganism’s anatomy (presumably, part of its brain)
that was reproduced by natural selection because of
its ability to produce items like M when environ-
mental circumstances call for it. Thus, M is a member
of a reproductively established family (by the second
clause of the definition). It was selected for, as
against some other variety of representation pro-
ducer that produces M’ (whose content is, say, “The
house is on fire.”) when environmental circum-
stances call for M. Thus, M has proper functions and
satisfies clause (1) of the definition of intentional
icons.
(2m) After being produced, M stands between the
representation producer and a reproduction consumer
(in biologically normal cases). The producer and
consumer have been designed by natural selection
to cooperate, to “speak the same language”. 
(3m) In normal cases, M causes a change in the
representation consumer such that the consumer
can fulfill some of its functions with respect to the
conditions indicated by M. For example, M might
cause a change in the consumer so that it can initiate
motion towards the food. Thus, clause (3) is fulfilled.
(4m) The organism is configured such that its rep-
resentation producer normally produces M, rather
than M’, only when environmental circumstances
accord with the content of M. This is the case because
producing M in when it is true that “There’s food
over there” causes the representation consumer to
enter a state so that it behaves appropriately with
respect to the content of M. So the function of M is
to cause the representation consumer to enter a state
that corresponds to its content by some certain map-
ping rules. Thus clause (4) is fulfilled by M. 
Thus, mental representations are intentional
icons and can have teleosemantic content. To the
extent that these two separate teleosemantic ac-
counts (1s–4s and 1m–4m) are reasonable, both sen-
tences and mental representations can have con-
tents that are determined by their teleofunctions.
Furthermore, they can have them independently. I
have labored this point for a reason. The indepen-
dence of the teleosemantics of language devices and
mental representations makes it the case that our
initial question (1) will require two separate answers.
That is, the question “How correct does adaptationism
need to be for teleosemantics to be possible?” will get one
answer for language, and another for mental representa-
tions. Before giving these answers, it will be useful to
see in a little more detail what adaptationism is.
Adaptationism, as I mentioned earlier, seems as if
it would not be especially easy to characterize be-
cause it was initially described by GOULD/LEWONTIN
(in 1979) who wished to criticize it, and thus was
from its initial definition something of a caricature
of the practice of actual evolutionary biologists.
GOULD/LEWONTIN (1979) claim that adaptationist
theorizing generally proceeds in two steps. First,
“[a]n organism is organized into ‘traits’ and these
traits are explained as structures optimally designed
by natural selection for their functions.” (1979, p77)
And second, “After the failure of part-by-part opti-
mization, interaction is acknowledged via the dic-
tum that an organism cannot optimize each part
without imposing expenses on others. The notion of
trade-off is introduced and organisms are inter-
preted as best compromises among competing de-
mands. Thus interaction among parts is retained
completely within the adaptationist program. An
suboptimality of a part is explained as its contribu-
tion to the best possible design for the whole.”
(1979, p75) 
Surprisingly, DENNETT, in his book length defense
of adaptationism (1995), endorses a very similar def-
inition of it, proposed later by LEWONTIN. “[Adapta-
tionism] is defined by one of its most eminent critics
as the ‘growing tendency in evolutionary biology to
reconstruct or predict evolutionary events by assum-
ing that all characters are established in evolution by
direct natural selection of the most adapted state,
that is, the state that is the optimal ‘solution’ to a
‘problem’ posed by the environment.’ (LEWONTIN
1983) These critics claim that, although adaptation-
ism plays some important role in biology, it is not
really all that central or ubiquitous—and, indeed, we
should try to balance it with other ways of thinking.
I have been showing, however, that it plays a crucial
role in the analysis of every biological event at every
level from the first self-replicating macromolecule
on up.” (DENNETT 1995, p238)
So, given that both the most eminent critics and
the most ardent defender of adaptationism accept
the same definition of adaptationism, we will also
accept it. Thus, adaptationism is a methodology6
whereby one treats an organism as a set of traits, each
of which is selected for because it is the optimal struc-
ture available to selection for the fulfillment of its
function (see also the essays collected in ROSE/
LAUDER 1996). 
Now, finally, we can see the connection between
adaptationism and teleosemantics. If adaptationism
is bad methodology, that is, if most features of current
plants and animals were not selected for, then most
features of current plants and animals might not have
functions according to MILLIKAN’s definition. I say that
they might not have functions as opposed to saying
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that they do not have functions because adaptation-
ism is a methodology for understanding natural selec-
tion, but things could have been selected for by
agents. An object might be a member of a reproduc-
tively established family and have been selected for,
thereby having a function, in a way that has nothing
to do with evolution by natural selection. The ac-
count of sentence meaning described in (1s)–(4s)
above is just such an account. Evolution by natural
selection is not mentioned or relied upon there at all.
So here is the answer to the first part of question (1): 
Adaptationism could be entirely incorrect—it
could be false that anything has a function derived
from natural selection—and teleosemantics would
still be possible for sentences and other language de-
vices. 
This answer makes sense when we consider that
sentences and other language devices are tools, arti-
facts designed by people to serve certain purposes.
Just as it is unproblematic to assign functions to my
computer, independently of the correctness of adap-
tationism, (1s)–(4s) above show that it is also un-
problematic to assign (teleo)functions to sentences. 
It is worth pointing out that MILLIKAN would dis-
agree with this answer to the first question. As we
can see from MILLIKAN’s claim that the meaning of
language is basic, not derived, she would certainly
acknowledge the possibility that language devices get
their meaning differently than mental representa-
tions do. But she believes that in fact sentences are
able to perform their functions because they cause
mental representations in the hearer. Thus she
would claim that question (1), “How correct does
adaptationism need to be for teleosemantics to be
possible?”, should only get one answer. And, as we
shall now see, it is not the same one that I have given
in the case of language devices.
Unlike the story told for sentences, the account of
the teleosemantics of mental representations offered
above (1m–4m) does make ineliminable reference to
objects and mechanisms that evolved by natural se-
lection. The representation producer and the repre-
sentation consumer were both “designed” by natu-
ral selection to have the functions that they do: the
producer was selected for it’s ability to produce rep-
resentations that map features of the environment
according to the rules that the consumer uses; the
consumer was selected for its ability to use the rep-
resentation produced by the producer to initiate ap-
propriate behavior with respect to the content it (the
representation) maps. So, for teleosemantics for
mental representations to be possible, it must be the
case that certain portions of the brain were selected
for their abilities to produce and consume represen-
tations in the same language. Thus, we have the an-
swer to the second part of question (1): For teleose-
mantics of mental representations to be possible, adap-
tationism must be correct enough that the portions of the
brain that produce and consume representations were se-
lected for their abilities to do so, and, so, have producing
and consuming representations as their functions. MIL-
LIKAN realizes that this is true, and since she thinks
that there needs to be a unified account of linguistic
and mental representation, she claims that she
“needs to assume the truth of evolutionary theory in
order to show that quite mundane functional items
such as screwdrivers and kidneys are indeed items
with proper functions.” (1993, p16) By separating
the teleofunctional account of language from that of
mental representations we have shown that this is
not necessarily the case. 
We now have our answer to both parts of question
(1), and can proceed to attempt to answer the second
question: 
(2) Is adaptationism correct enough to support te-
leosemantics? 
Part of the answer to this question comes imme-
diately. Since the teleosemantic story told above for
sentences makes no reference to functions derived by
natural selection, the fate of adaptationism can have
no effect whatsoever. So, whatever our verdict on adap-
tationism as a methodology, it is trivially sufficient for
the teleosemantics of linguistic representations. The
pressing question, then, is “Is adaptationism suffi-
ciently correct for teleosemantics of mental repre-
sentations?” For it to be so, it must be the case that
the critiques of adaptationism that we will now con-
sider do not make it unreasonable to think that cer-
tain parts of the brain have producing and consum-
ing representations as their proper function. These
critiques will come in two main types—problems
with optimization and evolutionary free riders.
The first line of criticism of adaptationism con-
cerns the assumption made by adaptationist evolu-
tionary biologists that natural selection is guaran-
teed to optimize, that is, to produce a feature of an
organism that is ideally suited to perform some func-
tion made necessary by the organism’s environ-
ment. It turns out that this assumption is simply
false. KITCHER (1985) points out several ways in
which natural selection will fail to yield an optimal
solution to the “problem” posed by the environ-
ment. First, he describes the course of evolution at a
locus in a Bantu population. The combination of al-
leles available in this population and their relative
fitnesses combine so as to lead to the demise of the
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fittest combination of alleles. (See KITCHER 1985,
pp215–2167) Furthermore, there are several other
ways in which the most fit combination of alleles
just cannot be reached by the population, KITCHER
calls this the trajectory problem (“Intuitively, the idea
is that you can’t get there from here.” 1985, p216)
Such trajectory problems can be caused by a variety
of factors such as small populations, various vagaries
of chance, and interactions among gene loci. When
there are trajectory problems, the best “solution”
that can be hoped for is a local optimum, which is
best described by altering KITCHER’s description of
the trajectory problem—intuitively, the local opti-
mum is “the best you can get to from here”. And it is
often the case that once the population settles into
this local optimum, the global optimum is no longer
an available option. Thus, the adaptationist is wrong
in assuming that natural selection is guaranteed to
optimize. 
What concerns us, remember, given the failure of
natural selection to guarantee optimality, is the effect
that this might have on the likelihood that portions
of the brain might have representation production
and consumption as their functions. It seems that the
failure of guaranteed optimization has no effect on
this. These parts of the brain, supposing that they
exist, will still have been reproduced because of their
ability to produce and consume representations. And
it is still likely that they were selected for their ability
to do so, even if they are only locally optimal for so
doing. In other words, the fact that there might be,
somewhere in the vast space of possible brain config-
urations, some unavailable configuration that would
be even better at producing and consuming represen-
tations, does nothing to make it the case that the
existing structures do not have functions. Further-
more, even if the existing representation producers
and consumers are not the local optimum, this does
nothing to change the fact that it is overwhelmingly
likely that they were selected for their abilities. Thus,
this first line of criticism of adaptationism fails to
cause any difficulties for teleosemantics.
We must now consider the other main line of crit-
icism of adaptationism: free riders, cases where selec-
tion of objects, rather than selection for, certain traits
has occurred. SOBER (1984) has characterized this dis-
tinction in an illuminating way. He asks us to imag-
ine a toy with balls of different colors and sizes
(which are correlated in that every ball of a certain
size is the same color) inside a cylinder that is divided
into several chambers. Each divider between two
chambers has holes of a particular size, with the larg-
est holes between the top and second chamber, the
next largest holes between the second third and so
on all the way down (see SOBER, 1984, p99, for a pic-
ture of this toy). With such a toy, if all the balls are
placed in the top chamber and the toy is shaken, the
balls will eventually descend to the lowest chamber
with holes above it that they can fit through. Sup-
pose, as SOBER does, that only the green balls are
small enough to fit through all the holes and reach
the bottom chamber. 
“When the green balls reach the bottom more fre-
quently than the blue ones, we think that there must
have been a reason why. Green balls were selected;
so they must have had some property that was se-
lected for. But the property in question was not their
color. There was selection of green objects, but no
selection for greenness. I offer the following slogan to
summarize this logical point: ‘selection of’ does not
imply ‘selection for’.” (SOBER 1984, p100)
What this example shows is that since it is only
properties that can be selected for and any object has
many properties, there are likely to be evolutionary
free riders, properties of objects of which selection of
occurred, but without selection for the particular
property in question. The greenness of the balls that
were selected is just such a case—there was selection
of the green objects, but this selection was selection
for size, not greenness. Evolutionary free riders fig-
ure importantly in two separate critiques of adapta-
tionism associated with Stephen Jay GOULD (GOULD/
VRBA 1982, GOULD/LEWONTIN 1979). We shall now
turn our attention to these. 
GOULD/VRBA (1982) introduces a new term to evo-
lutionary biology. Exaptations, they say, are charac-
teristics that “evolved for other purposes (or for no
function at all), and [are] later ‘coopted’ for their cur-
rent role.” (1982, p6) So exaptations begin as free rid-
ers, and only later become useful for some purpose or
other. Adaptationism is incorrect, they say, because
it fails to consider that certain traits might be exap-
tations. To return to SOBER’s toy example, imagine
that the greenness of the balls, which, remember,
came along as a free rider when the smallness was
selected for, suddenly becomes quite a useful trait.
Imagine, for example, that the balls are seeds and
birds in their environment are, for whatever reason,
particularly good at spotting green seeds, which they
then ingest and excrete at some distant points,
thereby spreading these green seeds, and the plants
they grow into, widely. There was selection for the
smallness of the seeds, and selection of the seeds them-
selves, including such traits as their greenness. Thus,
GOULD/VRBA would say, the smallness of a seed is an
adaptation, the greenness is an exaptation. Since ad-
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aptations have functions and exaptations only have
effects, the greenness of the seeds has no function8
GOULD/VRBA even suggest that the cognitive and lan-
guage–using abilities of humans may be underwrit-
ten by exaptations in a brain whose features were
selected for quite different reasons.9 This, then, is a
direct assault on teleosemantics of mental represen-
tations. For if the features of brains that underly our
representation producers and consumers are exapta-
tions, if they exist in current humans as free riders
that came along with some other trait that was se-
lected for, then they can have no functions. So, tele-
osemantics for them is impossible.
The GOULD/VRBA critique, however, does not lead
us to this conclusion. This is the case because all cur-
rent adaptations are (or once were) exaptations—
they only begin as free riders. A thought experiment
from DENNETT 1995 can be used to make this point
nicely. Imagine that some American engineers in-
vent a device to recognize U.S. Treasury twenty-five
cent pieces in American vending machines. Call
such a device a “two-bitser” and imagine that it is
(re)produced and placed in most vending machines.
Each “two-bitser,” then, is a member of a reproduc-
tively established family and was selected for (by
manufacturers of vending machines) because of its
ability to recognize quarters, so its function is to do
just that. Now imagine that after years of working in
the United States, a vending machine that contains
a two-bitser is brought to Panama, where there is a
coin called (this is true, DENNETT tells us) a “quarter
Balboa” that is the same shape and weight and ap-
proximate value as U.S. quarters. The two-bitser, it
turns out, is also an excellent detector of quarter-
balboas, and is used as a “q-balber” for several years.
It is then an exaptation for the detection quarter bal-
boas. So, GOULD/VRBA would say, it has as an effect
the detection of quarter balboas, but its function is to
detect U.S. quarters. (see DENNETT, 1995, 404–407)
But now, going a small step beyond DENNETT’s
thought experiment, imagine that a Panamanian
manufacturer decides to build lots more of these de-
vices precisely because of their ability to detect quar-
ter balboas. The device now meets the conditions of
having acting as a “q-balber” as its function; so, it is
now also an adaptation for de-
tecting quarter balboas.
What this shows is that ad-
aptations must all have been
features of an organism that
were already present for some
other (or no particular) reason,
and were then pressed into ser-
vice in a certain job. In other words, all adaptations
must have begun as exaptations. So either there are
no exaptations (because once they are reproduced
because they can perform the effect they were exapted
for, they become adaptations, and so are no longer
exaptations) or exaptations have functions (because
adaptations do and all exaptations are also adapta-
tions). Neither of these two options can lead to diffi-
culties for the teleosemantics of mental representa-
tions. This is the case because parts of the brain that
act as representation producers and consumers, if
such there be, might be exaptations, but exaptations
have functions too.
The final critique of adaptationism we will con-
sider, and the first that might lead to some problems
for the teleosemantics of mental representations, is
another free rider criticism—GOULD/LEWONTIN
(1979). In this masterpiece of scientific rhetoric10,
GOULD/LEWONTIN decry the excesses of what they
term the “adaptationist program”—a name which
has stuck. They claim that adaptationism is a bad
scientific methodology because its practitioners tell
evolutionary “Just-so Stories”—assuming that a trait
is the optimum solution to an environmental prob-
lem, and imagine scenarios whereby natural selec-
tion “found it”— to explain the presence of particu-
lar traits, ignoring the possibility that the traits could
be free riders of one sort or another. GOULD/
LEWONTIN do not primarily protest the fact that ad-
aptationists prefer to tell these stories, rather than
examine non-selective factors such as pleiotropy,
linkage, genetic drift, allometry and developmental
constraints (although they are concerned with this).
Instead they are concerned about what they call
“Panglossianism”, the assumption that every trait
must be optimized for the environment, even in the
face of disconfirmation of their Just-so Stories. 
“We would not object so strenuously to the adap-
tationist program if its invocation, in any particular
case, could lead in principle to its rejection for want
of evidence. We might still view it as restrictive and
object to its status as an argument of first choice. But
if it could be dismissed after failing some explicit test,
then alternatives would get their chance. Unfortu-
nately a common procedure among evolutionists
does not allow such a definable
rejection for two reasons. First,
the rejection of one adaptive
story usually leads to its re-
placement by another, rather
than to a suspicion that a dif-
ferent kind of explanation
might be required. … Second,
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the criteria for acceptance of a story are so loose that
many pass without proper confirmation. Often, evo-
lutionists use consistency with natural selection as the
sole criterion and consider their work done when
they concoct a plausible story. But plausible stories
can always be told.” (1979, p79)
The point of the critique is that Panglossian adap-
tationists assume that there must be a selectionist
history for every trait, even if the ones thought of
thus far have been empirically disconfirmed and no
others are in the offing. This critique of adaptation-
ism is absolutely correct; evolutionary biologists, es-
pecially the sociobiologists who are the primary tar-
get of the argument, often do tend to ignore non-
selectionist explanations of features of current
plants and animals. This does not mean, however,
that all or most or even many adaptationist explana-
tions are incorrect. It also does not mean telling se-
lectionist stories for traits is usually bad methodol-
ogy or that natural selection is not the most impor-
tant factor in evolution (see p81). All the GOULD/
LEWONTIN critique shows is that we need to be cau-
tious adaptationists, always remembering that there
are alternatives to selectionist histories.
This, however, is enough to cause concern for the
proponent of teleosemantics of mental representa-
tions. We can see this if we consider again what the
theory requires. For there to be a teleosemantic the-
ory of mental representations, it must be the case that
(1) there are portions of the brain that produce and
consume representations and (2) it must be their
function to do so. (2) requires that there be an adap-
tive story, whereby the representation producers and
consumers have been selected for their ability to
trade in representations. And this is where the prob-
lems arise. The problems arise here because the tele-
osemantic story requires a selective history be told for
a pair of brain structures that could very well not exist.
That is, representation producers and representation
consumers are theoretical entities; no one is certain
that there are such things. Indeed if current explana-
tions offered in connectionist artificial intelligence
(RAMSEY 1997), dynamical systems theory (VAN
GELDER 1995) and artificial life (WHEELER 1996) are
generalizable to full explanations of cognition, cog-
nition in general may be non-representational. So to
invent an adapationist story explaining why repre-
sentation consumers and producers are they way
they are is to take part in the Panglossian excesses
that GOULD/LEWONTIN so rightly criticized. Thus, un-
less there is real confirmation that there are portions
of the brain devoted to the production and consump-
tion of representations (if there ever is such), we can-
not have a teleosemantics of mental representations
because it would require that we tell a Just-so Story
for two merely theoretical traits, which is incautious
adaptationism, to say the least. 
It is now time to take stock. What we have seen is
that our first question—how correct does adaptation-
ism need to be for teleosemantics to be possible?—
requires a separate answer for public language and
private mental representations. In the case of public
language, we can have a teleosemantics without ad-
aptationism being correct at all. It could even be the
case that no part of humans evolved by natural selec-
tion, yet teleosemantics for public language would
still be possible. For inner mental representations to
get a teleosemantics, however, it must be the case
that certain parts of the brain evolved by natural se-
lection and so have functions. To claim that this is
the case, even when there is no direct evidence that
there are these parts, is Panglossian bad methodology
of the kind that GOULD/LEWONTIN rightly object to.
Thus we cannot conclude that representation con-
sumers and producers have proper functions, which
they must have for teleosemantics to be possible. Al-
though adaptationism is correct enough for a teleo-
functional account of sentences and the like, it fails
to be so for mental representation. 
The problem we have seen here is that teleoseman-
tics of mental representations requires that the brain
evolved in a particular way; it requires a Just-so Story
for objects that might not exist. These objects might
not exist because it is less than certain that what the
brain does is manipulate representations. Although
it is difficult to doubt that the brain is the organ that
organizes and coordinates the activities that consti-
tute thinking or intelligent behavior in some broad
sense, it is certainly possible (even likely, perhaps)
that most of what we call thinking is not the manip-
ulation of representations. Perhaps our ability to do
business in representations at all is dependent upon
the fact that we all learn public languages. Thus we
ought to be skeptical of the claim that the brain (or
parts of it) is an adaptation for producing and con-
suming representations; we ought, also, to be skepti-
cal of theories of meaning that depend upon this
claim. 
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Notes
1  In this paper, I will use ‘function’, ‘proper function’, and
sometimes even ‘teleofunction’ interchangably.  Anything
that I will claim has a function (simpliciter) satisfies MILLI-
KAN’s definition of proper function, and proper functions
are a variety of teleofunctions.
2 This however is not quite the case.  This definition fails to
cover newly invented devices that have not (yet) been re-
produced.  The same holds for neo-logisms which seem to
have stipulated meaning even if never spoken again.  This
fault could be rectified by adding another clause to the def-
inition.
3 This is the case because we will be considering what might
be called revisionist critiques in this paper.  More revolu-
tionary critiques would argue that the problems with evo-
lutionary biology are deeper than the rampant adaptation-
ism that GOULD and LEWONTIN and VRBA decry.  Examples
of more revolutionary critiques include SAGAN/MARGULIS
1991, BUSS 1987, and some of the essays collected in ROSE/
LAUDER 1996.
4 Representations are different from other intentional icons
in that they are used in inferences.  Henceforth, we will not
worry about this difference. (see MILLIKAN 1993, pp106–
116)
5 One may wonder at this stage why it is a function of the
hearer to respond to tokens of sentences in given ways.  In
the case where the hearer is a waiter or waitress, it is clearly
one of the hearer’s functions to bring what the speaker re-
quests. In the case of coming to believe the content of S, it
is the function of the hearer because (1) beliefs that p cer-
tainly form a reproductively established family, and (2) be-
lieving the content of the sentence, in normal circumstanc-
es, is something selected for—the hearer believes the spo-
ken content, rather than something else, because doing so
has had a great variety of positive effects in past hearing-
events.
6 I will refer to adaptationism as a methodology (rather than
a theory) and wonder whether or not it is correct (rather
than whether it is true) in order to avoid controversies over
whether or not adaptationism constitutes a theory.  I take
it as uncontroversial that adaptationism is at least a meth-
odology (a set of tools for dealing with a certain class of
problems—see e.g.  KITCHER 1985), even if some might dis-
pute that it is a full-fledged theory (whether of a first- or
higher-order).  Resolving this issue is beyond the scope of
the present paper.  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for
this journal for raising this issue.
7 The alleles and fitnesses are as follows: A, S and C are ini-
tially present; most members of the population are AA; AS
is fitter than AA; SS is lethal; C is recessive to A; CS is less fit
than AA; CC is the most it pair.  In such a population, C is
eliminated, and so the most fit pair CC is also eliminated,
despite the fact that it was present initially. (see KITCHER
1985, p215)
8 The (now classic) example GOULD/VRBA discuss is the flip-
pers of sea turtles. The flippers, they claim, are adaptations
for swimming that also serve reasonably well as diggers, an
activity for which they have been exapted. See MILLIKAN
1993, pp41–50, for a criticism of this particular case.
9 “Most of what the brain now does to enhance our survival
lies in the domain of exaptation—and does not allow us to
make hypotheses about the selective path of human histo-
ry.” (1982, p13)
10 SELZER 1993 is an entire book devoted to analyzing the writ-
ing style of this paper.
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Synergetics as a 
promising research 
program
Synergetics, or the the-
ory of self-organization
and evolution, which
originated mainly in the
natural sciences (nonlin-
ear mathematical analy-
sis, nonequilibrium
thermodynamics, the
theory of deterministic
chaos and fractal
research), is increasingly
demonstrating its useful-
ness in analyzing cogni-
tive and cultural
processes in humans.
Synergetics is fruitful in
unravelling some mys-
teries of the human con-
sciousness and human
psychology. The philo-
sophical content of the synergetic concepts and
ideas is rather rich. It ’s reasonable to make an
attempt to build synergetics into “the body of cul-
ture” carrying out a comparative analysis of the syn-
ergetic notions and historical and cultural images.
The theory of self-organization is a new interdisci-
plinary (or multidisciplinary) trend of scientific
research. It is the theory that mostly determines a
character of the modern post-nonclassical stage of
development of science. The rapid development of
the theory is connected with the names of such
scholars, as HAKEN (1978, 1996), PRIGOGINE (PRIGOG-
INE/STENGERS 1984), KURDYUMOV (1989, 1990), LAS-
ZLO (1995), MANDELBROT (1982), MORIN (1992),
VARELA (MATURANA/VARELA 1988).
Within the framework of synergetics, some laws
of evolution and self-organization of complex sys-
tems are in the process of investigation now. The
theory might be used as a general methodological
tool, since it is oriented to-
wards the search for com-
mon patterns of evolution
of complex systems of any
kind, regardless of con-
crete nature of their ele-
ments or subsystems. The
synergetic models can be
applied to understand hu-
man cognitive and cul-
tural activities as well as
the management of com-
plex sociocultural systems
(KNYAZEVA 1998).
Synergetics can be con-
sidered as one of the mod-
ern, most promising re-
search programs. The
development of synerget-
ics entails deep changes in
the conceptual net
through which we com-
prehend the world. A new
synergetic worldview is in
the process of formation. It means a shift of para-
digm, a radical conceptual transition from being to
becoming, from stability to sustainability, from im-
ages of order to chaos generating new ordered evolv-
ing structures, from self-maintaining systems to fast
evolution through a nonlinear positive feedback,
from evolution to coevolution, reciprocal evolution
of different complex systems. The new synergetic
style of thinking is evolutionary nonlinear and ho-
listic. This is a modern stage of development within
the traditions of cybernetics and the general theory
of systems. However, many elements of the latter
have undergone important changes since their ap-
pearance.
Synergetics is a multi-faceted phenomenon in
modern science. The epistemological dimension of
synergetics constitutes the synergetics of cognition,
the application of evolutionary nonlinear, syner
getic models to the comprehension of the human
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cognitive and creative processes. The investigations
fall into the frames of Evolutionary Epistemology
(EE) (RIEDL/DELPOS 1996; OESER 1988, 1996; VOLLMER
1984, 1994; WUKETITS 1991).
Two different research programs have been distin-
guished in EE (OESER 1996, p16–17; WUKETITS 1991).
The first program includes the investigation of the
human cognitive capacities as products of biological
evolution. The second program has an aim to ex-
plain the development of science in structural anal-
ogy to biological evolution. The application of syn-
ergetics to epistemology is relevant to the second
research program “evolutionary theory of science”,
but our current attention in the light of synergetics
is focused mostly on the individual level of the sci-
entific knowledge development.
Models which are derived from evolutionary biol-
ogy are still being widely used in evolutionary epis-
temology. Synergetics elaborates more profound
and fundamental evolutionary models which are
based on interdisciplinary knowledge. The applica-
tion of such models might open up new perspectives
of research in the field of evolutionary epistemology.
Several metaphorical notions or thought-images,
could be verbalized within a synergetic approach in
relation to human beings. These are as follows:
B patterns of self-organization and geometries of
human behavior;
B fractal pictures of historical events;
B individual (or sociocultural) mental landscapes,
in which yesterday–today–tomorrow are simulta-
neously and totally available;
B situations “here and now” as those places where
an unknown past meets an emergent future;
B cognitive maps of human mind and human ac-
tion;
B distribution and topological configuration of al-
ready occupied social niches in the collective social
activities;
B pictures of “thickening of innovations” in culture
(the splash of talented people) and “rarefying of in-
novations”.
It seems that the images originating from syner-
getics could become points of knowledge growth in
the humanities.
Basic model and its methodological 
consequences 
The methodological consequences presented here
are based on the analysis of the results of mathemat-
ical modeling and computational experiments with
the evolutionary processes in open nonlinear media
(or systems), conducted by the Moscow Synergetic
School at the Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathe-
matics (Russian Academy of Sciences) headed by
Sergei P. KURDYUMOV and at the Institute of Mathe-
matical Modeling (RAS) led by Alexander A. SAMAR-
SKII. A number of these results have been obtained
and proven in form of mathematical theorems.
Therefore, the new synergetic notions and their
applications to epistemology have a solid founda-
tion in the mathematical developments.
The synergetic models of burning and heat con-
duction (diffusion) processes are the most widely
used models claiming to be capable of explaining
many paradoxical features of self-organization. The
process of self-organization is mainly connected
with the appearance of localized (despite heat con-
duction) sources of burning (chemical reactions):
dissipative structures arise on an active (burning)
medium. Self-organizing structures of burning serve
as one of paradigmatic examples of synergetics.
The scholars of the Keldysh Institute of Applied
Mathematics and of the Institute of Mathematical
Modeling (both of the Russian Academy of Sciences)
managed to discover mechanisms of localization,
structure-formation in open nonlinear media (sys-
tems) and their evolution (reconstruction, integra-
tion and disintegration) (see ACHROMEEVA et al. 1989;
KURDYUMOV 1990; SAMARSKII et al. 1995 for more de-
tails). The internal mechanism of the structures gen-
eration is an interplay between two opposite factors
in a medium: a nonlinear source and a dissipative
factor. On one hand, the work of a nonlinear source
leads to creation of inhomogeneities in a continuous
medium. The nonlinear source can be of a different
kind: source of energy, information or infection. It
can be an active medium in the nuclear reactor which
generates an avalanche flow of neutrons, or it can be
a source of knowledge (for instance, an influential
scientific school which creates new knowledge
spreading over the scientific community) or a center
of infectious diseases. Nonlinearity means the fol-
lowing property of the source: the more is a deviance
from equilibrium, the faster the process goes. You
may imagine how a skier is going downhill and the
hill is becoming more and more steep. Moreover, it
may be a distributed nonlinear source which acts in
every local area of an open medium (complex sys-
tem) and produces self-stimulating growth all over
the space of the medium (system).
On the other hand, there is the factor which dis-
sipates, scatters about inhomogeneities in the me
dium. It can be of various nature as well: diffusion,
dispersion, hydrodynamics, etc. It can be diffusion
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of neutrons, or diffusion (dissemination) of knowl-
edge, or diffusion (spreading) of infectious diseases.
The basic model used is as follows: 
where σ > 0, β > 1, τ > 0, – ∞ < x < + ∞.
σ is coefficient of nonlinearity of diffusion in the
equation. It is indicator of dissipative processes of
different kinds. β is coefficient of nonlinearity of a
source. It shows a strength of factor which creates
inhomogeneities in a corresponding continuous
medium.
Depending on a result of competition of these two
complementary factors, three various regimes of the
processes development can be established in a corre-
sponding open nonlinear medium (system; see fig-
ure 1).
If β = σ + 1, i.e. a work of nonlinear source is in
conformity with dissipative processes in a medium,
the process will develop in S-regime.
This is a mode of the process development with
peaking when the process becomes localized and de-
velops with peaking inside a certain area, the funda-
mental length Ls. It is a kind of “standing wave” of
burning.
If β is less than σ + 1 , i.e. intensity of dissipative,
scattering processes is more than the strength of
nonlinear source, HS-regime of evolution will be es-
tablished. This is a type of the process development
in an open nonlinear medium when there is no lo-
calization (localized structures), all heterogeneities
are washed away. The evolutionary regime is a “wave
of burning” which infinitely spreads over the space.
It is a “diverging and growing wave of burning”.
If β is more than σ + 1 , i.e. the factor creating
heterogeneities in a medium (work of nonlinear
source) is considerably stronger than the dissipative,
scattering factor, evolution occurs in LS-regime. This
is a certain type of the process development with
peaking in an open nonlinear medium when the in-
creasingly intensive development of a process occurs
in a more and more narrow area near a maximum.
In this case we observe a “converging and growing
wave of burning”: the process develops very fast,
while its effective area of localization diminishes.
The main feature of the LS-regime is that it devel-
ops slower than the S-regime. The feature is reflected
in its name: “L” means “lower” than the S-mode. On
the contrary, “H” in the name of the HS-regime
means “higher” than the S-mode.
The third case is the most interesting. The above
mentioned nonlinear equation has here a set of qual-
itatively different solutions, i.e. eigenfunctions of
different complexity. Their number is described by
a simple formula: 
The set is defined only by inner properties of a
corresponding medium and can be considered as a
mathematical representation of a spectrum of possi-
ble evolutionary paths (structure–attractors) of the
medium. If we consider our paradigmatic example
of self-organizing structures of burning, we have a
spectrum of different forms of localized burning, so
to say “crystals of burning”. The phenomenon has
been investigated by the Moscow synergetic school
and is termed an “inertia of heat” (“inertia of burn-
ing”) (ACHROMEEVA et el. 1989).
A number of general and important consequences
can be derived from the model (KNYAZEVA/
KURDYUMOV 1994). This quite simple mathematical
model is very profound. It reflects and describes
some general features in the behavior of complex
systems: an interplay of two complementary factors
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in the systems and ways of localization of processes,
structures construction in them.
First. Synergetics discovers laws and conditions for
very fast, avalanche-like processes, blow-up regimes.
The above described S-, HS- and LS-modes are main
kinds of blow-up regimes. These are processes when
some characteristic parameters (temperature, en-
ergy, information etc.) infinitely grow during a finite
period of time. Q (t) → ∞, when t → tf. tf is the blow-
up time, time of peaking. Of course, the infinite
growth is impossible in real systems of the world. But
the rapid growth of the characteristic values in sev-
eral orders, sometimes even in several times, allows
to observe a number of astonishing effects which
have been predicted by the theory of blow-up re-
gimes.
Blow-up regimes are under investigation now in
more than sixty different fields of research, starting
from plasma physics (laser thermonuclear synthesis)
and meteorology (catastrophic phenomena in atmo-
sphere), ecology (rapid growth and sudden dying
out of biological population), neurophysiology (the
modeling of signal propagation along neural nets)
and epidemiology (spreading of infections). There
are similar blow-up regimes in human psychology,
social and cultural development. The growth of in-
formation and the population on the Earth proceed
according to hyperbolic rather than exponential
law, i.e. the processes occur in blow-up regimes.
It is important to understand how we can initiate
such processes in open nonlinear systems, for in-
stance on the field of human brain and conscious-
ness, and what are requirements for avoiding the
probabilistic decay of developed complicated struc-
tures near the moment of their maximal growth
(moment of peaking).
Second. Synergetics reveals the creative role of
chaos in the evolutionary processes of nonlinear
complex systems. There must be a certain degree of
chaos and destruction in the world. Small fluctua-
tions, i.e.chaos on the micro-level of a complex sys-
tem play an essential role in determining actual
trends (“aims”) of processes which occur on a macro-
level of the system. Chaos is a mechanism underly-
ing the choice of one evolutionary stabile structure-
attractors. The macro-organization emerges from a
disorder,from chaos on micro-level.
Dissipative processes, being a macroscopic mani-
festation of micro-chaos, constitute a necessary
complementary factor in our model of structure–for-
mation in open nonlinear media. Dissipation acts in
the same way as a sculptor, who chisels and shapes
a statue from a block of marble.
Order and chaos, organization and disorganiza-
tion, constructive force (a nonlinear source) and dis-
sipation seem to be well-balanced in the world.
Thus, it is senseless to resist chaos, or to strive for
complete eliminating undesirable, chaotic elements
from the world. They are necessary conditions for
self-organization.
Besides, chaos serves as a basis for integration of
relatively simple evolutionary structures into more
complex ones. It is a mechanism for coordinating
their tempos of evolution. Chaos, fluctuations on
micro-level, can also be a way of evolutionary
switching, making a transition from one evolution-
ary regime to another one possible.
Third. The evolution of complex structures under-
goes an alternation of various regimes of process de-
velopment. There can not be sharp growth of a struc-
ture without a threat of its fall and destruction. There
are some universal laws which govern these rhythms.
They are peculiar to living beings as well as to complex
structures in inanimate nature. There are cyclical
changes of state: upsurge – slump – stagnation – up-
surge – slump, etc. Only obeying these “life rhythms”,
or oscillatory modes, complex systems can maintain
their integrity and develop dynamically.
The synergetic models used here allow to describe
such mechanism of self-maintenance peculiar to
complex structures. In addition to the HS-mode with
peaking, there is a HS-regime of “cooling” with de-
creasing intensity of the processes and infinitely
scattering wave. For open media (systems) with
strong nonlinearity, periodic change of two opposite
regimes, the LS-mode with peaking and the HS-
mode of “cooling” takes place with high probability.
Thus, under certain conditions a mode of localiza-
tion and structure–formation, i.e. the LS-regime, is
established in an open nonlinear medium. The mode
keeps chaos in a definite form. But developed local-
ized structures turn out to be unstable with regard to
chaotic disturbances, fluctuations on a micro-level.
The fluctuations destroy an available synchroniza-
tion of speeds in different fragments of a complex
structure, and the structure comes to be in danger of
a decay. There is a possibility to avoid the process of
decay, if a change-over to an opposite evolutionary
regime occurs in good time. This is the HS-regime of
“cooling” and diverging wave, a renewal of some old
tracks. The mechanism of auto-oscillations between
these two complimentary regimes (HS- ↔ LS-) resem-
bles the oriental image of Yin–Yang.
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Fourth. One of the most astonishing consequences
of synergetics is the notion of discrete spectrum of
evolutionary paths. If we choose an arbitrary path of
evolution, we have to be aware that this particular
option may not be feasible in a given complex sys-
tem. Only a definite set of evolutionary pathways is
“allowed”; only certain kinds evolutionary struc-
ture–attractors can emerge. This is a kind of evolu-
tionary prohibition rules (KNYAZEVA/HAKEN 1997).
According to our models, localized meta-stable
structures arise in the LS-regime with peaking. The
estimated number of possible structures can be quite
large, but it is limited. The spectrum of possible
structure–attractors is by no means a continuous
one. The spectrum corresponds to a set of eigenfunc-
tions of nonlinear equation describing the evolu-
tionary processes in a certain complex system.
Here the question of pre-determination of evolu-
tionary processes arises. Although the future states
of complex systems actually escape our control and
prediction, and the future is open, not unequivocal,
there are definite spectra of “purposes” of develop-
ment, i.e. of evolutionary structure–attractors, in
open nonlinear systems. There is, so to speak, a “tacit
knowledge” on the part of complex system them-
selves, because these spectra are determined exclu-
sively by inner properties of the systems.
Thus, the future is open in form of spectra of pre-
determined possibilities.
The evolutionary structure–attractors as possible
forms of future organization determine the course of
historical events. The future is in some sense avail-
able in the present. Patterns precede processes. They
can be interpreted as a “memory of the future”. All
the attempts that go beyond one of possible basins
of attraction are futile attempts. Everything which is
not in accordance with the structure–attractors will
be wiped out, annihilated. For example, a human
can fight unconsciously against those forces (some
latent attitudes and plans as structure–attractors)
that “pull him” from the future, but all these at-
tempts are doomed to failure.
Fifth. Further consequences of the synergetic mod-
els under consideration include some new principles
which govern the emergence of complex evolution-
ary totalities from simpler elements. A complex
structure is an integration of structures of “different
ages”, that is: structures at different evolutionary
stages. The principles which govern the integration
of such structures of “different ages” are gradually
being revealed. The integration of relatively simple
structures into a complex one occurs by the estab-
lishment of a common tempo of development in all
unified parts (fragments, simple structures). Struc-
tures of ‘different ages’ start to co-exist in one and
the same “tempo-world”. The term “tempo-world”
proposed here signifies “a world having a certain rate
(tempo) of development”. The rate of development
is the most important characteristic in the process of
assembling of a complex evolutionary whole.
Sixth. Due to synergetics we acquire knowledge how
it is possible to multiply reduce time and efforts in
order to generate, by a resonant influence, the desir-
able and, what is no less important, feasible struc-
tures in a given complex system. It proves that man-
aging influences must not be energetic, but rightly
topologically organized. Weak, but proper, so called
resonant, influences upon complex systems are of
great efficiency.
This feature of complex organizations had been
guessed thousands years ago by the father of Taoism,
LAO-TSU. It was expressed as the weak defeats the
strong, the soft defeats the hard, the low defeats the
loud. Considered from the modern point of view,
complex systems turn to possess a property of selec-
tive topological sensitivity. They demonstrate unex-
pected strong replies to excitations which are rele-
vant to their inner structural organizations, i.e. to
resonant excitations.
The creative mind from the synergetic 
point of view 
The task of applying synergetic models for a better
understanding of cognitive evolution and the
growth of scientific knowledge is part of the prob-
lems raised by evolutionary epistemology. There are
only few publications devoted to the subject so far.
E.g. the works of HAKEN (1996), HAKEN/STADLER
(1990), KRIZ (1997), VOLLMER (1984).
To consider the creative mind from the synergetic
point of view is a challenging, but difficult task. As
HAKEN puts it, “Creativity appears to be the deepest
of all puzzles concerning the brain. It means the
birth of thoughts that have never been generated
before and, in particular, whose generation was ex-
tremely unlikely. One may compare the creation of
a new idea to a jigsaw puzzle” (HAKEN 1996, p304–
305).
The application of synergetics to the human cog-
nitive processes is currently under discussion. Syner-
getics can be applied, because it is oriented to the
revelation of the universal patterns of evolution and
self-organization of complex systems of any kind.
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Synergetics tries to construct certain bridges be-
tween inanimate and animate nature, between the
quasi-purposes of natural systems and human ratio-
nality, between the birth of something new in na-
ture, the so called “creativity of nature”, and the cre-
ative and imaginative capabilities of a human being.
There is a complex mutual connection of con-
scious and unconscious processes, purposeful and
spontaneous ones, the processes of organization and
self-organization in human mind. Cognitive activi-
ties can contain synergetic mechanisms, which oc-
cur regardless of the scientists’ intentions and free
creative aspirations. The mechanisms concern these
processes which are realized, so to say, “above the
creating minds”.
In relation to the development of scientific
knowledge and creative processes on the individual
level, it is reasonable to search the synergetic mech-
anisms in those processes which are not under the
control of consciousness, which occur on both sub-
conscious and unconscious levels. If we consider the
growth of knowledge on the level of collective activ-
ity of the scientific community, the mechanisms of
self-organization are connected with some unpre-
dictable consequences of the scientists creative work
as well as with the integration of the actions of indi-
vidual scientists into general trends of scientific re-
search. To underline the relevance of the synergetic
approach to the evolution of scientific knowledge
three arguments ahould be noted. These are as fol-
lows:
B first, the role of the cooperative, coherent effects
in science (for instance, an appearance of a new sci-
entific paradigm is connected with the establish-
ment of some coherent, synergetic patterns of
behavior),
B second, the fruitfulness of the approach devel-
oped by post-structuralists (LYOTARD, DELEUZE, DERR-
IDA, KRISTEVA),
B third, the long approbation and the constructive
value of information theory. Formation of struc-
tures of scientific knowledge can be described in
terms of the theory.
In the light of synergetics, some peculiarities of
cognitive and creative activities can be reinterpreted
and seen in an unusual way. The alternative ways
and the scenarios of creative thinking, the latent at-
titudes and pre-determinations, self-completion of
the whole images, deliverance from gaps in available
nets of knowledge are the most important of these
prculiarities. In this connection, it’s worth to com-
pare the functioning of human intuition with med-
itation in yoga and Buddhism. Here a number of new
heuristic images could be proposed and investigated,
namely:
B how to erase the old traces of memory and to
make room for something new;
B consciousness as a treasure-house carrying in it-
self traces of the past activities and complete images
of the future;
B an hierarchy of subconsciousness – conscious-
ness – super-consciousness as a connection of differ-
ent tempo-worlds (these are worlds developing with
different rates);
B the rhythms of the creative activities which are
similar to the Yin–Yang rhythms of the universe;
B a peculiar state of a meditating man, i.e. human
being as a device extremely sensitive to all happen-
ing in the universe, a kind of resonance of a medi-
tating mind with universe;
B a danger of splitting of the human consciousness
due to the construction of a super-complex struc-
ture on a field of consciousness–unconsciousness
during the meditation experiments;
B ways of starting the “adventures of conscious-
ness”, facilitating the intuitive activity by the topo-
logically rightly organized influences upon the
human brain and mind.
The functioning of creative intuition and imagi-
nation in general can be considered in the light of
synergetics as a process of self-organization and of
self-completion of visual and mental images, ideas,
notions, and thoughts. The term of “self-organiza-
tion” means here a spontaneous (accidental, unpre-
dictable) growth of structures of new knowledge as
well as their own growth which is determined by in-
herent laws. The self-completion of visual images
and ideas is the filling up gaps in the nets of knowl-
edge and the self-construction of a whole from parts.
Cognitive chaos, in the sense of an openness to
multiple alternatives, plays a positive, stimulating
role in creative thinking. At the initial stage of cre-
ative intuition, a maximal widening of the creative
field takes place. The maximally possible variety of
elements of knowledge seems to be embraced. Be-
sides, the proper balancing of the main and the sub-
ordinate, the essential and the non-essential, that is
the radical revaluation of all cognitive values in front
of the creative aims (they may be conceivable in a
more or less degree) is the base for productive choice
of an idea. The initial wandering over a net of mental
steps serves as a good preparation to the innovative
leap of thoughts.
The notion of evolutionary attractors which de-
termine the trends of development of available
knowledge is of great importance for the explana-
Evolution and Cognition ❘ 151 ❘ 1998, Vol. 4, No. 2
The Synergetic View of Human Creativity
tion of the mechanisms for creative thinking. If a
system falls into the cone of certain attractor, it will
inevitably evolve towards this relatively stable state.
The central thesis can be formulated in the form
of a paradox: new knowledge is emergent, it is not
derivable from the elements of the available con-
scious knowledge, and at the same time the knowl-
edge is latently pre-determined in the present ele-
ments. The translation of knowledge from the
potential to the actual is non-trivial and means the
event of discovery. The appearance of a specific cre-
ative state—an inspiration—means, from the syner-
getic point of view, hitting the field of one of the
creative attractors. The notions in their essential fea-
tures concur with the notion of attitude in Gestalt–
psychology, namely: anticipation, determining ten-
dency, latent attitude, organizing principle, gradient
of purpose, etc.
The mechanism of self-organization and self-
completion of the visual and mental images in-
cludes, first, the purposefulness to an emerging
whole. Of course, there is no certain image of the
whole, but only a direction to the whole. The atti-
tude (a plan, a main idea or a conjecture) serves as a
“guiding thread” of the search. This is an attractor
for creative activities.
Second, the selection, the cutting off “all that is
unnecessary” takes place on the basis of the initial
increase of variety, the revaluation of cognitive val-
ues. The latent attitudes taking a selective role. The
mechanism of creative thinking is not an accidental
sorting of variants.
It is a choice of the main element in order to or-
ganize a whole structure. The self-organization oc-
curs around a key element. The intellectual creative
work as well as creative writing are connected with
the pitiless exclusion of many ideas and images
which were admitted a little bit earlier during the
stage of cognitive chaos.
Third, the mechanism of self-organization in cre-
ative thinking can be presented as a process of filling
up gaps in the nets of knowledge, a self-completion
of ideas and a self-assembly of a complete image. Not
simply the instantaneous organization of a whole
structure takes place, as it was assumed by Gestalt-
psychologists. According to the synergetic models,
creative thinking is the growth of a whole from its
parts as a result of spontaneous and intrinsic compli-
cation of the parts. The flow of thoughts and images
becomes complicated because this is a way of reali-
sation of ist inner potentials. The flow builds itself
spontaneously. Fourth, the scientific discovery
might be interpreted as a reorganization within a
field of questions. It might be seen as a crystallization
of knowledge, an transition to a new structure. A
successful creative work in science often leads to
whole series of new knowledge crystallizations. This
process to a great extent is irreversible. Discoveries
influence their creator, they transform his personal-
ity. A multitude of talent crystallizations may occur
in the individual life of a truly creative scholar.
Blow-up in the cognitive field 
Insight. Fast and sudden solution of a problem.
Insight, i.e. very rapid and sudden finding of ways
how to solve a problem, is one of the most astonish-
ing events in human creative activities.
Insight is still hardly explainable by pure logical
means. A huge concentration of cognitive activities
serves as a prerequisite, a necessary, but not suffi-
cient, pre-condition for unexpected flashes of in-
sight. A similar concentration, a kind of tightening
into a point, constitutes a due stage of meditation in
practice of yoga as well as of CHAN and ZEN Bud-
dhism.
Here one could try to apply the synergetic model
of the LS-regime with peaking. A localized meta-sta-
ble dissipative structure converges to a center in the
regime. In addition, the structure develops tremen-
dously fast when it reaches a blow-up point. Near
the blow-up moment, changes occur only in a nar-
row area around a center of the structure. The main
fragments of the structure are already stopped, “fro-
zen” processes which, in a sense, have fallen into the
past. A final architecture of the structure includes
these “frozen pieces” of the past as well as the
squeezed, swiftly completing (near the blow-up
point) future. Insight really means an innovative
crystallization of knowledge as well as a break-
through into the future.
A culminating moment of insight—an enlighten-
ment, or an Aha-experience—looks as the most mys-
terious one. In our mathematical model, there is an
infinite growth of function near the blow-up point.
There is a special condition for establishing the
LS-regime in an open nonlinear media: a nonlinear
source should act more intensive than a dissipative,
scattering factor. In order to stimulate the work of
intuition and to create conditions for insight flashes,
a human has to concentrate his own energy. He has
to organize such a blow-up regime, when the inner
sources of energy are stronger than factors of distrac-
tion, scattering and dissipative flows of an ordinary
way of life.
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As a result of intensive mental activity a highly
complicated structure of the LS-regimes, probably
with a number of different maxima of intensity, may
develop in a field of consciousness–subconscious-
ness. The structure becomes unstable near the blow-
up point and is exposed to danger of decay.
A breach of synchronization between different
fragments of the complicated structure (different
maxima of intensity of the processes) may lead to the
rupture of interactions between them. The ex-
tremely complicated structure developed in the hi-
erarchical field of consciousness may disintegrate
into a number of separate and isolated conscious-
nesses.
In this connection it’s worth to remember re-
peated warnings in the Eastern studies that one
should be occupied with meditation only under the
supervision and observation of a teacher, Guru, and
that it is dangerous to follow this path of meditation
completely independent, especially for the first
time. What was the sense of these warnings? Was it,
perhaps, a conjecture about the danger of disintegra-
tion of the complex structure in the field of con-
sciousness? Was it the threat of its splitting? Some
scientists who investigate human creative abilities
actually argue that genius people often have various
mental diseases, including schizophrenia (literally
means from Greek “to split the mind”). They try to
find schizophrenic deviations in EINSTEIN’s activity
and draw up whole lists of geniuses who supposedly
suffered from mental disorders (DESCARTES, PASCAL,
NEWTON, KANT, SCHOPENHAUER, NIETZSCHE, etc.).
According to the modern theory of self-organized
criticality which is a special point of interest at the
Santa Fe Institute (New Mexico, USA), any complex
organization is wise, but very fragile. It is poised on
the “edge of chaos” in such a way that the best next
step towards its further complication and even im-
provement may lead to a destructive avalanche
(KAUFFMAN 1995, p29). In this sense, a genius who
operates with complicated structures of knowledge
poises between the wisdom and the madness. The
complicated cognitive structures evolve to a danger-
ous edge of chaos.
Human creativity is subjected to certain rhythms.
The break-through to a new and the fast growth of
knowledge, the explosion of creative activities usu-
ally follow the periods of delay and stopping, the
slowing down of processes. According to the syner-
getic models, the HS-regime of “cooling” and “scat-
tering wave” precedes the LS-regime of localization,
the rapid growth and the formation of structures.
The experience of thousand years in the study in
creativity shows the necessity of the stage of relax-
ation against the back-cloth of an intensive mental
work and the turning to another forms of activities
or to the regime of sleep.
Therefore, it is senseless to hasten the events. Un-
til the stage of spreading over the old tracks in the
HS-regime, the revival of the processes in subcon-
sciousness and the maturing of hypotheses and ideas
have not been passed through, there can be no stage
of the LS-regime when the fast formulation and ver-
balization of something already matured in subcon-
sciousness takes place. Until there was no dipping
into a slowed down world of subconsciousness, there
will be no active work of consciousness.
Instabilities. The idea is in the air. The situations
when “an idea is in the air” happen rather often in
science. These situations lead to simultaneous, or
parallel, and independent discoveries. The examples
of such discoveries are numerous in the history of
science. It’s well worth mentioning the dispute be-
tween NEWTON and LEIBNIZ about the priority of de-
velopment of mathematical analysis, the simulta-
neous construction of non-EUCLIDEAN geometry by
Russian mathematician LOBACHEVSKY and Hungar-
ian scholar BOLYAI, the parallel developments in spe-
cial theory of relativity obtained by EINSTEIN, LORENZ
and POINCARÉ.
These situations look like it is not people who are
looking for ideas, but the ideas themselves are look-
ing for people. The very scientific medium prepares
and ‘pushes forward’ its heroes, because correspond-
ing discoveries are completely matured in its depths.
Such kind of situations were described by DUHEM:
“The idea is in the air, carried from one country to
another by a gust of wind, and is ready to fertilize
any genius who is disposed to welcome it and de-
velop it, as with pollen giving birth to a fruit wher-
ever it meets a ripe calyx. In the course of his studies,
the historian of the sciences constantly has opportu-
nities to observe this simultaneous emergence of the
same doctrine in countries far from one another, but
no matter how frequently this phenomenon occurs,
he can never contemplate it without astonishment”
(DUHEM 1991, p255). He gives an example: “The sys-
tem of universal gravity germinate in the minds of
Hooke, Wren, and Halley at the same time that it was
being organized in the mind of NEWTON” (DUHEM
1991, ibid.).
Is there a synergetic analogy of such situations
generating discoveries? According to synergetic
comprehension of evolutionary processes, “the idea
is in the air”, “spirit of the times” (“Zeitgeist”) and
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the other similar clichés are ways of describing a spe-
cific state of the scientific medium, or a peculiar
mental disposition in the corresponding scientific
community. This is the state of instability.
Instability means a high sensitivity of a scientific
medium towards small changes and advances in so-
lutions of scientific problems. Synergetics shows
that a medium in such a state of instability can (due
to a nonlinear positive feedback) repeatedly multi-
ply small fluctuations and perturbations and de-
velop them into some new macroscopic ordered
states. In the states of instability, there is a mutual
connection of different levels of reality. Depending
on the instability of the scientific medium, a certain
connection between the level of individual creative
activity and scientific discoveries on the one hand,
and the level of activity of scientific community and
scientific innovations on the other hand, can be es-
tablished. In such states, small shifts on the individ-
ual level may lead to appearance of a new collective
cognitive pattern. The very medium in which scien-
tists work in such a state of instability spawns scien-
tific innovations. It is possible to supposedly find
even a mathematical equivalent to these situations
in the history of science. If β is more than σ + 3 (the
work of nonlinear source in a open medium is essen-
tially stronger than the action of dissipative factor),
i.e. there is an idea with very good prospects, a cor-
responding nonlinear equation has a non-localized
solution of falling amplitude. This mathematical so-
lution turns to be unstable to small deviations. A
small group of scholars or even a single scientist may
drastically change the situation. The level of under-
standing of a certain scientific problem begins to in-
crease very rapidly. A new trend in science may ap-
pear. At the initial stage of the LS-regime with
peaking, even some decrease of intensity and some
scattering of processes may be observed. But when
this scattering wave fills up a whole “effective area
of localization”, as it should be at the developed
stage, the process starts its fast growth.
The situations generating multiple and simulta-
neous discoveries are sometimes described in a sim-
ilar way. American psychologists SIMONTON draws
the following picture: “Discoveries and inventions
become virtually inevitable
(1) as prerequisite kinds of
knowledge accumulate in
man’s store; (2) as the atten-
tion of sufficient number of
investigators is focused on a
problem” (SIMONTON 1988,
p136).
Boom. Explosion of investigations in a scientific
field. An explosion of investigations, or so-called
boom of activities, can sometimes be observed in
specific fields of science. Synergetics could propose
an interpretation of such a phenomenon. There are
some reasons to apply the synergetic model of ava-
lanche-like growth, development in LS-regime with
peaking. The characteristics of the process seems to
be as follows:
B there is very fast increment of knowledge, or rap-
id rise in the understanding of scientific problems
and methods of their solution;
B in spite of an observable increase in the number of
scientists and scientific schools involved into inves-
tigation of corresponding problems, a certain local-
ization of the process takes place. It means that only
few scientific schools or eminent single scholars de-
termine a real level of current research in the field;
B if there is a complicated localized structure with
several maxima of intensity of the process (a compe-
tition of several scientific schools or scholars in a
scientific field subjected to rapid growth), some fur-
ther development of the process leads to a gradual
rapprochement of different leading centers (maxi-
ma) within this complex configuration of the en-
gaged scientists. According to our model, we have
“many-headed” structure of burning with maxima
of intensity drawing closer to one another. A proper
interpretation of the feature of avalanche-like pro-
cesses in application to epistemology could be a
subject of further research. 
Synergetics as a positive heuristics: 
how far can we go? 
Trying to explain some purely human phenomena,
such as human creativity, synergetics challenges
the humanities. It leads to a profound question.
How could the synergetic intentions to reveal some
universal patterns of evolution and self-organiza-
tion be justified? How is synergetics as a new world-
view and a new way of transdisciplinary and cross-
professional communication in general possible?
Because the theory which explains all explains
nothing. Wolfgang PAULI once set for himself a
rule: “If theoretician says
‘universal’ it just means pure
nonsense”. It can be argued
however that synergetics is
something more than a kind
of intellectual yoga, a kind of
sophisticated exercises on the
mental field.
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The development of synergetics as a positive heu-
ristics has a profound background. Synergetics has
rather good elaborated “hard kernel” in form of al-
ready described evolutionary mechanisms of the
complex systems. Some results have been proven
even as mathematical theorems.
Two fundamental discoveries form the basis of the
new theory of self-organization and complexity as
well. These are the discovery of strange attractors
and the discovery of blow-up regimes. Both of the
discoveries have profound philosophical impact.
They open a possibility to build a bridge between
synergetics, which originated mainly in the natural
sciences, and the humanities (cognitive sciences,
psychology, epistemology, etc.). Due to the interdis-
ciplinary character of the fundamental discoveries,
synergetics moves towards a new dialogue between
the natural sciences and the humanities.
Thus, I have tried to show some innovative
achievements of synergetics in the field of episte-
mology. The synergetic models of the evolution of
scientific knowledge considered here have, so far,
mostly a phenomenological character. But they en-
able us to comprehend some epistemological prob-
lems in a new light and also indicate promising ave-
nues for further research. The synergetic aspect of
consideration is an evolutionary nonlinear and inte-
grated, holistic one.
Synergetics does not teach us to be wise, it dis-
closes the evolutionary wisdom of nature. Synerget-
ics is a wisdom of a soft management, management
through advices and recommendations, through
weak, appropriate influences.
As a matter of fact, it is a self-management and
self-control.
Synergetics in general opens the possibility to un-
derstand how to imitate nature in solving conflicts,
in assembling parts into a whole, in developing from
one stage to another. Synergetics uncovers evolu-
tionary, historical strata of wisdom in each of us. It
shows that temporal transformations of a structure
can be distributed in space.
Synergetics prompts that it’s possible to reveal
and to put into account still latent, hidden structures
in a complex system and that there is, as a rule, a lot
of such unrevealed possibilities of evolution and
that the path into the future is not pre-determined.
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Introduction
Perhaps the stumbling
block of scientific ratio-
nality is represented by
the famous problem of
induction, first stated in
the XVIIIth century by
David HUME. The stan-
dard formulation of the
problem says that induc-
tion is logically untenable
as the foundation of sci-
ence, because it is impos-
sible to justify a universal
law by observation or
experiment, since it tran-
scends experience. In
other words, the problem
of induction refers to
whether a particular set of
observational results is
enough to extrapolate
such an experience to
other circumstances. In
this century, Karl POPPER
suggested a solution to the empirical problem of
induction. According to POPPER, the acceptance of a
scientific law or theory it is always tentative, thus
suggesting that all laws and theories are conjectures
or tentative hypotheses. Every theory is accepted so
long as it stands up to the most stringent empirical
tests, otherwise it is rejected; but it is never inferred
from the empirical evidence. Therefore, only the fal-
sity of the theory can be inferred from empirical evi-
dence, and such an inference is purely deductive
(POPPER 1983).
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss
whether the widely popular suggestion made by POP-
PER, has truly solved the empirical riddle of induc-
tion. However, GODDARD has cogently argued that
HUME’s problem of induction implies a further prob-
lem that was left un-
touched by POPPER’s solu-
tion (GODDARD 1993).
The following lines from
HUME are the best intro-
duction to such a second
problem: “If there be any
suspicion that the course
of nature may change,
and that the past may be
no rule for the future, all
experience becomes use-
less, and can give no rise
to inference or conclu-
sion” (HUME 1952) and
“We can at least conceive
a change in the course of
nature; which sufficiently
proves, that such a
change is not absolutely
impossible” (HUME 1992).
However, such words
have been construed so as
to only mean whether the
laws of physics, and the
relevant physical con-
stants, will remain stable in the future, a condition
which appears to be compulsory in order to extrap-
olate our experiences into the future. For example,
GODDARD argues (quite convincingly in my opin-
ion), that our current knowledge of physics supports
the translational invariance of the laws of physics in
time, and modern large-scale observations support
the temporal stability of the laws of physics over a
large sector of space–time. Using OCCAM’s razor as a
cornerstone for his argument, GODDARD affirms that
in the absence of any falsifying evidence the simplest
hypothesis prevails and nature is reasonably pre-
sumed to be stable in time. Thus a metaphysical
proposition (the invariance of the laws of physics in
time), has been transformed by the advances of mod-
ern science into a scientific conjecture that has with-
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David HUME’s famous riddle of induction, implies a
second problem related to the question of whether the
laws and principles of nature may change in the
course of time. Claims have been made that modern
developments in physics and astrophysics corroborate
the translational invariance of the laws of physics in
time. However, the appearance of a new general prin-
ciple of nature, which might not be derivable from the
known laws of physics, or that might actually be a
non-physical one (this means completely independent
of physical science), supports the notion that the
course of nature can change in time. Here it is argued
that natural selection satisfies the criteria that identi-
fy a general principle of nature which so far, appears
to be nonderivable from the known laws of physics
and therefore, it is likely that it arose in the course of
time, thus leaving open again the quest for a true solu-
tion to HUME’s second problem.
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stood an amazing number of tests, and HUME’s sec-
ond problem has been practically, if not formally,
solved. 
The supposed invariance of the laws of nature in
time derives from the assumed stability and unifor-
mity of nature. Indeed, the existence of pattern or
symmetry in nature, has suggested the existence of
laws or rules of change. Classical laws of change
correspond to the invariance of some quantity or
pattern. These equivalencies were established only
long after the formulation of the laws of motion
which govern allowed changes. The PLATONIC out-
look suggests that timeless, unchanging attributes
exist. These attributes have emerged within the
realm of science in the form of laws of nature or the
invariances and conserved quantities of modern
physics (like energy and momentum). Currently,
modern physicists consider symmetry as the pri-
mary guide into the structure of the elementary
particle world, and the corresponding theories and
laws of change are derived from the requirement
that particular symmetries (often quite abstract in
nature) be preserved. These so-called gauge theories
require the existence of the forces they describe in
order to preserve the invariances upon which they
are based. They also dictate the character of the
elementary particles that they govern, because the
subatomic world is populated by sets of identical
particles. The powerful concept of symmetry has
enabled whole systems of natural laws to be derived
from the requirement that a certain abstract pat-
tern be invariant in the universe. This has led to the
generation of successful theories to explain each of
the separate physical interactions observed in na-
ture. Currently, the search for a unification of those
theories into more comprehensive ones, based on
larger symmetries, is in the forefront of research in
physics. The unification of the electromagnetic
and weak interactions into a single theoretical
framework is one of the outstanding achievements
of this search for a theory of everything (e.g., BARROW
1991)
However, I want to contend that the quoted para-
graphs from HUME might also refer to the question
of whether the nature of reality can change so that
new natural laws and principles may emerge, and
this means not only new laws of physics but any sort
of natural law or principle. Therefore, we can ask the
question: are there any natural laws or principles
which are not known to be derivable from the cur-
rent laws of physics, or which might actually be non-
physical (in the sense that they belong to a level of
explanation that is completely independent from
physical science), but that might have emerged in
the course of time? If such is the case, then HUME’s
second riddle remains as valid as ever, and awaiting
for a further solution. The following discussion is
directed to suggest that there is such a law or princi-
ple of nature, namely, natural selection, which was
apparently not inherent to the fabric of the universe
but arose in the course of time. In order to develop
this argument, it is necessary first to discuss some
generalities about the major trends in biogenesis,
and then to use a particular theory on the origin of
life as a concrete example to illustrate that natural
selection emerged at an specific epoch in time. I
want to emphasise that my choice of such a theory
does not mean I regard it as the true explanation for
the origin of life. However, the chosen theory clearly
illustrates a fundamental assumption common to all
rational schemes for explaining the origin of life:
prebiotic an early biotic evolution are characterised
by a series of evolutionary thresholds which must be
successfully crossed in order for evolution to pro-
ceed. 
Generalities About Biogenesis
Biogenesis refers to the study of the origin of life.
This field of enquiry can be traced back to the nine-
teen century, when the success of mechanistic
research programmes in physiology and physio-
logical chemistry made biologists increasingly
reluctant to accept any impenetrable barriers
between the living and non-living domains. On
the other hand, cosmological theory (via thermo-
dynamics) moved away from the notion of a more
or less unchangeable and eternal universe. Once
the eternity of the universe began to be ques-
tioned, the idea of the eternity of life lost its basis,
and the origin of living things required explana-
tion (KAMMINGA 1991). For example, HAECKEL’s
views on the origin of life were part of a monistic
philosophy which asserted the unity of nature, and
according to which all natural processes stand in a
material, causal and historical connection. There
could be no fundamental distinction between the
living and non-living; and in order to explain how
biological evolution had begun on a lifeless Earth,
it was necessary to postulate that life was the his-
torical product of inorganic nature (HAECKEL
1929).
In the present century, OPARIN was the first to sug-
gest a theory of the origin of life which presented a
full evolutionary narrative and explicitly showed
each step to be consistent with empirical and theo-
Evolution and Cognition ❘ 158 ❘ 1998, Vol. 4, No. 2
Armando Aranda-Anzaldo
retical knowledge accepted at the time (OPARIN
1957). The main impact of OPARIN’s theory was to
pose, for the first time, the fundamental questions
that should be addressed by any theory of the origin
of life. Such questions would concern the properties
that the first organisms should have in order to be
recognised as being alive; the order in which differ-
ent biological functions evolved during the early his-
tory of life; the environmental conditions at each
stage of life’s development; the location of sites at
which such conditions prevailed; and the mecha-
nisms that brought about the origin and develop-
ment of systems displaying the required properties
under the conditions specified. Thus, the constraints
on any concrete theory of the origin of life are quite
severe: it must be consistent with a wide range of
background theories, pertaining to several fields of
science, as well as with any empirical evidence bear-
ing on the theory. Nevertheless, an overall coher-
ence of the theory in question is not a guarantee of
its truth content.
More than a hundred theories of the origin of life
have been published (GUTIÉRREZ-LOMBARDO/
LUGOWSKI 1991), such theories can be divided in two
major groups, namely, cells-first and genes-first. The
cells-first theories represent the oldest group, and ar-
gue that the first forms of life were primitive cells
which constituted metabolically active systems, the
genetic mechanisms of which evolved only later.
However, the impact of molecular biology led to a
shift of emphasis, and the relatively new genes-first
theories addressed the question of the origin of self-
replicating molecules which later developed the cells
containing them. However, all these theories can be
further divided into three hypothetical groups. The
first group is formed by the non-historical theories,
which stand upon the advance of molecular biology,
and explain the processes of prebiotic and early bi-
otic evolution exclusively on the basis of physical
and chemical principles. The second group is formed
by suprahistorical theories, which accept the histor-
ical nature of prebiotic and early biotic evolution,
but preserving the invariance of the principles
which support the mechanisms of evolution. The
third group is formed by the truly historical theories,
which accept that all principles and mechanisms of
evolution belong to a single historical process and as
such are also subject to change in the course of time
(LUGOWSKI/GUTIÉRREZ-LOMBARDO 1991). Some theo-
ries in the second group and all theories in the third
group constitute a set of theories which imply that
new, nonimmanent natural principles, have ap-
peared during the course of time.
Hans Kuhn Theory as a Plausible 
Scheme for Biogenesis
It has already been suggested that the theory pro-
posed by Hans KUHN, might be an example of a truly
historical theory of the origin of life, even though
the very author of such a theory might not be aware
that such is the case (GUTIÉRREZ-LOMBARDO/
LUGOWSKI 1991). KUHN’s theory satisfies two funda-
mental conditions for any plausible hypothesis on
the origin of life: it respects any known physical-
chemical law or principle, and it presents a logical
continuous chain of events which are causally
linked, and are reasonably probable both individu-
ally and as a whole set (KUHN 1976a). For KUHN the
problem of the origin of life poses the questions of
which principles guided the evolution of biological
macromolecules, what limiting conditions emerged
during the successive steps of prebiotic and early
biotic evolution, and which mechanisms allowed to
surpass such limiting conditions.
The starting point for such a theory is that the
origin of life took place in an environment that was
highly structured in the spatio–temporal sense.
KUHN suggests that the basic spatio–temporal
rhythms constitute the primum mobile of prebiotic
evolution. Therefore, such an evolution is character-
ised by a series of consecutive phases which are de-
termined by the cyclical changes of the environment
(like day and night; drought and rainfall): every ac-
tive phase of multiplication and propagation it is
followed by a passive phase of selection determining
which molecules are able to withstand a tendency
towards disorganisation. This means that the “sur-
vival” of specific molecular configurations it is not
linked to any global function which may drive such
systems towards survival in a particular environ-
ment, the apparent adaptive capacity of such molec-
ular configurations is ephemeral because it is depen-
dent on the selective periods determined by external
changes.
KUHN suggests that the two phases determined by
the spatio–temporal structure of the environment
were gradually substituted by a series of convergent
and divergent phases. Every time that the prebiotic
evolutionary trend stagnated, there was a phase of
experimentation in which fortuitous events diversi-
fied the structures of the early molecular aggregates.
Such is a divergent phase, characterised by the fact
that the eventual complexity of the systems in-
volved is not contributing any real selective advan-
tage to such systems. Evolution then falls in a sort of
vicious circle in which chance is not leading towards
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the appearance of novel functions in the evolving
systems. Such a kind of chance has been termed di-
vergent chance (WETTSTEIN 1982, p42). However, the
circumstances of prebiotic evolution can be sud-
denly transformed, when such an evolution enters
into a convergent phase that might be determined
by a single fortuitous event that contributes a novel
selective advantage able to break the evolutionary
impasse. Such a sort of chance has been termed con-
vergent chance (WETTSTEIN 1982, p42). Within KUHN’s
theory, there must have been at least five of such
events leading towards the appearance of the first
unicellular living system:
1. formation of molecular aggregates, 2. emer-
gence of catalytic properties within such aggregates,
3. the formation of a double–stranded polynucle-
otide which corresponds to the dextro (d) isomer of
DNA, 4. formation of polypeptide films that func-
tion as primitive membranes surrounding such mo-
lecular aggregates, 5. formation of a primitive ribo-
some that may control and increase the efficiency of
the mechanisms of self-replication acting upon the
molecular aggregates.
KUHN’s theory for the origin of life was formulated
quite before that it was discovered the existence of
self-catalytic RNA molecules, the so-called ri-
bozymes. However, it will not make any difference
to KUHN’s general theory or to my current argument,
if we consider that the molecular aggregates sug-
gested in the events numbered from 1 to 3 were RNA
molecules, in a world as yet devoid of DNA. Here I
am using KUHN’s theory to exemplify the general
structure of any plausible modern theory about the
origin of life, and I am not concerned with particular
molecules or molecular mechanisms that made pos-
sible the actual crossing of particular evolutionary
thresholds during pre-biotic and early biotic evolu-
tion on Earth. 
It is a fact that the overwhelming majority of ter-
restrial organisms use DNA as the primary genetic
material and protein as the chief agent of catalytic
function. However, it has been suggested that the
DNA–protein based life was preceded by RNA–based
life, with RNA serving as both the genetic material
and principal catalyst (GILBERT 1986). There are
many uncertainties concerning how this RNA world
arose. But a defining feature of the RNA world is that
it must have contained RNA molecules that were ca-
pable of undergoing DARWINIAN evolution based on
natural selection. This requires that RNA (an informa-
tional molecule) must be replicated efficiently and
accurately in a reaction catalysed by the RNA itself
(JOYCE 1996).
Several experts on the origin–of–life problem have
serious doubts about the ‘RNA first’ notion. Particu-
larly notable are the objections put forward by Ger-
ald JOYCE as a leading contributor to the field of self-
catalytic RNAs and in vitro evolution. JOYCE has
stressed the obvious superiority of proteins over RNA
in terms of catalytic power, as well as the unlikeli-
hood of the prebiotic synthesis of RNA. Indeed,
JOYCE suggests that life did not start with RNA as a
self-replicating molecule, but rather as a result of
chemical evolution through non-instructed pro-
cesses which allowed the chemical ordering of com-
plex peptides, and possibly the formation of mem-
branous vesicles. This stage made it easier for the
later appearance of self-replicating molecular sys-
tems (JOYCE 1991). Thus, a period of chemical non-
genetic evolution was necessary so that a genetic sys-
tem based on some simple RNA–like molecules will
eventually be able to arise (JOYCE/ORGEL 1993).
Once more, I must stress that my purpose is not
to prove that KUHN’s theory is right, but only to use
that theory to illustrate the fact that a series of
thresholds must be traversed in order for life to ap-
pear. Recently, it has been argued that most contem-
porary theories on the origin of life support the con-
tinuity thesis that the development of life from
matter is a gradual process to be explained on the
basis of physical principles and as such, the gap be-
tween inanimate matter and life was not bridged by
a unique, miraculous event (FRY 1995). However,
stated as such, this ‘continuity thesis’ seems not to
consider the fact that once there is life, there is no
need that such life may be subjected to any kind of
evolutionary process, nor that this process may be
based on natural selection acting upon self-replicat-
ing genetic systems. Moreover, it is quite reasonable
to imagine a living world populated by a single kind
of primeval organism able to replicate itself and pos-
sessing a genetic system that is so well insulated from
the environment and so faithfully copied in every
round of replication, that there is no need or scope
for further biotic evolution as we know it. Some may
claim that any system having a material basis, such
as a self-replicating genetic system, is naturally sub-
jected to some form of variation and transformation
derived from diverse factors like thermal noise and
spontaneous degradative processes acting upon the
system. Indeed, that sort of argument is at the basis
of further theories (e.g., KIMURA 1983), that question
or reduce the role played by natural selection in bi-
otic evolution. However, here I am only concerned
with biotic evolution as we know it, and thus I con-
sider that natural selection is relevant to biotic evo-
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lution, without entering any debate about the actual
specific importance of natural selection in the pro-
cess of biotic evolution. Therefore, the naive ‘conti-
nuity thesis’ ignores the problem that there is no
apparent reason of why life should keep evolving
further complexity. Moreover, rigorous experiments
with isolated “replicators” (in this case viral genomic
RNA molecules), lacking any phenotypic organisa-
tion beyond the presence of a replicating enzyme,
the template nucleic acid and the appropriate mo-
lecular precursors, show that DARWINIAN evolution
by means of natural selection will always lead the
replicating system towards simplicity (Mills et al.
1967). These results are in agreement with the fact
that there is no obvious theoretical reason to expect
evolutionary lineages to increase in complexity with
time (SZATHMÁRY/MAYNARD-SMITH 1995), but on the
other hand, they are against the obvious fact that
evolution on Earth has gone from simplicity towards
complexity (ARANDA-ANZALDO 1997).
WETTSTEIN has suggested that in order to under-
stand the evolutionary process leading to the ap-
pearance of life on Earth, it is necessary to make a
distinction between a general (cosmic) evolution
and a particular evolution that must exist from the
moment that specific evolutionary thresholds de-
limit the main stages of the early evolution of life on
Earth (WETTSTEIN 1982, p42). The crossing of each of
such thresholds is determined in each case by a sin-
gle event, nonpredictable and unique, termed a con-
vergent chance. KUHN himself says that within every
convergent phase it occurs an oriented evolution
which explores a new domain, and gradually, such
a convergent phase is transformed into a divergent
phase which lacks any particular trend; the evolving
systems stagnate within such a divergent phase until
it happens the crossing of a further threshold, event
that introduces the evolving systems into a new
ecodomain which defines a new convergent phase
(KUHN 1976b). This implies that at some time in the
course of prebiotic evolution, such a process entered
into an ecological stage, where the selective pressure
upon the molecular aggregates was exerted not only
by the environment but also by the molecules them-
selves onto one another. The increasingly complex in-
ter-molecular relations that ensued lead to the ap-
pearance of complex structures and a complex
spatio–temporal order within such structures. Actu-
ally, the evident increasing complexity of living sys-
tems over evolutionary time, suggests that the living
systems participate themselves in generating the
conditions that allow the evolution of further levels
of life’s complexity, a point that was appreciated by
DARWIN since the first edition of The Origin of the
Species.
A common worry, shared by most current theories
of the origin of life, is to show that the theory’s par-
ticular scheme avoids assuming any principle of na-
ture other than those given by physics and chemis-
try, as if physical–chemical laws would represent the
sole valid input for a rational, simple and parsimo-
nious theory of the origin of life. However, as KUHN’s
and many other theories suggest, the difference be-
tween living and non-living systems is determined
by the fact that living systems have properties which
allow them to survive in a given environment. In
other words, ‘they know how to adapt to their envi-
ronment’. This knowledge is manifested as the use-
fulness of a certain inherited information for a given
system surviving within an environment that dis-
plays a particular spatio–temporal structure. The
emergence of such an information coupled with the
first self-replicating molecules implied the end of
true prebiotic evolution, in which the rhythms and
changes of the environment were the original driv-
ing force behind evolution. The nature of evolution
radically changed after such a crucial event, and
from then onwards it shifted towards new trends
that were independent of those strictly determined
by the sole environment. Therefore, the appearance
of early biotic evolution implied a change in the fun-
damental mechanism leading towards further evo-
lutionary developments. In KUHN’s own words:
“[T]he appearance of the first systems that reproduce
themselves and that eventually change by error dur-
ing the copying process represents a jump in quality
(cursives mine), in which a fundamental property of
matter suddenly manifests itself. Systems begin to be
carriers of information, of a meaningful message”
(KUHN 1983), and “[W]ith the first occurrence of a
self-reproducing entity a new quality of matter ap-
pears: the quality of knowing how to survive as a
species” (LEHMANN/KUHN 1984).
Thus, true biological evolution begins as a process
of ‘learning’ within populations of macromolecules
in order for some of such populations to overcome
successive barriers of stagnation.
Herewith appears a central problem faced by all
theories about the origin of life which rest on the
fundamental assumption that life arose from non-
life: how it was possible that non-biotic molecules
could reach the level of self-organisation necessary
to produce systems for keeping and replicating infor-
mation (genetic systems), considering that so far, it
has not been possible to obtain in the laboratory any
evidence for the existence of non-enzymatic infor-
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mational replicating systems (ORGEL 1992). Current
experience shows that one could not maintain a
long polynucleotide sequence without informed en-
zymes and one could not have informed enzymes
without a long polynucleotide to code for them
(MAYNARD-SMITH 1982). This is a serious problem
faced by all modern genes-first theories about the or-
igin of life.
The proponents of the RNA world agree that for
DARWINIAN evolution to occur RNA replication must
be template–directed and energetically favourable,
but the most crucial feature is that the RNA replicase
must operate with sufficiently high fidelity to pro-
duce accurate copies of RNA molecules that are at
least as long as itself (JOYCE 1996). So far, the best
candidate for an RNA-based RNA replicase is a ri-
bozyme which contains 98 nucleotides but allows
the propagation of an RNA containing only some 12
nucleotides (EKLAND et al. 1996). The demonstration
of an RNA enzyme with replicase activity will put the
previous existence of an RNA world on a firm basis,
but researchers in this field agree that a process of
DARWINIAN evolution would be required to develop
such a molecule in the laboratory (WRIGHT/JOYCE
1997). Thus, the question would remain as to how
DARWINIAN evolution could have begun in the first
place (JOYCE 1996).
On the other hand, it has been pointed out that
the three main proponents of the cell-first models:
OPARIN, HALDANE and BERNAL, were adherents of di-
alectical materialism, which explicitly assumes an
intrinsic tendency of nature to create higher forms
of organisation, although they do not provide any
hint about the reason for such a tendency (DE DUVE
1991). These older theories emphasised the produc-
tion of membranes, micelles, vesicles and so on, as a
fundamental event leading to the origin of life, as
they provide mechanisms for keeping together solu-
ble molecules that have been involved in each
other’s synthesis. But this already seems to imply an
essential precondition for the efficient action of nat-
ural selection, a situation that was neglected by the
authors of such theories (MAYNARD-SMITH 1979). For
example, in a modern theory of the cell-first kind
proposed by DYSON, it is suggested that early in evo-
lution appeared cell-like systems devoid of any sort
of genetic system; such systems can exist for a very
long time, so that for practical purposes they do not
die, but also they do not interact with one another.
Thus, according to DYSON, under such conditions
there cannot be a DARWINIAN evolution based on nat-
ural selection, and evolution of the population of
molecules within such cell-like systems proceeds by
random drift (DYSON 1985). In principle, such sys-
tems can diversify into many mutant populations as
they split, but in the absence of exact replication,
nothing of the parent-cell’s qualities survive in the
next generation above the chance level. Therefore,
without faithful replication and natural selection, there
can be no irreversible changes in the population, no
real memory, only minor random fluctuations. By
denying to such early cell-like systems the peril of
death, they are also deprived of all the advantages of
differential reproduction, which is so important in
biological evolution as we know it. 
The Emergent Principle of 
Natural Selection
It has been argued that life is a process capable of
both doing work and incorporating information
continuously, without being irreversibly worn out
in the process. Every replicating system is both an
order–maintaining and an order–inhibiting system.
As long as it exists, preserving its own order, it hin-
ders the creation of other ordered systems. The
destruction of any autocatalytic system enhances
the creation of another, because it releases reactants
as it decomposes, increasing the likelihood for the
formation of another molecule. When such a
destruction is systematic, i.e. it eliminates only the
systems with certain traits, then the reaction of the
population is also systematic, increasing the num-
ber of systems with the opposite traits (ELITZUR
1994). Natural selection determines that such a
destruction is truly systematic, because is exerted by
rather constant environmental conditions that pre-
vail for long periods over large areas.
Thus, it can now be properly emphasised that the
only distinctive trait of the so-called convergent
chance, rests on the true selective advantage which
is due to the fortuitous appearance of a novel struc-
ture. WETTSTEIN distinguishes three different kinds of
chance acting upon the early evolution leading to
life: 1. a divergent chance, which sometimes can in-
novate at the expense of former conditions created
by previous fortuitous events, but without leading to
the crossing of an evolutionary threshold, 2. a deci-
sive divergent chance, also termed non-authentic
convergent chance, which innovates and destroys
the conditions created by the previous divergent
chance, thus allowing the crossing of an evolution-
ary threshold, 3. the true convergent chance which
innovates without eliminating the participation of
the previous divergent chance, and allows the cross-
ing of an evolutionary threshold so that the resulting
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new systems may explore further ecological niches
(WETTSTEIN 1982, p49). A chance of the second kind
was necessary to create the conditions for crossing
the barrier between prebiotic and truly biotic evolu-
tion as we know it. 
The current evidence available shows that all evo-
lutionary thresholds, which occurred before the ap-
pearance of the first unicellular organism, have left
no independent trace of themselves. It seems to be
an empirical fact that the principles of self-organisa-
tion described by the logic of the unicellular organ-
ism have not been substituted or eliminated after
their emergence in the course of time. For WETTSTEIN,
the decisive divergent chance leading to the emer-
gence of the first unicellular being, it is not only the
last of its kind, but also the first of the so-called true
convergent chances, because it allowed the expan-
sion of the ecological niches to be explored by life
(WETTSTEIN 1982, p50).
KUHN himself confuses the different categories of
evolutionary transitions suggested by his theory,
when he affirms that the process of prebiotic evolu-
tion is also DARWINIAN (KUHN 1974). However, other
proponents of well-structured, modern theories of
the origin of life, suggest that prebiotic evolution
was not subjected to Darwinian selection (MAYNARD-
SMITH 1979; EIGEN et al. 1982; CAIRNS-SMITH 1982;
ELITZUR 1994; JOYCE 1996). Since non-informational
replicating systems are not genetic systems. They
cannot evolve by natural selection, because they do
not store information in a stable way (ORGEL 1992;
Joyce 1996). That ‘natural selection’ is a technical
term which implies amplification through replica-
tion is illustrated by the following quotation from a
review of the book The Natural Selection of Chemical
Elements (WILLIAMS/DA SILVA 1996): “I have a gripe
about the title, though. The book is all about selec-
tion at various levels, but it is a pity that these are
discussed under the blanket term ‘natural selection’.
I would like to have ignored this as a minor gaffe…
but there it is, blazoned in the title… So I don’t think
something should be described as natural selection
just because it is natural and results in selection. One
consequence of this is that we may overlook the
problem of the origin of life: the origin of a long-term
process of evolution through, yes, natural selection—
which is not just another example of the sort of thing
we find here, there and everywhere...But actually the
origin of life is difficult in an extremely interesting
sense: it hardly seems possible that it could have
happened at all. This is largely because natural selec-
tion depends on high-quality replication; finding
molecular machinery that can do this under simple
conditions is a major challenge for modern chemis-
try...(this is) a wonderful book. Pity about its title.”
(CAIRNS-SMITH 1996)
This fact do not denies that non-informational,
non-genetic, replicating systems may have been im-
portant for the origin of life, because they may well
have been necessary for the creation of an environ-
ment in which informational replication could get
started (MAYR 1988, p16; JOYCE 1989).
Thus, selection in the prebiotic stage of evolu-
tion is a consequence of the periodicity of the en-
vironmental conditions acting upon early macro-
molecular societies. Within such societies appear
molecular populations displaying certain func-
tional capabilities which determine whether the
molecules may survive or not. However, such func-
tions are not programmed in any way by the struc-
ture proper to those molecules. There is no relation-
ship between the logic of such macromolecules and
their associated functions which allowed them to
survive, because such functions appeared only
through the action of the external environment.
But after the decisive divergent chance (non-au-
thentic convergent chance) that made possible the
emergence of informational self-replicating sys-
tems, such new systems were able to enter into di-
rect competition with the previous macromolecu-
lar systems. Moreover, the event represented by the
first true convergent chance (according to the def-
inition by WETTSTEIN), establishes the logic of the
unicellular system which might explore new habi-
tats in direct competition with previous existing
systems, but without implying the complete elimi-
nation of the former systems. On the contrary, the
mutual competition between systems renders them
more able to adapt and survive. Natural selection
becomes a factor tied to the logic of societies of
evolving living systems, because such systems have
lost their ephemeral character that was only sub-
jected to external periodicities. It is clear that once
the first unicellular beings appeared, they rapidly
went to diverge into species, and the appearance of
a new species did not imply the compulsory elimi-
nation of the former species. From then on, a new
system (species) introducing a new selective advan-
tage will devote a certain time to explore different
niches until it emerges the eventual competition
with other species. The fact that the new selective
advantage does not completely abolish the logic of
the less-complex systems, and thus the less-com-
plex systems have the opportunity to survive as
long as they find how to adapt to the new circum-
stances created by the new competitor, implies a
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radical departure from the logic behind the series
of divergent phases of prebiotic evolution, charac-
terised by the lack of continuity of the organisation
represented by the ancient systems. The logical in-
novation represented by the unicellular organisa-
tion is the consequence of the last decisive diver-
gent chance which becomes the parent of all the
future true converging chances.
The Question of Causality in Biology 
and the Principle of Natural Selection
The concept of law is fundamental in science. Most
scientific explanations base their assertions on sci-
entific laws. According to BUNGE, scientific explana-
tion is explanation by law, not by causes (BUNGE
1979; CASTI 1992, p409). Cause–and–effect relation-
ships are comfortable for the human mind, but
since HUME’s time, a scientific epistemology based
exclusively on material and efficient causality looks
rather weak as the source of transcendental knowl-
edge. Moreover, not all scientific laws are causal.
Causal determination is only a special type of deter-
mination. Many important phenomena are
explained by phenomenological laws having no
causal component, such as the second law of ther-
modynamics (CASTI 1992, p37).
In classical physics laws were considered univer-
sal. A belief in universal, deterministic laws implies
a belief in absolute prediction. For the classical the-
ory of causality a causal explanation is as good as its
predictive value (BUNGE 1959). However, SCRIVEN has
suggested that an important contribution of biolog-
ical evolutionary theory to philosophy is that it has
shown the independence of explanation and predic-
tion, considering that, according to SCRIVEN, the the-
ory of natural selection can describe and explain
phenomena with considerable precision, but it can-
not make reliable predictions (SCRIVEN 1959). A sim-
ilar situation is found in the field of meteorology
which belongs to the physical sciences. Indeed, the
belief in micro-precise causality (micro-determin-
ism) has been untenable since the enunciation of
HEISENBERG’s uncertainty principle. Scientists now
recognise that most physical laws are not universal
but are statistical in nature, leading to probabilistic
predictions in most cases.
The conceptual framework of biology is quite dif-
ferent from that one in the physical sciences. Physi-
cal–chemical principles are operant in biological
processes, but a purely physical description of them
is at best incomplete if not irrelevant (MAYR 1982).
Generalisations in biology tend to be statistical and
probabilistic and often have numerous exceptions.
Nevertheless, comprehensive biological theories ap-
pear to certain authors as comparable in explanatory
power to those of the physical sciences (MUNSON
1975; VOLLMER 1995). But for other authors the laws
of biology are no more than high-level generalisa-
tions (KITCHER 1984).
According to PANTIN, physics and chemistry are
exact sciences because much of the wealth of natural
phenomena is excluded from their study (PANTIN
1968, pp123–128). For SIMPSON, all known material
processes and explanatory principles apply to organ-
isms, while only a limited number of them apply to
non living systems (SIMPSON 1964). It has been sug-
gested that there is not one single inferential chain
which leads from anything important in physics to
anything important in biology, and in every direct
confrontation between universal physics and special
biology, it is physics which has to give ground
(ROSEN 1991). Biology poses the need of adopting an
enlarged scientific vocabulary that includes con-
cepts such as biopopulation, teleonomy and pro-
gram (MAYR 1988, p21).
The notion of causality in biology is quite differ-
ent from that one in classical mechanics, because the
complexity of the living systems is an a posteriori
product of natural selection, which acts as a “tink-
erer”, being completely opportunistic considering
that it starts from scratch in every generation (JACOB
1977; MAYR 1988, p210). Thus, for many a scientist
natural selection is permissive rather than construc-
tive (PANTIN 1968, pp73–74). The descriptive and ex-
planatory power of the principle of natural selection
(PNS), has been compared to that of the second law
of thermodynamics which describes the fate of mat-
ter and energy in complex systems and tells us the
direction in which change is taking place (PEIRCE
1877; MAYR 1988, p36). It is a fact that natural selec-
tion is regarded by many a biologist as the universal
direction–giving factor in evolution, without imply-
ing that we can know in advance the direction of the
evolutionary changes (MAYR 1988, p109; ARANDA-
ANZALDO 1996).
The PNS is understood in the following way: over
a long period of time the environment of a given
species is never stable but it will change in various
ways. As it does so the characters which best fit the
individuals to the changed environment will be se-
lected (not consciously of course) and the species
will change. The environment may change only in
part of the range of the species and thus lead to di-
vergence and the production of a new species along-
side the old one.
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For several modern theoreticians the theory of
natural selection (TNS) has a statistical nature, but
there has been debate about the source of the statis-
tical character of evolutionary theory. ROSENBERG
has suggested that the DARWINIAN dictum about the
survival of the fittest is the basis of the statistical
character of the TNS (ROSENBERG 1985, p217). In fact,
ROSENBERG has axiomatised the TNS in order to iden-
tify its biological principles of undoubted generality,
which may be unrestricted in expression and inde-
pendent of the actual course of evolution in our
planet (ROSENBERG 1985, pp212–213). Thus, the
fourth axiom of the TNS states the following: if D is
a physically or behaviourally homogeneous subclass
of a species, and D is superior enough in fitness to
the rest of the members of the species for sufficiently
many generations, then the proportion of D in the
species will increase. For ROSENBERG, this axiom is of
the same form as the statistical version of the second
law of thermodynamics which states that given
enough time and enough interacting bodies a phys-
ical system will always move towards equilibrium
and maximum entropy, even though we cannot
completely disregard the possibility of a highly im-
probable opposite outcome. The fourth axiom of the
TNS reflects the possibility that evolution need not
and does not move in a straight line towards equilib-
rium levels of populations size for various species
and their subpopulations, but it also asserts that in
the long run, evolution must move in this direction
and that the length of the long run is a function of
these differences (ROSENBERG 1985, p217).
The arguments against the existence of 
a principle of natural selection
There are several scientists and philosophers which
think that there are no universal and distinctively
biological laws of nature. For them, the biological
laws are indeed contingent (STEBBINS 1982, p14;
BURIAN/RICHARDSON 1996). According to this view,
the PNS is not a law but something similar to a plot
or narrative that requires specification by an
account of the physical–chemical and environmen-
tal factors which affect survival and reproduction
(BRANDON 1978). Moreover, it has been suggested
that most biochemical rules are contingent on the
physiological contexts secured in the course of evo-
lution (BURIAN/RICHARDSON 1996). Therefore, the
contingencies of evolution underlie the biochemi-
cal, developmental and ecological regularities and
as such, the biological ‘laws’ are no more than tem-
porary regularities which result from the process of
evolution itself. Such ‘laws’ cannot be generalised
over evolutionary time (BEATTY 1995).
SHIMONY has provided an important argument
against the existence of a principle of natural selec-
tion. For him the theory of natural selection is only
a rich systematisation of biological knowledge with-
out a first principle. He suggests that whenever the
fitness of an organic variety is well defined in a given
biological situation, its sources are local contingen-
cies together with the background of laws from dis-
ciplines other than the theory of natural selection.
Thus, any generalities that may hold in that theory
are derivative rather than fundamental (SHIMONY
1989a). SHIMONY grounds his argument on the no-
tion that the fundamental concepts of any theory
should be presented explicitly and what makes a
concept fundamental is that it is not explicitly de-
fined in terms of other concepts within the theory;
therefore, such a concept is underived within the
theory (SHIMONY 1989b). Nevertheless, SHIMONY is
ready to attribute the category of ‘principles’ to the
laws which underlie the theory of Mendelian hered-
ity. For SHIMONY it is enough that such principles
impose constraints upon the temporal development
of the biosphere, even though the constraints in
question are restricted to terrestrial life and they are
probabilistic. In contrast, SHIMONY argues that the
theory of natural selection imposes no constraints of
its own, and it is rather a systematic study of tempo-
ral development of the biosphere after all constraints
from elsewhere are acknowledged: constraints im-
posed by the general laws of physics and chemistry,
constraints imposed by general laws from other
branches of biology, constraints imposed by the rel-
evant singular facts of the biological situation.
Therefore, SHIMONY will only accept the existence of
the PNS if someone demonstrates that such principle
imposes any sort of unborrowed constraint upon the
biosphere (SHIMONY 1989b).
But philosophers of biology like Elliot SOBER, have
shown that the arguments offered by SHIMONY
against the existence of the PNS are rather depen-
dent on the particular definition of ‘principle’ used
by SHIMONY (SOBER 1989). Moreover, the argument
of SHIMONY is clearly weakened by the fact that he
acknowledges a ‘principle’ status to MENDEL laws in
spite of the contingent fact that only some living
systems on Earth follow such laws (organisms under-
going sexual reproduction), while a large number of
organisms and genetic systems do not follow such
laws (unicellulars, transposons), but nevertheless
they are known to evolve. Thus, whichever principle
or principles underlie the evolution of living sys-
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tems, they seem to stand at a deeper level than the
so-called MENDEL laws.
At first glance, if we accept that there is not a PNS,
then HUME’s second problem becomes a perpetual
stumbling–block for any attempt to develop a ratio-
nal, scientific biology that might offer something
more than mere descriptions of current events. This
poses a tremendous problem for the coherence of
mainstream biological science, since a large part of
current research in biology is grounded on the the-
ory of natural selection which implies the existence
of the PNS. Moreover, the radical view that denies
the existence of specific biological laws or principles
(sponsored by some contemporary philosophers
and biologists), implies that there is no possibility to
extrapolate our present biological knowledge into
the future. It also implies that the rules that guide
the evolutionary process may change at any time.
Therefore, prediction in large areas of biology be-
comes an impossible task and most biological expla-
nations are reduced to historical reconstructions of
past scenarios. Such reconstructions will always rest
on the shaky ground provided by circumstantial ev-
idence that may always change in the course of time.
Thus, such a radical position undermines the ratio-
nality of biological science and condemns it to a sec-
ond rate scientific status. 
Differences Between Biotic and 
Nonbiotic Evolution
It is possible that the radical view which denies the
existence of autonomous biological laws and princi-
ples, is based on a lack of distinction between biotic
and non-biotic evolution. It is true that certain
‘laws’ of biology such as MENDEL’s laws of heredity
are too narrow in scope, so as not to guarantee their
status as truly general biological laws. As it was men-
tioned before, MENDEL’s laws are only applied to
sexually reproducing organisms and even within
such organisms there are genetic entities, such as
the transposons, that do not follow those laws
(LEWIN 1994). However, the empirical evidence sug-
gests that all living systems are subjected to the PNS.
Biology is by definition the science of life or living
systems; therefore, the PNS seems to stand at a
deeper level within biological science, since appar-
ently, all living systems evolve. At the core of my
argument for the autonomy of the PNS, lies the
question of whether the PNS can be applied to
material non-living systems, in which case it is part
of physical science and quite possibly inherent to
the fabric of the universe, or whether the PNS arose
at a certain epoch in time, perhaps alongside the
first living systems which are its subject matter. 
WILLIAMS, in a now classical book, stated that the
modern theory of evolution is: “...based on the as-
sumption that the laws of physical science plus nat-
ural selection [cursives mine] can furnish a complete
explanation for any biological phenomenon, and
that these principles can explain...any particular ex-
ample of an adaptation” (WILLIAMS 1966).
I share the worries of those who raise a question
mark about the claims of the synthetic theory in the
sense that it is capable of furnishing a complete ex-
planation of biotic evolution (ARANDA-ANZALDO
1996). Also, I share the doubts about the idea that
natural selection is the only driving force in biotic
evolution. HALDANE (as quoted by WADDINGTON) al-
ready stated that ‘...natural selection is an important
cause in evolution’, thus suggesting that it is not the
only cause (WADDINGTON 1969). Here it is not my
purpose to develop an argument about which are the
other possible factors or principles which may guide
or influence biological evolution. Nevertheless, I cite
the passage by WILLIAMS in order to illustrate the idea
that natural selection is a principle different and not
derivable from the laws of physics.
Very soon after the big-bang (if such a thing was
the case), the laws of physics , as embodied in quan-
tum mechanics, began to rule the physical universe,
but the future laws of chemistry were already im-
plied in the early quantum world. This fact is inde-
pendent of whether the universe could have evolved
in a different way that do not leads to the appearance
of complex chemical molecules. I rise this point in
order to illustrate that some emergent laws, such as
the laws of chemistry, are no more than particular
cases of older and more general principles. The fun-
damental laws of chemistry are wholly derivable
from quantum mechanics. Actually, there is much
more agreement between chemistry and quantum
mechanics than between quantum mechanics and
general relativity. So far, none has been able to de-
velop a consistent quantum theory of gravity. How-
ever, to my knowledge, up to this day, there is not
the faintest evidence for the existence of a chain of
inferences or speculations that may lead to the deri-
vation of the PNS from either quantum mechanics
or general relativity. Of course, the previous state-
ment do not proves that there would never be such
a derivation, but the burden of finding it lies with
those that might pretend to include the PNS within
the realm of physical science. On the other hand,
there is a time honoured tradition of finding analo-
gies between thermodynamics and biological evolu-
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tion as I have previously shown. Moreover, in a now
classical paper, LEWONTIN already attempted to axi-
omatise not the principle, but the theory of natural
selection, and as such he tried to define the minimal
general characteristics that a system must satisfy in
order to be suitable for evolution by means of natural
selection. According to LEWONTIN, thermodynamic
factors as well as very general boundary conditions
that apply to all complex molecular systems are
among the obvious necessary conditions for the ac-
tion of natural selection (LEWONTIN 1970). However,
from the previous statement some readers have de-
rived the unwarranted suggestion that this is equiv-
alent to proving that the PNS is derivable from ther-
modynamics. Also, there have been some recent
attempts to translate certain concepts derived from
the PNS, such as fitness, into the language of ther-
modynamics (MADDOX 1991; TORRES 1991). But I be-
lieve that such attempts represent a valid effort to
find rules of correspondence between two basically
incommensurable theoretical frameworks.
Many people confuse nonliving with living evo-
lution. The claims that the evolution of galaxies or
radioactive decay are similar to biological evolutive
processes are quite erroneous, but this has not de-
terred some authors from suggesting that the fine-
tuned values of the physical constants are the result
of a process of cosmological natural selection, be-
cause causally isolated ‘universes’, such as a black
hole and our own universe, display the properties of
variation, multiplication and heredity (MAYNARD-
SMITH/SZATHMÁRY 1996). But so far, there is no clear
formulation of where might it lay the so-called he-
redity of a given universe, or what do they mean
when talking about fitness and differential survival
in relation to such ‘universes’. Without any proper
definition of the system or physical feature respon-
sible for storing and transmitting the “hereditary”
information of the universe, and in absence of defi-
nite evidence that any universe is able to replicate
and leave progeny akin to itself, this extrapolation
of the PNS to the problem of cosmological evolution
seems a case of far fetched speculation. 
LEWONTIN has already shown that evolution in
galaxies is transformational, not variational evolu-
tion ; while MAYR has shown that radioactive decay,
controlled by physical laws, is teleomatic, not teleo-
nomic as biotic evolution (LEWONTIN 1983; MAYR
1988, p17). For MAYR, any change in an object or
system which is a result of its intrinsic potential,
such as the change of a white star into a red star, is
developmental evolution, entirely due to the action
of teleomatic (physical) processes. But the evolution
of living systems is variational evolution, and is due
to the selection of certain entities from highly vari-
able populations of unique individuals and the pro-
duction of new variation in every generation. Thus,
MAYR classifies as teleomatic processes those regu-
lated only by external forces or conditions, since the
end-state of such inanimate processes is automati-
cally achieved. All teleomatic processes come to an
end when the potential is used up, they simply fol-
low physical laws such as gravity or the second law
of thermodynamics. On the other hand, teleonomic
processes, display goal-directed behaviour which is
guided by a program and it depends on the existence
of some endpoint. In the case of living organisms as
we know them, there is a genetic program which,
within the context of General Systems Theory, is in
some way causally responsible for the teleonomic
nature of the organisms (VON BERTALANFFY 1976).
Whether such a program originated through a lucky
event or through a slow process of gradual selection,
or through learning and conditioning, is quite irrel-
evant for the classification of a process as teleonomic
(MAYR 1988, p45).
Complexity by itself is not a valid criteria to dis-
tinguish between living and nonliving systems, be-
cause some nonliving things (such as the weather
system) are highly complex. But living systems are
complex at every hierarchical level. Organisms are
unique at the molecular level because they have a
mechanism for the storage of information that has
been historically acquired. Inanimate systems lack
such a property. MAYR himself speculates that per-
haps there was an intermediate condition at the time
of the origin of life, but the distinction between liv-
ing and nonliving matter has been complete for
about three billion years, because all known organ-
isms possess a historically evolved genetic program
(MAYR 1988, p16).
We must bear in mind that natural selection acts
through differential reproduction (JACOB 1973).
Thus, adaptation is the result of a subtle game be-
tween the organism and the environment. The en-
vironment selects the organism in the same way as
the organism selects the environment, and repro-
duction becomes an amplifier that enhances the
spontaneous variations. Once set up in a particular
evolutive path, an organism is constrained by natu-
ral selection (alone or in association with other as yet
not well established factors), either to follow that
path or to disappear. Here we find a radical distinc-
tion between living and non-living evolution, be-
cause, for example, the disappearance of all atoms of
a given atomic number does not entail the disap-
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pearance of a place or space in the periodic table of
the elements, whereas the disappearance of all mem-
bers of a species entails its extinction. As ROSENBERG
has pointed out, the eventual appearance of new or-
ganisms qualitatively indistinguishable from the
former members of an extinguished species does not
constitute the reappearance of the same species,
since it did not arise in any line of descent from the
old one which became extinct (ROSENBERG 1985,
p206).
Artificial life and the PNS
The growing research on artificial life models has
provided interesting insights which suggest that
natural selection corresponds, indeed, to a particu-
lar stage in the history of evolution on Earth;
because complex molecular systems can achieve an
important degree of self-organisation even in the
absence of natural selection. But the realisation that
complex systems display a self-organising potential
implies that it is necessary to study not only such
self-organising properties but to understand how
such an spontaneous organisation guides, allows,
constrains or interacts with natural selection (GOU-
JON 1995). Therefore, it might be the case that there
is an as yet unknown fundamental law that links
the self-organising properties of complex molecular
systems with the principle of natural selection thus
leading to biotic evolution as we know it. KAUFFMAN,
a leading figure in the field of artificial life research,
states the following in the Epilogue of his influen-
tial book The Origins of Order: “I have tried to take
modest steps toward characterizing the interaction
of selection and self-organization” (cursives mine)
(KAUFFMAN 1993).
 We must bear in mind that cellular automata and
other computer–generated ‘beings’ which display
adaptive evolutionary trends, do so because they are
the result of computer simulations designed to imi-
tate the properties of life as we know it. It is a fact
that natural selection was ‘invented’ by nature itself,
not by an artificial life scientist. However, some may
claim that the PNS is only valid for life on Earth,
considering that we have as yet no formal evidence
of life elsewhere in the universe. Thus, it is possible
to design artificial life scenarios in which the evolu-
tion of complex systems occurs according to fixed
and well defined rules or ‘laws’ which are indepen-
dent of natural selection (LANGTON 1996). Therefore,
it is not apparently unreasonable to suppose the ex-
istence, in another part of the universe, of living sys-
tems that do not need to evolve, or they do evolve
but according to laws or rules which do not include
the PNS. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that we still lack
any hard evidence for the existence of life elsewhere
beyond the Earth, there is a consensus suggesting
that there may be life elsewhere in the universe. And
yet, some debaters might argue that life elsewhere is
different from life on Earth, because such alien life
obeys to local, contingent biological rules which
cannot be applied to other regions of the universe.
But this argument leads to a blind alley, since it im-
plies that in the absence of any common set of bio-
logical principles or laws extrapolable to any region
of the universe, it is not possible to speak of life oc-
curring elsewhere beyond the Earth, because we lack
those common principles which allow us to define
and to identify the basic characteristics of life. Ac-
cording to this view, stones in Mars might be alive
but we have no means to determine that. A reason-
able option to undo such a tangle of hair–splitting
arguments, is to dig up Occam’s razor and then to
assume, as most physicists do, that there is a general
trend towards regularity in nature which suggests
that life on Earth, as well as elsewhere in the uni-
verse, is based upon some common principles, in-
cluding some biological principles such as the PNS.
Conclusion
The material parts of both living systems and artifi-
cial machines can only be constructed on certain
structural principles, determined by physics and
chemistry, and only limited kinds of material are
available to make them. The objects of the natural
world constitute a vast array of varying complexity
but nevertheless with severe limitations. Natural
selection has in fact enforced evolving species of
organisms to traverse certain routes through that
complex array of possible systems. Whatever the
complexity of possible living systems at different
levels of organisation, it is natural selection which
ensures the survival of such systems, but the classes
of organisms which attain reality are selected from
the classes of possible material configurations,
because natural selection is permissive rather than
constructive.
Thus I restate my original contention that natural
selection constitutes a new general principle of na-
ture, underived from any known physical or chemi-
cal law, that emerged only after the appearance of
the first living informational self-replicating sys-
tems. On the other hand, I do not want to imply that
life is equal to an informational self-replicating sys-
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tem. Actually, it is not my purpose to offer any defi-
nition of life or to enter any debate about the items
to be included in such a definition, because this is a
complex issue beyond the scope of the present work
(WUKETITS 1995).
On the question of why it was possible for such
self-replicating informational system to appear,
there seems to be no current definite explanation
based on fundamental physics, beyond the sugges-
tion implied in what is known as the strong anthropic
principle, which contends that physical laws and
fine-tuned physical constants can be explained by
the fact that they have given rise to intelligent ob-
servers, able to discuss their nature. Thus, according
to such a controversial principle, the universe must
have those properties that allow life to develop in it
at some stage of its history (BARROW/TIPPLER 1986).
But there is nothing in the argument behind the an-
thropic principle, suggesting that the pathway to-
wards intelligent life must specifically depend on
evolution by means of natural selection. This fact
reinforces the notion that the PNS is underived from
any known physical principle.
Life is quite old for terrestrial standards (about 3.5
to 4 billion years old). However, it is a relatively recent
phenomena when compared with the currently esti-
mated age of the universe (around 15 billion years).
The laws of physics and chemistry ruled alone until
natural selection appeared; a new principle of nature
which did not abolish any of the previous general
principles but that it was also not implied or con-
tained in any of such ancient natural principles (as far
as current knowledge allows us to conclude). Some
recent models suggest that DARWINIAN biotic evolu-
tion is consistent with the general principles of ther-
modynamics, but they do not imply that natural se-
lection belongs to the realm of thermodynamics
(MADDOX 1991; TORRES 1991). Of course, if someone
demonstrates that the PNS is fully derivable from
thermodynamics or from any well established theory
from physics or chemistry, then the main argument
of the present discussion shall be falsified, but that
remains to be shown. 
Once more, I must stress that it is not my point to
argue whether natural selection is the only principle
acting upon biotic evolution; it is quite likely that
several other principles, many of which belong to
physics and chemistry, are actively involved in driv-
ing such an evolution (DOOLITTLE/SAPIENZA 1980).
Also, it is not my intention to enter any discussion
on whether biological evolution is a sudden or a
gradual process (GOULD 1980). However, if as some
thinkers suggest: the PNS is only a local ‘rule of
thumb’ because it is completely contingent on the
particulars of evolution on Earth (STEBBINS 1982; SHI-
MONY 1989a), then both, HUME’s first and second
problems (the problem of induction and the possi-
bility that the laws of nature may change in the
course of time), become harder than ever to solve,
unless we regard biological science as a local exercise
in description without any pretension to a universal
character. I believe that those who suggest that the
PNS is nothing more than a ‘meta-principle’ or ‘rule
of thumb’, must consider biology as a sui generis nat-
ural science, closer to history than to true natural
sciences such as physics and chemistry. This posi-
tion supports, in quite a radical way, HUME’s sugges-
tion that the course of nature might change in a
rather arbitrary way. Since an ‘unprincipled’ theory
of natural selection implies that the evident process
of biotic evolution will always escape from rational
analysis, and that whatever rules we assumed were
involved in the evolution of past organisms they are
likely to change at any time in the future. A rather
naive way to overcome the extreme epistemological
conclusions and problems implied by those which
deny any law-like status to the PNS, is to consider life
as a local phenomenon of limited scientific or epis-
temological interest. If such is the case, then HUME
second problem is only relevant for the physical–
chemical sciences, which then become the only
‘possible’ sciences, at least within an epistemological
outlook which believes in the rationality and coher-
ence of the scientific enterprise.
Therefore, I suggest that the second problem posed
by HUME, namely, whether the course of nature may
change in time, can be currently answered in the affir-
mative, because as far as reason allows us to tell, nat-
ural selection constitutes the evidence that new gen-
eral principles could emerge in time. However, I
believe that this point of view has less radical conse-
quences than those which deny any law-like status
to the PNS, thus implying that biotic evolution, as we
know it, is a basically unintelligible accident and
hence, that biological science is a truly odd disci-
pline. Economy of thought suggests that the PNS ap-
peared when nature arrived at a certain point in the
evolution of complexity (which none may attribute
to the PNS itself), otherwise the PNS becomes, in-
deed, a meta-magical principle, a weird entity that
was wandering in the abstract depths of nothingness,
just awaiting for the right time to manifest itself. 
Nowadays, it is rather common to find in the spe-
cialised literature further arguments showing that
biological science is basically a historical science
with an epistemological framework completely dif-
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ferent from physical science, and as such, biology is
not then subjected to the traditional criteria that
might define a mature science based on law-like
principles (as exemplified in C.G. HEMPEL’s classic
Aspects of Scientific Explanation 1965). This position,
shared by a number of philosophers of biology, leads
to an unavoidable clash with the research pro-
grammes of disciplines such as biochemistry and
molecular biology which nevertheless, are very in-
fluential in modern biology. On the one hand, bio-
chemistry and molecular biology strive to achieve
the level of rigour associated with physics and chem-
istry. Indeed, biochemistry can already provide very
specific, quantitative predictions about the future of
a given molecule incorporated in the transforma-
tional steps of a specific metabolic pathway. On the
other hand, we are still waiting for a foolproof expla-
nation of how the giraffe got its long neck, not to
mention the fact that although we have a reasonable
idea about the future of our Sun, we cannot provide
any reasonable scenario about the features of the
species that might be alive on Earth, within one or
two million years ahead. Therefore, although bio-
chemistry and molecular biology provide a powerful
material basis for certain neo-DARWINIAN claims (as
explicitly stated in MONOD’s book L’hasard et la né-
cessité), those disciplines do not seem to require an
evolutionary theory of any sort, because the expla-
nations in biochemistry and molecular biology are
synchronic, while evolutionary biology needs diach-
ronic explanations.
I am among those who worry about the fact that
the current progress of biological science takes place
within a dichotomous epistemology: on the one
hand, the search for biological covering laws; on the
other hand, the positive assertion that biology needs
not such covering laws. I believe this is not a problem
of reductionism vs holism, nor a revival of the old
dispute of materialism vs vitalism, because it is not a
question of reducing biology to physics. On the con-
trary, this is a more serious problem that reflects a
deep incoherence in the structure of biological sci-
ence itself. This can be illus-
trated by the recent discoveries
in the molecular biology of de-
velopment, which show that a
set of genes, collectively
known as Hox genes, orches-
trate the patterning of the em-
bryo in animals as diverse as
the fly and man. Moreover,
highly homologous genes be-
longing to this Hox family, are
directly involved in controlling the development of
appendages as diverse as wings, fins, arms, antennae
and lobopodia. The molecular data supporting this
conclusions are both elegant and straightforward,
but the alternative evolutionary explanations for this
facts are very contrasting. One hypothesis suggests
that genes or genetic circuits were convergently re-
cruited for limb development during the evolution
of vertebrates and arthropods. These genes would not
be involved in appendage development in the com-
mon ancestor of vertebrates and arthropods, so each
gene or circuit was involved in other developmental
events. This situation would require the parallel co-
option of members of similar gene families, acting
along different developmental axes to pattern an out-
growth of the body wall in at least two taxa. Thus, the
evolution of limbs in each group would necessary
involve the convergent recruitment of numerous
genes to define similar developmental axes. If such
was the case, this would be a most baffling case of
highly-improbable convergent evolution. The alter-
native explanation suggests that some genes or cir-
cuits were components of an ancestral genetic regu-
latory system that was used to pattern a structure in
the common ancestor of vertebrates and arthropods,
but this ancestral structure need not to be homolo-
gous to arthropod or vertebrate limbs. The genetic
circuit could have originally patterned any one of a
number of outgrowths of the body wall in a primitive
bilaterian. It is assumed that such genes were initially
involved in other developmental events and the key
step in limb evolution was the establishment of an
integrated genetic system to promote and pattern the
development of certain outgrowths. So this system
provided the foundation for the evolution of quite
heterologous structures such as wings, arms, anten-
nae and lobopodia (SHUBIN et al. 1997). Thus, in spite
of the hard molecular data on which the aforemen-
tioned hypotheses rest, it is difficult not to conclude
that we end with a pair of just-so stories in our hands.
If we add to this situation the possibility that the PNS
is devoid of any law-like status, then evolutionary
scenarios, as those previously
described, become truly arbi-
trary schemes. 
It is not possible to say
whether further new general
principles will eventually
emerge, but I think that the
example of natural selection is
enough to support the idea
that HUME’s second problem
is alive and well. Moreover, in
Armando Aranda-Anzaldo, Laboratorio de
Biología Molecular, Facultad de Medicina y
Facultad de Ciencias, Universidad Autóno-
ma del Estado de México, Apdo. Postal 428,
C.P. 50000, Toluca, Edo. Méx., México.
Tel: 52-72-173552, Fax: 52-72-174142
Email: aaa@coatepec.uaemex.mx
Author’s address
Evolution and Cognition ❘ 170 ❘ 1998, Vol. 4, No. 2
Armando Aranda-Anzaldo
Jacques MONOD own words: “La biosphère ne con-
tient pas une classe prévisible d’object ou de
phénomènes, mais constitue un événement particu-
lier, compatible certes avec les premiers principes,
mais non déductible de ces principes. Donc essentiele-
ment imprévisible.” (The biosphere does not con-
tain any foreseeable class of objects or phenomena,
but it constitutes a particular event that is compati-
ble with general principles, but that it is not deducible
from such principles. Therefore, the biosphere is es-
sentially unpredictable) (MONOD 1970).
I think HUME could have construed such an state-
ment so as to mean that biological science is an im-
possible task. Unless we consider a further possibil-
ity: that chance–driven evolution by means of
natural selection is not the truly fundamental pro-
cess that supports the evolution of life on Earth (and
possibly elsewhere), but that there must exist some
constant and rational biological laws which are truly
responsible for guiding and organising the varied
complexity that we call life. Then, the PNS might
happen to be wholly derivable from such, more fun-
damental, biological evolutionary principles, which
may impose the true constraints upon biological
evolution. Such laws might be derivable or non-de-
rivable from physical–chemical laws, and so they
might or might not overcome the burden of HUME’s
second problem, a point that is beyond the scope of
the present discussion. 
In his classic What is life?, SCHRÖDINGER says:
“...from the knowledge we have gained of the struc-
ture of living matter. We must be prepared to find a
new type of physical law prevailing on it. Or are we
to term it a non-physical, not to say super-physical law?”
(cursives mine) (SCHRÖDINGER 1945).
Indeed, besides SCHRÖDINGER, some of the leaders
of quantum mechanics, such as BOHR, HEISENBERG,
and PAULI, postulated that someday someone would
discover laws in organisms that were different from
those which operate in inert matter. Actually, when
Max DELBRÜCK switched from physics to biology,
one of his original objectives was to discover such
laws (KAY 1985).
Later on, León BRILLOUIN argued: “It may well hap-
pen that the discovery of new laws and of some new
principles in biology could result in a broad redefi-
nition of our present laws of physics and chemistry,
and produce a complete change in point of view”
(BRILLOUIN 1964).
Thus, it might be the case that biological science
needs to reduce its dependence on the DARWINIAN
paradigm (based on the theory of natural selection),
in order to shift towards a further paradigm, perhaps
along ARISTOTELIAN lines, so as to overcome (fully or
partially) the burden posed by HUME’s second prob-
lem, and then to become as rational as physical sci-
ence. 
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1. Man’s special 
position: scientific 
knowledge and 
dogma
Together with ethnology,
contemporary biology,
psychology and episte-
mology basically and
unanimously start out
from an special position
taken by man (cf. OESER
1996; GUILLE-ESCURET
1994). In the framework
of Evolutionary Episte-
mology, this statement
relates to man as both a
biological and sociocul-
tural being—the starting
point being the compari-
son between man and
other living beings. Con-
tinuity between biologi-
cal evolution and cultural
development is a signifi-
cant precondition in this respect, yet man is consid-
ered to have a special position in nature due to his
quite specific development. DARWIN already referred
to the “effet réversif de l’évolution” in the sociocul-
tural domain (TORT 1983, 1992). The unresolved
question must therefore be addressed as to what
extent today DARWINIAN biological theory of evolu-
tion is important for a specifically sociocultural
approach.
Even though various sciences start out from man’s
“special position”, this does not necessarily imply
that the conclusions drawn from such an insight are
the same in all approaches. In DURKHEIMIAN sociol-
ogy, a classical example, the premise of man as a
social being is intended, from the very beginning, to
rule out extrasocial causes of social phenomena or
change. Against this back-
ground, man is regarded a
priori to be a social being:
Human nature is meant to
be seen as social, while
other factors considered
as external to society are
basically to be omitted
from perspective (cf.
CHEVRON 1990; BARKOW/
COSMIDES/TOOBY 1992).
This approach has exerted
a deep influence on sev-
eral generations of sociol-
ogists. The theory of auto-
poiesis in LUHMANN’s
understanding should
also be mentioned here, as
it considers social devel-
opment to be the mere re-
sult of a “self-referential”
procedure—in spite of its
basic intent to biologize
social development (cf.
LIPP 1987).
These scientists who see in man an exclusively
cultural being found their argumentation on the
premise of man as a social being, without acknowl-
edging the concomitant necessity of an interdiscipli-
nary debate of their basic arguments. Likewise, little
attention is paid to the possible consequences ensu-
ing from such a discussion, taking into account cul-
tural as well as biological factors.
In the cultural sciences, especially in ethnology,
an occasional starting point was the assumption of
transition from a natural to a cultural state. For in-
stance, LEVI-STRAUSS and other writers touched on
this issue of transition, yet their investigations in
this connection were seldom a focus of their scien-
tific endeavors. As to contemporary populations,
rough schemes made out a difference between those
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living in a natural state and others of high culture.
Such a differentiation indicated that the former cat-
egory was not conceived of as lacking culture but
rather as representative of a lower cultural level,
since the latter category was referred to not as simply
cultured—but as highly cultured.
Most scientists would agree that man assumes a
special position in nature only as a cultural being.
But, at times, humans are considered to be cultural
because they are social beings—equipped with lan-
guage and symbolic abilities and developing these
abilities in social interaction (cf. inter alia CARRITHER
1992). Nevertheless, man’s sociability is only a nec-
essary yet by no means sufficient prerequisite of
“culturability”, because—as is sufficiently known—
man is not the only social being on earth. Many
other living beings share this character with him.
Of course, the premise of man’s special position
can also be substantiated religiously, on the assump-
tion that man as God’s creature is to be considered
as set apart from other offspring of “Creation”. (Cf.
the discussion in the Catholic church on human sin-
gularity; extremist positions such as Creationism are
referred to here for the sake of completion only). 
This paper deals with two questions. The first
question is, how do the different findings on man’s
special position—as a natural, social and/or cultural
being—fit together? And the second question is, to
what extent can these insights be made consistent?
Or more precisely: To what extent can the state-
ments elaborated by the theory of evolution—en-
compassing all sciences that present an evolutionary
approach to certain issues, including Theoretical Bi-
ology, Evolutionary Epistemology and Evolutionary
Psychology—be conciliated with sociocultural theo-
ries of development?
Yet even when taking into account none of these
various premises and theories, the scientific issue re-
mains unresolved as to man’s special status in na-
ture. One intricacy that cannot be bypassed refers to
human beings’ actual nature and cultural develop-
ment. In other words, we have to ask, if man’s special
position, be it assumed or established on the basis of
specific findings, dismisses the social and cultural
sciences from approximating the biological precon-
ditions of human nature? Or rather—put more pre-
cisely—is a purely biological answer to this question
sufficient and are additional insights in a sociocul-
tural perspective perhaps superfluous?
Ethnologists’ technical focus does not allow them
to venture out too far while dealing with this prob-
lem. On the other hand, we are faced with the ques-
tion as to whether such issues can indeed be avoided
or even ignored. For theories of cultural develop-
ment and change have always been elaborated in
ethnology. Therefore, it is doubtlessly advisable to
investigate such theories alongside their innate con-
clusiveness. Consideration should also be given,
however, to existing approaches and results from
other sciences which chiefly deal with such issues.
This is because the premise of man as a social be-
ing should under no circumstances become a
dogma—such as in DURKHEIM’s sociology—which a
priori obliges the dialogue with other sciences to fol-
low along a preconceived track. This kind of ap-
proaches preclude any open scientific inquiry into
the nature of man and culture, together with the
mechanisms of cultural development.
2. The relationship between biological 
and cultural development
The postulate of man’s special position in nature
results in the scientific question as to the very
nature and emergence of such a position. This ques-
tion is particularly important against the back-
ground of an evolutionary approach. Only if we are
aware of the many little steps and findings in vari-
ous sciences that are necessary to expand our
knowledge in this field of research, it becomes clear
to what extent we at times have to rely on supposi-
tions. In an ethnological perspective, for example, it
thus also seems appropriate to address the possibili-
ties of interaction between biological and cultural
development.
Therefore, the starting point in our observations
is made up of the concepts of both evolution itself
and of how the social and cultural sciences, along-
side Evolutionary Epistemology, consider the rela-
tionship between evolution and cultural develop-
ment. Our approach will for the present limit itself
exclusively to specific aspects in the history and the-
ory of science, as dealing with this issue on a larger
scale would certainly exceed the scope of any single
paper.
2.1 Evolution and cultural development in the 
social and cultural sciences
Taking a historical perspective, and in view of vari-
ous social- and cultural-scientific approaches,
three positions can be roughly determined. In the
first position, considerations and theoretical
approaches—as in the sociological theories men-
tioned above—primarily focus on cultural devel-
opment in terms of sociocultural change and thus
Evolution and Cognition ❘ 175 ❘ 1998, Vol. 4, No. 2
Man’s Special Position in Nature
largely deny the significance of exogenous factors,
i.e. extrasocial causes (cf. LIPP 1968, p83). In turn,
such non-consideration contains an indirect, yet
clear statement regarding the present problem. It
means, that it is only with regard to human social
nature that man is an object of our scientific
inquiry. In this regard, the relationship between
cultural development and/or change and evolu-
tion fails to be taken into account due to the pre-
vailing premise of man as a social being.
The second position pays attention to the ques-
tion as to what cultural development really is, bring-
ing it into connection with evolution, e.g. in terms
of theoretical considerations of the tension between
history and evolution. Originally, inquiries into reg-
ular sequences of cultural development were never
free of the notion that something may be concealed
behind social and cultural change: that is, directed
development toward ever greater complexity or—in
COMTE’s and SPENCER’s terms—a “succession of social
conditions” (TJADEN 1972, p122).
Especially since the success of Social DARWINISM of
the SPENCERIAN type, the concept of progress1, in
terms of development toward an ever more complex
and complete state, has become part and parcel of
most sociocultural theories of development or evo-
lution. In the closing years of the 19th and at the
beginning of the 20th century, the concept of socio-
cultural development was in surprising agreement
among both biological and social-scientific ap-
proaches. Thus, ENGELS (1995) speaks of the method-
ological model function shown by DARWIN’s Selec-
tion Theory in 19th-century biology.
For ethnology, a third theoretical standing was to
prove more crucial: the various evolutionist theories
of the turn of the century, along with the theory of
multilinear development presented by the North
American cultural anthropologist Julian STEWARD in
the 1950s. The most frequent starting point in older
theories of evolution had been unilinear develop-
ment. Characteristically, such evolutionism con-
ceived of uniform, i.e. unilinear development, link-
ing this conception to the idea that the Western
civilized world should be regarded as the standard for
future development in all populations of the world.
This was a significant constituent of the above-men-
tioned belief in progress, having gained importance
from the times of SPENCER’s Social DARWINISM on-
ward. Toward the close of the 19th century, theories
of evolution gave much prominence to the sequence
of living and economic forms within the continuum
of human history. Cultural development, for in-
stance, was understood as a result of adaptation to
environmental conditions. However, one of the ma-
jor drawbacks of these theories was their understand-
ing, based on the above superficiality of approach, of
present-day cultures as representing levels of devel-
opment. Such levels were frequently established on
the basis of “speculative” considerations, so that frag-
mentary data was conceptually drawn upon without
investigating cultural surroundings.
On the other hand, STEWARD’s theory of multilin-
ear evolution (1955) showed that a theory of devel-
opment that took evolutionary aspects into account
could very well be accepted by a science devoted to
empirical experience. On account of the empirical
approach and limited scope of validity shown by
STEWARD’s theory, valuable considerations about the
mechanisms and paths of development in human
cultures were formulated in terms of adaptation to
clearly defined environmental conditions. In this
sense, an optimal connection between theoretical
and empirical research was ensured. Incidentally,
this example shows particularly well that useful (par-
tial) results and serious approaches are only brought
about by theoretical considerations and open debate
of existing theories.
For ethnology today, there can be no doubt that
previous evolutionist approaches should only be ap-
plied with great care and that the question must be
reformulated in consideration of present-day multi-
disciplinary knowledge. Substantial progress has
been made, for example, by at all realizing that in a
theoretical perspective, there is no doing without a
clarification and critical scrutiny of the relationship
between biological evolution and cultural develop-
ment (cf. MÜHLMANN 1952; WERNHART 1971, 1987).
If history were thought to be associated with the
field of culture, and evolution with that of biology,
then dealing with biological approaches in ethnol-
ogy would represent one out of many chapters in the
history of science. Yet if development is seen as the
cultural continuation (of whatever kind) of an evo-
lutionary process, and if it can be claimed that “evo-
lution continues to maintain control of the func-
tionality of Homo sapiens as a species” (RIEDL 1981;
translation by MFCh), then the issue of the relation-
ship between biological and cultural theories of de-
velopment appears in a very new light.
2.2 Evolution and cultural development in the 
perspective of Evolutionary Epistemology
At an initial level, the issue of the relationship
between evolution and cultural development is
quite easily resolved in the perspective of biology
Evolution and Cognition ❘ 176 ❘ 1998, Vol. 4, No. 2
Marie-France Chevron
and Evolutionary Epistemology. For it is possible
and even assumable—as indicated by OESER—that
biological evolution endures today, albeit in a way
imperceptible to man. However, this general state-
ment fails to facilitate conclusions from the said
upon the kind of relationship between the two
domains. OESER continues by stating that: “The
sociocultural evolution of man is thus a second kind
of evolution, based upon—yet not representing the
linear extension of—organic evolution” (1996,
p244; translation by MFCh). For DARWIN as well,
OESER emphasizes, the theory of evolution was “the
foundation and starting point for a theory of
human self-transcendence (“Selbstüberwindung”)”
(1996, p244; translation by MFCh). Thus, beginning
with a period of transition from animal to man, in
which “progressive encephalization” is said to have
taken place, DARWIN considered the history of man
to represent a chain of sociocultural development
which was by no means governed by genetic princi-
ples (cf. OESER 1996, p246f). Only in this regard, it is
possible to speak of evolution at different levels and
of the continuation of evolution as a biological pro-
cess within a sociocultural setting. 
In classical Evolutionary Epistemology, certain
insights are maintained that have an impact on our
considerations:
a) The conception of biological evolution itself as
the result of a historical development (LORENZ 1992,
p161f). This simple statement ensues from year-long
research aimed at reconstructing “the features and
laws of the singular, phylogenetic becoming of liv-
ing beings” (1992, p208; translation by MFCh); 
b) The conception of sociocultural development
in terms of—whatever kind of—continuation of bi-
ological development: As opposed to what is often
assumed, the starting point in this relationship is not
direct continuity between biological evolution and
cultural development but rather the emergence of a
new phenomenon. In this view, LORENZ (1977, p167)
related to the “uniqueness of man” and rejected any
reductionist perspective, which “clings to the fiction
of the continuity of the evolutionary process, believ-
ing that it can only produce differences of degree”.
Furthermore, he noticed that “every step in evolu-
tion causes a change not only of degree but also of
essence”. In this respect, LORENZ considered “the life
of the human mind” as “a new kind of life” (LORENZ
1977, p172);
c) The conception of cognitive development in
terms of a special, autonomous continuation of cul-
tural development. This refers less to LORENZ’ “fulgu-
ration of the human mind” than to a special case of
continued development of human mind—i.e. the
progress of sciences as further-reaching develop-
ment according to autonomous regularities—and
increasing cognitive competence. However, this
third issue is still very much disputed within Evolu-
tionary Epistemology—and was incidentally elabo-
rated in particular by POPPER, resulting in a specific
discussion between him and LORENZ, alongside other
scientists in this field of research (cf. VOLLMER 1995,
p133ff; CALLEBAUT 1996, p128).
While much emphasis is given in French science
to the aspect of autonomous development of man
as a social being (GUILLE-ESCURET 1994), there are
many approaches in the English and Anglo-Ameri-
can literature attempting to explain the broad field
of transition between animal and man. The problem
has in the last years been approached by seeking the
connection between the social nature of man and
his cultural being. This has been a continuous part
of the debate, as exemplified by CARRITHER (1992),
BARKOW/COSMIDES/TOOBY (1992) and DEACON
(1997). The standing of Evolutionary Psychology
has now been crucial to understand this approach:
“The central premise of the Adopted Mind is that
there is a universal human nature, but that this uni-
versality exists primarily at the level of psychologi-
cal mechanisms, not of expressed cultural behaviors
(BARKOW/COSMIDES/TOOBY 1992, p5). It is argued
that “much of human intelligence is social intelli-
gence, the product of selection for success in social
competition” (1992, p628), considering processes of
adaptation—ascertained with the help of biology
on the one hand and psychology on the other—to
the ancient living conditions of Pleistocene hunters
and gatherers as the foundations for interpreting
present-day patterns of behavior. In this connec-
tion, it is stated that “Freed from the Standard Social
Science Model’s stricture to locate all causes outside
of psychology, modern approaches to culture can
explore the ancient psychological mechanisms that
underlie and explain recently emerging cultural
phenomena”. This approach is similar to that out-
lined above, the psychological aspects, however, be-
ing interlarded between biological and cultural ex-
planations as an additional interpretive option.
Here, we are again confronted with the fact that this
is an interdisciplinary field of research in which no
science alone may offer a solution. Another arising
question relates to the degree of integratability
shown by the theory of evolution after DARWIN. As
aptly indicated by VOLLMER (1995, p59), this ques-
tion will require a pronounced answer, since the
DARWINIAN theory of evolution—a theory of the
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evolution of living beings which can certainly be
extended to other fields—does not represent a “uni-
versal theory of evolution”. In this regard, VOLLMER
has commented that “It is the concept of evolution,
not the available theory of evolution, which is uni-
versally applicable” (1995, p59; translation by
MFCh).
2.3 Analogy as a cognitive tool: between biology 
and culture
2.3.1 Concepts of analogy and the “biologization
of society”. As outlined above, evolutionary and de-
velopmental approaches are not unfamiliar to eth-
nology as a science that itself theoretically and prac-
tically deals with cultural diversity, specificity and
change. Despite this, many theories holding such a
claim have in the past failed on account of their
largely speculative considerations. At the turn of the
last century, research in human development, be it
biological or sociocultural, was the prevailing para-
digm in the “human sciences”. At once, a concept of
sociocultural development evolved—under the in-
fluence of DARWIN and, in particular, SPENCER’s the-
ory of development—which was in surprising agree-
ment in approaches of both biology and the social
sciences (cf. ENGELS 1995).
From the very beginning, evolutionary observa-
tions had been present in ethnology along two dif-
ferent, characteristic patterns: First, the search for
levels of development, leading to the large-scale the-
ories elaborated by BACHOFEN, MORGAN and other
evolutionists; and second, thinking in analogies,
making it possible to compare biological and cul-
tural phenomena and integrate such phenomena
into a broader theoretical framework.
As indicated by OESER, this kind of analogy is lo-
cated at an “initial, ‘superficial’ and thus largely un-
secured, yet heuristically precious level of compari-
son” between biological and cultural phenomena
(1996, p214; translation by MFCh; cf. LORENZ 1974).
OESER, referring to the initial level of analogy forma-
tion, speaks of “metaphorical similarity” (1996,
p214).
The image of society as an organism is one of the
most widely acknowledged examples of such an
analogy. This analogy was already in use by SPENCER
who started out from the “growth” of society resem-
bling organic growth (cf. OESER 1996, p240). Some
ethnologists also made use of this image. LEROI-
GOURHAN, for one, did not consider himself an evo-
lutionist, yet his is definitely an approach from
within a specific evolutionary perspective upon so-
ciety. This becomes evident in his attempt to sketch
the most complete possible reconstruction of hu-
man development from prehistoric to present-day
man. Moreover, LEROI-GOURHAN also intended to
identify general lines of development of societies.
The starting point of his scientific interest was the
technological equipment of populations through-
out the world, comparing the respective states of
technology they had arrived at. Although he avoids
the term “progression” because of its evolutionist
tinge (1971, p39), the concept of “state of technol-
ogy” is equated with that of technical level in purely
evolutionary terms. The mechanisms of surmount-
ing one specific “state of technology” and passing
over into another represent a core issue in LEROI-
GOURHAN’s conception of technology. With regard
to technology, his considerations reflect upon the
concept of “milieu”, distinguishing—like
DURKHEIM—an internal milieu (society itself) from
an external milieu (environmental conditions and
other societies). The technical milieu, one of the
constituents of the internal milieu, becomes very
important in this connection. This milieu is the
point where the internal milieu comes into contact
with the external milieu. Both milieus bear clear
traces of this contact and mutual penetration (cf.
1973, p333). LEROI-GOURHAN conceives the technical
milieu as a kind of projection of the external and
internal milieus into social reality, a quite faithful
description of the phenomenon of adaptation in a
biological sense of the word. In this connection, LE-
ROI-GOURHAN regards the objects of material culture
as resulting from the contact between internal and
external milieus. Such objects play a central role in
human environmental perception due to their inter-
mediate relationship to the two milieus, and man in
the end is only able to experience the environment
through the objects of his own respective culture (cf.
CHEVRON 1998 on this aspect).
Yet LEROI-GOURHAN moves way beyond this step
by comparing objects created by man with the spe-
cialized organs of animals and plants, the outcome
of slow processes of adaptation to the environment,
as to their functions: “In nature, human groups be-
have like living organisms; similar to animals and
plants, which cannot directly appropriate the prod-
ucts of nature, since they depend on the function of
organs processing various basic substances, human
groups appropriate their environment by means of
a ´curtain´ of objects (tools and devices)” (1973,
p321, quoted in CHEVRON 1998; translation by
MFCh). LEROI-GOURHAN basically considers the tech-
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nical milieu as a continuous sectional area or field of
contact between the internal and external milieu.
This consideration is given primary importance in
his concept of society in terms of organisms engaged
in a continual process of adaptation and developing
ever-new technomorphological features (cf. LEROI-
GOURHAN 1973, p332f).
The present paper has considered the superficial
application of analogy in detail because it is in fre-
quent use in the social and cultural sciences, as well
as biology. However, the issue becomes more intri-
cate in cases in which analogy can indeed be clearly
recognized as analogy, while the way the applied
terms are theoretically embedded conceals the rela-
tionshipships between various levels of comparison.
The theory of autopoiesis in LUHMANN’s view is
such an example which largely builds upon an anal-
ogy from biology. In this case, a theory is adopted
from biology and transferred to another framework.
This is the typical case of analogy: It is not the image
of adaptation to the environment that comes to be
applied, but rather that of the self-organization of a
system in parallel to the self-organization showed
by organic systems, i.e. biological organisms. LUH-
MANN has been deemed one of the main advocates
of autopoiesis in sociology. He was correctly re-
proached, however, for merely borrowing the rele-
vant concepts from biology and incorporating them
into new conceptual connections without reflecting
upon the deeper meaning of comparison (LIPP 1987,
p453).
LIPP has raised a question in connection with LUH-
MANN’S approach, which directly touches on our is-
sue: “Are the categorical constituents—and struc-
tures according to which they are linked—
maintained in detail in the process of translation,
such that the cognitive profits originally warranted
by the concepts are perpetuated into new genera-
tional levels?” (1987, p453; translation by MFCh).
This question expresses exactly what analogy is in
classical terms: A relationshipship between two phe-
nomena is transferred from one field into another
(cf. REMANE 1971, p216). To pose this question, how-
ever, also implies to disclose the ways in which anal-
ogies can at times be manipulated. LUHMANN trans-
mitted the biological concept of autopoiesis in
VARELA’s and MATURANA’s classical sense and the re-
lated problem of self-organization with reference to
systemically proceeding biological processes (LIPP
1987, p457) into sociology. This does not primarily
address the relationship between organisms and the
environment, yet consideration is given to the pro-
cesses taking place between systems and the envi-
ronment, “which—in quite DARWINIAN terms—ap-
pear as selection, adaptation and evolution” (1987,
p457; translation by MFCh). It is shown in the case
of autopoiesis as conceived by sociology that trans-
mitting the theory of autopoiesis does not function
that smoothly. For instance, determining an entirety
and its parts in a given social and/or cultural system
proves far more complicated than in a biological sys-
tem (1987, p461). In forming analogies, in particu-
lar, this difficulty to determine the levels and delim-
itation of areas often escapes notice. Thus, constant
shifts between levels result in a misleading usage of
concepts. As amply demonstrated by LIPP with the
example of selection, these basic concepts of the the-
ory of evolution—against which a theory of auto-
poiesis in a sociological sense would need to prove
its value according to its own claims—are linked to
other contexts (1987, p462f).
Finally, it should be borne in mind that, at an
early date, various writers in biology made use of
analogies between cultural and biological phenom-
ena. For instance, recall the comparison put forth by
VIRCHOW in 1855 or Ernst HAECKEL in 1904 between
citizens of a society and the cells of an organism (cf.
SANDMANN 1995, p331). SANDMANN has indicated the
issue alluded to here: “While Virchow and other au-
thors do recognize the relativity of this analogy,
HAECKEL rejects it on account of his monistic concep-
tion of reality” (1995, p331; translation by MFCh).
However, SANDMANN fails to see the fact that HAECKEL
not only absolutized but also inverted the analogy
along the lines of which a mechanism of social co-
existence is applied to interpret a biological phe-
nomenon. Again, “biologization of society” was the
final result in this case.
One basic problem that prevails is that analogies
are not designated as such and that the demands
made on such analogies are seldom expressed
clearly. Rather, the impression is given in most cases
that we are dealing with “authentic” analogies, i.e.
equality of relationshipships in the classical sense of
the word (cf. REMANE 1971, p214). This suggestive
use of analogy does more harm than elucidate con-
nections. The process is reminiscent of KOZENY’s no-
tion of “psychological process of conceptualization”
which points out the subjective attributions and cat-
egorizations involved in the development of preju-
dice (1997, p50ff). Thus, such approaches are rather
counterproductive in terms of establishing knowl-
edge. They are not useful with regard to the claim to
consider biological approaches in the social and cul-
tural sciences, since they purport to deal with certain
aspects while in fact simply neutralizing them.
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2.3.2 “Analogy as a source of knowledge” in sci-
ence. However, the significance of analogy is not
limited to its abuse, and it does not suffice to simply
indicate the limits of such an instrument without
demonstrating genuine options of applicability. In a
theoretical perspective, therefore, we must round off
the problem by adding some supplementary obser-
vations.
Comparatively applying analogy to determine
the causes of similarities, biology is a discipline in
which analogy has developed to be a major method-
ological tool. In this framework, analogy—”as the
form of similarity that develops on the basis of inde-
pendent adaptation to identical environmental con-
ditions” (RIEDL 1981, p209)—is seen in contrast with
homology—”as the form of biological similarity that
is established by the identical regularity of epige-
netic systems” (1981, p211; translation by MFCh).
In the case of analogy, similarity is attributable to
identical external conditions in terms of the func-
tional adaptation of an organism or organ to such
conditions. In the case of homology, on the other
hand, the cause of similarity is to be identified
within the system itself (1981, p211).
Yet regardless of this technical understanding of
the concept of analogy, “analogy as a source of
knowledge” (LORENZ 1974) has been more closely in-
vestigated in terms of its validity as a theoretical tool.
Relatively few scientists have attended to this issue,
although it is a fundamental problem in connection
with the basic conditions and mechanisms that gov-
ern the generation of knowledge. Of course, this fact
is chiefly problematic since practically every scien-
tist makes use of analogy. Analogy is particularly sig-
nificant in the initial, purely intuitive phases of re-
search, i.e. the setting up of hypotheses. This form
of analogy would fit into OESER’s second type—fol-
lowing Beer’s systematization—of analogy forma-
tion. After the metaphor, this kind of analogy was
the second form of analogy that proved itself as gen-
uine, or as LORENZ commented: “However, no such
thing as a false analogy exists: an analogy can be
more or less detailed and hence more or less infor-
mative” (LORENZ 1974, p186).
A typical and particularly suitable example for
such a process is the development of the concept of
natural selection which is one of the corner stones
of DARWIN’s Descendence Theory. For DARWIN, pro-
fessional selective breeding represented the starting
point for the question as to whether this mechanism
may function in nature as well (TORT 1992, p28). The
comparison between artificial and natural selection
is appropriate because the former to some extent ex-
perimentally confirms the hypothesis of natural se-
lection (cf. OESER 1996, p105). Here, the formed anal-
ogy does not only lead to a primary thinking process
and thus facilitates an initial superficial comparison.
There is also a deeper-lying reason for the compari-
son: Human beings tend to use the natural variabil-
ity of organisms in the case of selective breeding to
their own advantage. Selected out by man, such an
advantage suggests to see the same phenomenon in
both processes, although it may once take place to
the advantage of the given organisms and otherwise
to that of man (cf. TORT 1997, p33f).
The example outlined above presents a relatively
simple—scientifically straight-lined—explanation
of a complex phenomenon. Explanations are less
overt and thus more complicated in terms of com-
paring the spheres of biology and culture, espe-
cially—and frequently—if they are located between
science and ideology. This is because genuine prob-
lems develop less in connection with analogy forma-
tion but rather with the interpretation of analogy.
As observed by RIEDL (1981, p132f), “analogy as a
source of knowledge” is thought little of by scientists
who rather confuse it with a kind of pseudo-knowl-
edge. This is not primarily because of analogy itself
but rather due to its interpretation, i.e. the act of
determining the reasons for actual similarity.
On account of their inherent latitude, analogies
can become vehicles for other contents, since they
can be easily associated with other ideas at a second
level. In any case, it appears befitting to refer to this
latitude, since false associations may very well gain
quick access and, under certain circumstances, be-
come more powerful than the original scientific idea
that was meant to be illustrated and disseminated.
This problem indicates a second level: the level of
RIEDL’s “second-degree analogisms” (1981, p132).
The first step of analogy formation applies to a kind
of hypothesis about the world, starting out from the
notion that “similar things admit of anticipation as
to further similarities” (RIEDL 1981, p93; translation
by MFCh), and thus rendering it possible to perceive
and interpret the world. However, it is imperative to
form a second hypothesis to interpret the very sim-
ilarity perceived and represented.
Yet the use of analogy in an interspace between
biological and sociocultural phenomena sets many
snares which let the above problem appear even
more intricate and complex. The difficulty in ana-
lyzing the degree of validity held by analogy stems
from the fact that not only can the compared fea-
tures and complexes of features be located at differ-
ent levels of comparison. Rather, other elements
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such as the Zeitgeist or ideology must be given due
consideration. Thus, for example, we can take the
interaction between SPENCER’s Social DARWINISM and
DARWIN’s Descendence Theory (cf. BOWLER 1995,
p309ff).
Such interaction between science and ideology is
increasingly coming to the fore in natural-scientific
debates on the formation of theories (cf. MATALON
1998). The “ideological dimension of DARWINISM”
has often been neglected, although this very area of
complex interaction between ideology and theoriza-
tion set up the foundation for popularizing this sci-
entific idea. It was SPENCER who first employed the
concept of evolution in terms of biological and cul-
tural development, acknowledging “a manifestation
of a universal trend toward progress” (BOWLER 1995,
p313; translation by MFCh). Comparisons between
DARWIN’s and SPENCER’s approaches to the problem
of evolution make it clear to what large extent anal-
ogies merely represent cognitive tools, while their
adequate and useful application finally depends on
the theoretical construction in which they are em-
bedded. At an early date, SPENCER’s Social DARWINISM
made itself felt as a social philosophy showing
strongly ideological components. On the other
hand, the fact that DARWIN’s thought was heavily
influenced by certain notions prevailing in those
days did no further harm to his theorization. This is
because although DARWIN was inspired by such
ideas, and on account of his concrete observations
and interpretations of “experiments”, he was also
able to detach himself from those notions in the
course of further-reaching scientific work. Of course,
the theory of science should draw attention to this
kind of basic problems of knowledge generation, yet
it is imperative that individual specialized disci-
plines, p192ff).
This paper will not deal with the topic in all its
facets. Rather, our intention is to indicate how this
fundamental problem of scientific research has
failed to attract sufficient consideration, notwith-
standing some notable exceptions. To some de-
gree, furthermore, it still represents a basic diffi-
culty of interdisciplinary work in a certain field of
research.
Finally, it should be noted—because it represents
an additional difficulty in research and is often a
reason for misunderstandings between scientists—
that analogy is a philosophical and methodological
instrument which is not alien to the sciences of
culture. In these sciences as well as others, a more
precise application of such instruments of concep-
tualization and representation seems appropriate.
This refers to scientists’ professional ethics, as self-
deceit and ideological conviction may all too easily
dull our perspective. This aspect is a considerable
concern in the present field of research, and even
though there may be no such thing as false analogy
(LORENZ 1973), there are certainly misleading anal-
ogies.
Analogy has proven useful in the intuitive process
of conceptualization, yet it seems advisable to
closely consider how it can be put to precise use to
explain and elucidate specific processes and phe-
nomena. Unfortunately, it is to be expected that
analogies maintain a stronger hold than the scien-
tific facts themselves.
3. Cultural evolution and biological 
development
It has so far been the objective of this paper to indi-
cate basic difficulties and sources of mistakes in the
interdisciplinary study of the relationship between
biological evolution and cultural development, as
well as to emphasize the basic necessity and useful-
ness of such research. From a cultural science per-
spective, important roles are played by both
considerations in the history of science and meth-
odology and interdisciplinary investigations about
individual issues. In addition, it seems absolutely
essential in the cultural sciences to investigate the
ongoing theoretical discourse in biology and Evolu-
tionary Epistemology in order to better evaluate the
implications of recent research results and integrate
them into their own theoretical considerations.
However, this also applies to biologists who intend
to incorporate the phenomenon of cultural devel-
opment into their analyses and who thus must
become familiar with the approaches of cultural
sciences and their inherent logic. It is crucial to
know not only others’ limits and frailties but also
one’s own, in addition to the full scope of current
discussion in alien disciplines, in order to truly
comprehend the respective issue on hand. This is
because interdisciplinary work can never consist in
arbitrarily taking elements of another science out
of their context.
As to content-relevant discussion, it has long
been clear to many researchers who deal with this
issue that the strict distinction between evolution
as a biological process and development as a cultural
process cannot go without the slightest contradic-
tion. Yet frequently, the two fields are still either
dogmatically separated or otherwise uncritically
confused.
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3.1 The problem of universality of the biological 
theory of evolution
A relatively frequent mistake in the theory of evolu-
tion has been the attempt to—literally—transfer the
DARWINIAN theory of evolution to other than purely
biological events. Awareness has not been sharp
that although the concept of evolution is claimed to
be universally valid, such validity has yet to be
proven with regard to the theory of evolution (cf.
VOLLMER 1995, p59). This naturally does not rule
out that evolution can be the major issue in various
fields paying attention to certain regularities and
law-governed phenomena within a developmental
event.
This fact is substantial in a biological perspective,
since it implies that the theory of evolution perceive
“the necessity to include non-DARWINIAN evolution-
ary factors” (VOLLMER 1995, p59; translation by
MFCh) in order to faithfully address all the effective
components to be considered.
At once, it seems appropriate to think about the
large integrative power emanating from the theory
of evolution in terms of a “pure theory that is uni-
versal and biological” (OESER 1996, p145f), i.e. to re-
flect upon the need to deal with basic concepts such
as selection and adaptation (OESER 1996). BLUTE al-
ready referred to this problem two decades ago
(1979, p46f). Rejecting any significance in ap-
proaches deriving from a purely biological theory of
evolution for the cultural and social sciences, this
author nevertheless considered cultural-science in-
quiries into biological approaches to be a rewarding
endeavor. The fact that thought is given to the mech-
anisms of analogy formation, and thus the reasons
for such parallel ways of looking at the issue, can be
very productive in a epistemological perspective.
For some time now, a discussion has been under
way in biology, which has concentrated on the issue
of interaction between evolution and development
(cf. WIESER 1994, p35f). With regard to evolution as
a historical process, LORENZ argued that “the fact of
the development of both human beings and oaks is
merely the outcome of a very specific, unique histor-
ical event” (1992, p162; translation by MFCh). In
view of its implications, this simple remark is highly
significant in theoretical terms as it serves to clarify
the connection between becoming and having be-
come, between biological systematics and the theory
of evolution: “Every question as to the causes of ‘be-
ing this and nothing else’ in a given organism’s
structure and performance is responded to with an
analogous, basically historical answer: All causal
analysis of structure, as well as performance in all
living beings, is conclusively and unconditionally
dependent on phylogenetic inquiries into these fea-
tures’ development” (1992, p163; translation by
MFCh).
More recent progress in biology has also shown
that attention is paid in Evolutionary Developmen-
tal Biology to the importance of historical pro-
cesses—in terms of an analogous connection be-
tween such processes and evolution as well as the
possible interaction between the two fields. There-
fore, and amending the classical synthetic theory of
evolution, solutions are sought not only “in locally
specific genetic expressions but especially in the epi-
genetic dynamics of developmental system”
(MÜLLER 1994, p185; cf. WIESER 1994, p35ff; transla-
tion by MFCh). A call is made—and research is on-
going—in this framework for a “synthesis of the the-
ory of development and the theory of evolution”
(MÜLLER 1994, p185; translation by MFCh). Deriving
exclusively from Evolutionary Biology, this insight
is still particularly interesting if the complexity of
such phenomena is to be given emphasis. 
3.2 Culture as a long-past process of learning
The above considerations have argued that we must
first and foremost address the question as to how
interaction between biological evolution and cul-
tural development takes place—in cultural sciences
generally and ethnology specifically. Or perhaps
more correctly: What section of this phenomenon
do we at all perceive? Apart from the basic question
as to how important the theory of evolution is for
cultural development, the problem of the kind of
relationships and interaction between the different
levels of observation still remains unresolved.
Addressed by MÜHLMANN in 1952, the connection
between history and evolution is far from being dis-
closed, and individual researchers depend increas-
ingly on interdisciplinary cooperation to which they
must remain susceptible. In this regard, a purely cul-
tural-scientific perspective is as little constructive as
an approach deriving solely from Evolutionary Biol-
ogy. Thus, it is an indispensable precondition to con-
sider human, i.e. sociocultural evolution as an out-
come of phylogenetic adaptation leading to specific
human aptitudes. Cultural scientists participating in
serious and profound human research must beware
not to disregard this kind of development—which
unfortunately often is the case. As indicated else-
where (CHEVRON 1998, p38f), it would appear useful
and profitable to integrate results from a science
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such as ethology as “the more basic field of knowl-
edge” (OESER 1996, p183). That means that we have
to include biological knowledge in relation to our
behavior and the cognitive apparatus (a priori no-
tions and categories of thought) for the benefit of
research into culture and society.
For ethnology, a science phenomenologically in-
vestigating all cultures as equal (historical) entities,
the question as to the status of evolutionary obser-
vations arises, against the empirical background of
cultural comparison, in a way that is different from
other sciences. It is generally agreed in ethnology
that it would prove inadequate to raise this question
along the lines of the old theories of evolution—
regardless of the fact that dealing with such ap-
proaches is in fact advisable. This problem can and
should be addressed anew on the basis of results and
insights gathered by other sciences.
The major difficulty—perhaps a unique opportu-
nity for ethnological research—is that we are con-
fronted with empirical facts which are as yet alien to
the constructs of Western science. This allows to
more easily filter off cultural bias from the theoreti-
cal approaches, while making the ethnological ac-
cess to knowledge an ideal pilot light for a critical,
not merely receptive theory and history of science.
Thus, it has been possible at least since TYLOR’s crit-
icism of sources (1871)—and his examination of
data both collected on one’s own and taken over
from other researchers—to observe and recognize
cultural and ideological bias. For instance, such cul-
tural bias includes belief in incessant progress, which
gained access to all fields of evolutionism, i.e. the
theory of unilinear development.
In this connection, a number of ethnicities all
over the world were classified as representing previ-
ous levels of development—regardless of the fact
that these groups represented contemporary cul-
tures. By 1895, SPENCER was not the first scholar to
write that “the mental characteristics of the uncivi-
lized … are features that are present in the children
of civilized peoples” (quoted by OESER 1987, p145;
translation by MFCh). Likewise, DARWIN considered
the Fuegians to be prehistorical ancestors (cf. OESER
1987). The problem attached to the primitiveness of
peoples as a constituent of
evolutionism is one of the no-
tions most frequently handed
down from ethnology. Cer-
tain definitions long dis-
carded by ethnology were oc-
casionally adopted by other
sciences, and the image of
“Stone Age men” living in the most remote parts of
the world certainly remains more strongly present
in public conscience than any single concrete report
on those ethnicities’ actual ways of living. This topic
will be detailed elsewhere, yet it is already clear that
such notions regarding primitivism as an adopted
feature of human cultures must be seen as remnants
of old evolutionism. They have been handed down
as persistently as the dichotomy of innateness and
acquiredness, long considered as refuted in biology,
has at times been uncritically repeated in the cul-
tural and social sciences. At the same time, much
more nuanced comments are seldom, if at all, taken
note of.
In cultural and social sciences, traditional theories
of cultural development are rarely considered in a
higher-level perspective. Theories of cultural change
have led to completely divergent results, depending
on whether they were set up from a social- or cul-
tural-science perspective and in accordance with the
respectively other premises. The decisive fact in this
regard was that exogenous factors were indeed con-
sidered in one case, while being utterly disregarded
in another, such as in autopoiesis deriving from sys-
tem theory. In yet other theories, development was
regarded as the cultural continuation of an evolu-
tionary process. Some writers focused on the transi-
tion from nature to culture and from anthropogen-
esis to higher levels of development. From the start,
however, this phylogenetic perspective was heavily
biased by certain premises, such as the above-men-
tioned arbitrary definition of developmental levels
according to unclear criteria or the equation of
present-day populations with children or Stone Age
people.
This problem is much more closely approximated
by approaches in search of transcultural universals
of human or cultural ethology and the “ratiomor-
phic apparatus” as outlined by BRUNSWICK (1955). Be
it defined as “primitive” or not, the focus here is on
what is generally human as well as what are identical
phenomena in different cultures of the world. This
is seen by some researchers as one of the substantial
operational directions in ethnology, as it “seeks to
recognize common grounds and repetitions in all
cultures … the same generally
human basis, i.e. such univer-
sals” (SCHUSTER 1978, p547;
translation by MFCh). This
does not refer to the universal
historical perspective in the
old sense of the word. Rather,
the question concentrates on
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certain common foundations and regularities of cul-
tural development—a more constructive objective,
for sure.
WERNHART’s concept of “Universalia humana et
cultura” (1987, p19) is one ethnological endeavor to
interpret basic universal patterns of human existence
along with their specific cultural superstructures. Re-
acting to the “universal cultural insights” gathered
by cultural history (WERNHART 1984, p66), the Vi-
enna school of historical ethnology had an early-date
critical look at the universals postulated by human
and cultural ethology (cf. HIRSCHBERG 1976; WERN-
HART 1987). The objective has not only been to inves-
tigate the biological foundations of actually emerg-
ing common properties among various populations
but also to explain cultural differences and histori-
cally evidenced development. It is interesting that
this interdisciplinary and now strongly ramified field
of research bears nuanced comments on the prob-
lems connected with the issue of universals, while
some issues are readressed in a novel perspective. 
At this level, it has nevertheless become obvious
that the (basic or initial) conditions of sociocultural
development are given by evolution. Whatever indi-
vidual implications may derive from the theory of
“human self-transcendence (“Selbstüberwind-
ung”)” (OESER 1996), this field of research, rich in
hypotheses, represents the most exciting challenge
for today’s pure interdisciplinary research on man as
a cultural being.
Note
1 BOWLER (1995, pp309–325), referring to “Social LAMARCK-
ISM”, has precisely documented the significance of belief in
progress in DARWIN’s Theory of Evolution.
References
Barkow, J. H./Cosmides, L./Tooby, J. (eds) (1992) The Adapt-
ed Mind. Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of
Culture. Oxford University Press: New York–Oxford.
Blute, M. (1979) Social Cultural Evolutionism: An Untried
Theory. In: Behavioral Science 24: 46–59.
Bowler, P. J. (1995) Herbert Spencers Idee der Evolution und
ihre Rezeption. In: Engels, E.-M. (ed) Die Rezeption von
Evolutionstheorien im 19. Jahrhundert. Suhrkamp (STW
1229): Frankfurt a.M., 309–325.
Brunswick, E. (1955) “Ratiomorphic” models of perception
and thinking. Acta psychol. 11: 108–109.
Callebaut, W. (1996) Thomas Kuhn as an Evolutionary Natu-
ralist. In: Evolution and Cognition 2: 127–138.
Carrither, M. (1992) Why Humans Have Cultures. Explaining
Anthropology and Social Diversity. Oxford University
Press: Oxford–New York.
Chevron, M.-F. (1990) Der geographische Gedanke in der
franzosischen Ethnologie. Ein wissenschaftstheoretischer
Beitrag zur Geschichte der Ethnologie. Diss. der Univ.-
Wien.
Chevron, M.-F. (1995/96) Ursprung und Urformen. Theo-
rienansätze in Österreich und Frankreich zu Beginn des 20.
Jahrhunderts. In: Mitteilungen der Anthropologischen Ge-
sellschaft in Wien (MAGW), Band 125/126, pp. 187–196.
Chevron, M.-F. (1998) Mechanismen der kulturellen En-
twicklung aus ethnologischer Sicht. In: Mitteilungen der
Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien (MAGW), Band
128, pp. 33–42.
Deacon, T. (1997) The Symbolic Species. The Co-Evolution of
Language and the Human Brain. Allen Lane The Pinguin
Press: London.
Engels, E.-M. (1995) Biologische Ideen von Evolution im 19.
Jahrhundert und ihre Leitfunktionen. Eine Einleitung. In:
Engels, E.-M. (ed) Die Rezeption von Evolutionstheorien
im 19. Jahrhundert. Suhrkamp (STW 1229): Frankfurt a.M.
Guille-Escuret, J. (1994) Le décalage humain: le fait social
dans l’évolution. Editions Kimé: Paris.
Hirschberg, W. (1976) Adolf Bastian’ Elementar- und Völk-
ergedanke in Kulturhistorie und Verhaltensforschung. In:
Matreier Gespräche (1981), Maske-Mode-Kleingruppe. Be-
iträge zur interdisziplinären Kulturforschung. Hrsg. vom
Inst. f. Vergleichende Verhaltensforschung der österr.
Akad. d. Wiss., Wien-München, pp. 25–33.
Kozeny, E. D. (1997) Gruppengesetzmässigkeiten und Voru-
rteil. In: Mitteilungen der Anthropologischen Gesellschaft
in Wien (MAGW), Band 127, pp. 43–57.
Leroi-Gourhan, A. (1971) L’Homme et la matière. (1st ed.:
1943) Editions Albin Michel: Paris.
Leroi-Gourhan, A. (1973) Milieu et techniques. (1st ed.: 1945)
Editions Albin Michel: Paris.
Lipp, W. (1968) Institution und Veranstaltung. Zur Anthro-
pologie der sozialen Dynamik. Duncker & Humblot: Ber-
lin.
Lipp, W. (1987) Autopoiesis biologisch, Autopoiesis soziolo-
gisch. Wohin führt Luhmanns Paradigmawechsel? In: Köl-
ner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 39 (3):
452–470.
Lorenz, K. (1974) Analogy as a Source of Knowledge, Les Prix
Nobel en 1973. The Nobel Foundation: 1974.
Lorenz, K. (1977) Behind the Mirror. A Search for a Natural
History of Human Knowledge. Methuen and Co Ltd: Lon-
don (First published 1973 as “Die Rückseite des Spiegels”
by Piper Verlag: München).
Lorenz, K. (1992) Die Naturwissenschaft vom Menschen.
Eine Einführung in die vergleichende Verhaltensfors-
chung. Das “Russische Manuskript” (1944–1948). Aus dem
Nachlaß herausgegeben von Agnes von Cranach. Piper:
München–Zürich.
Evolution and Cognition ❘ 184 ❘ 1998, Vol. 4, No. 2
Marie-France Chevron
Matalon, B. (1998) La marche des idées scientifiques. Evolu-
tion ou révolutions? In: Sciences Humaines–Hors Serie No
21, juin/juillet, pp. 24–26.
Mühlmann, W. M. (1952) Ethnologie und Geschichte. Archiv
für Kulturgeschichte, Bd. 34.
Müller, G. B. (1994) Evolutionäre Entwicklungsbiologie:
Grundlagen einer neuen Synthese. In: Wieser, W. (ed) Die
Evolution der Evolutionstheorie. Von Darwin zur DNA.
Spektrum Akademischer Verlag: Heidelberg.Berlin.Oxford,
pp. 155–193.
Oeser, E. (1996) System Klassifikation Evolution. Historische
Analyse und Rekonstruktion der wissenschaftstheoretis-
chen Grundlagen der Biologie. Braumüller: Wien.
Remane, A. (1971) Analogie. In: Ritter, J. (ed) Historisches
Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Bd 1. Schwabe & Co: Basel,
pp. 214–229.
Riedl, R. (1981) Biologie der Erkenntnis. Die stammesge-
schichtlichen Grundlagen der Vernunft. Verlag Paul Parey:
Berlin und Hamburg. (1. Aufl. 1979).
Sandmann, J. (1995) Ernsts Haeckels Entwicklungslehre als
Teil seiner biologistischen Weltanschauung. In: Engels, E.-
M. (ed) Die Rezeption von Evolutionstheorien im 19. Jahr-
hundert. Suhrkamp (stw 1229): Frankfurt a.M, pp. 326–346.
Schuster, M. (1978) Ethologie und Ethnologie. In: Stamm, R.
A./Zeier, H. (eds) Lorenz und die Folgen. Die Psychologie
des 20. Jahrhunderts, Bd. VI, pp. 546–550.
Steward, J. (1955) Theory of Culture Change. The Methodol-
ogy of multilinear Evolution. Univ. of Illinois Press: Urba-
na Chicago London (2nd ed. 1973).
Tjaden, K. H. (1972) Soziales System und sozialer Wandel.
Enke Verlag (dtv): Stuttgart.
Tort, P. (1983) La pensée hierarchique et l’Evolution. Aubier
Montaigne: Paris.
Tort, P. (1992) L’effet réversif de l’évolution. Fondements de
l’anthropologie darwinienne. In: Tort, P. (ed) Darwinisme
et société. PUF: Paris, pp. 13–46.
Tylor, E. B. (1871)  Primitive Culture: Researches into the De-
velopment of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language,
Art and Customs. London: Murray.
Vollmer, G. (1995) Biophilosophie. Philipp Reclam jun.: Stut-
tgart.
Wernhart, K. R. (1971) Einige Gedanken zum Kulturwandel
aus ethnohistorischer Sicht. Ethnologische Zeitschrift
Zürich, Jg. 1971, Heft 1.
Wernhart, K. R. (1984) Walter Hirschberg 80 Jahre, oder
“Zum Kanon der Fächer der Anthropologie”. In: Mitteilun-
gen der Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien
(MAGW), Band 114, pp. 1–11.
Wernhart, K. R. (1987) Universalia humana et cultura. Zur
Frage von Mensch, Kultur und Umwelt. In: Mitteilungen
der Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien (MAGW),
Band 117, pp. 17–25.
Wieser, W. (1994) Gentheorien und Systemtheorien: Wege
und Wandlungen der Evolutionstheorie im 20. Jahrhun-
dert. In: Wieser, W. (ed) Die Evolution der Evolutionstheo-
rie. Von Darwin zur DNA. Spektrum Akademischer Verlag:
Heidelberg. Berlin.Oxford, pp. 15–48.
Evolution and Cognition ❘ 185 ❘ 1998, Vol. 4, No. 2
1. Introduction 
and overview
The present paper pro-
vides an evolutionary
framework for discussing
some fundamental fea-
tures of perception and
cognition and tries to
point out a number of
current controversies in
cognitive science that
can be resolved by adopt-
ing this perspective. The
main questions are:
What can provide a firm
ground for a theory of
categorization, if we
insert it into an evolu-
tionary framework? Is it
enough to build a theory
of categorization on sen-
sory input alone, and
what place does “reality”
have in such a theory?
An evolutionary per-
spective on categorization1 provides natural con-
straints on what categorization can be like. First and
foremost, evolutionary theories need some form of
evaluation mechanism—categorization has to be
about something for evolution to work, for example
about finding food or avoiding danger. These evalu-
ation mechanisms I have called values.2 The organ-
ism needs substances with food value for its survival,
needs to find a partner with reproduction value to pro-
duce offspring, must protect itself from predators
with destruction value. These are objective constraints
that all living systems have respected throughout
their evolutionary history. One of the major themes
in this paper is to present values as the driving force
of categorization (section 2).
Thus, categorization is built upon cognitive and
sensory processes, but is about, for example, finding
food, which is not used for feeding cognition, but for
feeding the body. The
value systems constitute
the life processes. Categori-
zation is about keeping the
creature alive. Eating is not
primarily a cognitive pro-
cess, with the aim of stim-
ulating the senses in the
digestive system, but con-
sists of uniting substances
possessing food value with
our body to maintain the
homeostasis. See figure 1.3
These physiological
processes are (rightly)
taken for granted in the lit-
erature of psychology and
philosophy, but the dis-
tinction between cogni-
tive processes and life pro-
cesses cannot be
overlooked in an evolu-
tionary account, as the life
processes constitute the
mechanism of evaluation
of the evolutionary pro-
cess. One of the main themes of this paper is to ac-
count for the connection between cognitive pro-
cesses and life processes, or, as I call it, sense domains
and value domains.
Consider, as an example, the two meanings of the
word hurt. It refers both to the sensation of pain, and
to the physiological process of injury.4 Thus, there is a
close connection in our minds between sense pro-
cesses and value processes. And the only means we
have of escaping injury is to escape the pain! How
would we be able to protect ourselves if the sensory
impulses did not correctly predict the values? In sec-
tion 2.1, I examine the correspondence between
sense domains and value domains.
There are some other nontrivial consequences of
considering the closed loop of the life processes. Like
any other cognitive feat, categorization must for ex-
ample respect the time limits set up by the survival
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of the organism. Thus, categorization can be seen as
a trade-off between the availability of information
and its predictive power. See section 2.2.
Another consequence is that all categorization is
seen as embodied and situated. The cognitive func-
tions are seen in relation to the functions of the or-
ganism, in a context. The actions of the organism
always take place in a multidimensional environ-
ment. In this environment, a multitude of informa-
tion is available for use as sensory information,
whether or not it is used by the organism. The bac-
teria in the Petri dish on my desk have for example
access to the same potential of sensory information
as I have. They could look at me as I look at them,
but they don’t. 
This condition, that all organisms are surrounded
by a vast potential of sensory information, is used to
challenge the common view that categorization is
built up from inferences in single dimensions. Rather,
in section 3, I argue that the basic units of categori-
zation are complexes of covarying properties. The unit
of perception will thereby lie closer to the unit of
interaction.
The phenomenon of categorization is ascribed in
the literature to a vast range of organisms, from pro-
tozoa to humans. Informally, it may described as fol-
lows: “Given the motivational state of the organism,
it has to find useful situations with food, mates and
shelter, and must avoid danger, such as enemies,
cliffs or excessive sunlight. In each situation, there is
a choice to be made as to how to proceed, and this
choice represents the categorization of the organ-
ism.5
There are of course several ways of performing cat-
egorization. Finding my way out of a house of hor-
rors, I can proceed by reasoning to work out where I
came in, following the sensory information in the
trails in the dust or “blindly” reacting to the weak
daylight coming through the shuttered windows. A
dog could use the trails and the daylight. An amoeba
only the daylight. 
In most theories of human categorization, it is
said to serve reasoning. (See KOMATSU (1992) for a re-
view.) In principle, there is nothing wrong in assum-
ing that the main function of human categorization
and concept formation is to serve reasoning. But if
we want to attain a deeper understanding of funda-
mental human cognition, if we want to understand
the connection between animal and human cogni-
tion, or build artificial systems with categorization
capabilities, then categorization must be based on
something that can support evolutionary con-
straints, and does not rely on the advanced abilities
of humans, notably language.
According to some traditions, humans use lin-
guistic faculties for all forms of cognitive process-
ing—the so-called Language of Thought (FODOR/
PYLYSHYN 1988). I have chosen not to follow this tra-
dition, but rather to find the foundations of catego-
rization in nonlinguistic cognition. This will provide
the common ground for human and nonhuman cat-
egorization that an evolutionary approach will need.
Although I devote this paper to aspects of catego-
rization that are general to all organisms, there are a
number of important features of human cognition
that are necessary to remember as uniquely human
when discussing categorization: peeling off the cog-
nitive characteristics of language will uncover un-
derlying similarities between animal and human
cognition. In this paper, I will limit myself to laying
a stable ground for categorization in the value sys-
tems that are common to all organisms. 
2. Values, senses and brains
In this section I go deeper into the concept of values
and show its relation with perception and cogni-
tion.6 The method I use is akin to those of JENNINGS
(1906) and von UEXKÜLL (1909/1985; 1982). I con-
struct a world with some basic properties, and this
will provide the starting point for the discussion of
some themes of perception and cognition.
The world I assume has to be stable to some ex-
tent. At least, the aspects of the world that are cap-
tured by cognitive generalizations have to be stable,
otherwise there would be no generalizations to cap-
ture! The organisms inhabiting the world—descen-
dants of the Vehicles of BRAITENBERG (1984), and the
Berry creatures of GULZ (1991) and BALKENIUS
(1995)—are theoretical creatures, but exhibiting
many behaviors common to living organisms.7
All creatures have to comply with the restrictions
imposed by the closed loop of survival: intake of
food, reproduction, homeostasis of temperature and
organism
food
waste products
regeneration
Figure 1: The value loop for substances with food value.
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other conditions of life, such as oxygen content, air
pressure etc. For the lowest organisms, the sensory
requirements are at a minimum: for bacteria in a
heap of dung, no senses or sensory information are
needed to find the food—it is always there. In higher
organisms a radical shift has taken place due to sym-
metry breaking (STEWART/GOLUBITSKY 1992). We eat
at regular intervals, rather than continously, and as
long as the intervals are not greater than the loop
admits, we have the freedom to leave the food and
do other things. But then we will need sensory or-
gans to find the food again.
The world we move around in is a complex world.
The theoretical analogy that I want to use is that of
a cave that is not known to us in advance. We move
around in the cave, and as long as we keep clear of
the walls, nothing prevents our exploration. This
world is objective in an ontological sense. It poses
constraints on us that we have to comply with (STEW-
ART 1996). I have illustrated this in figure 2.8
The black area in the figure represents the world,
in terms of objective possibilities: wherever the crea-
ture tries to go, inside the area, there will be nothing
(in these two dimensions) that will stop it. The
hinder that the “end of the world” represents has
nothing to do with sensory stimulation. It is purely
a matter of physical constraints. 
The movement does not have to be restricted to
spatial movement. Also other aspects of our experi-
ence can be represented dimensionally (GÄRDENFORS
1996). When we look for something to eat, we ex-
plore an area of potential food that extends over sev-
eral dimensions. Some food is beneficial to us and
will continue to be part of our world. Some food is
dangerous and will stop our exploration. 
The values that substances have will vary depend-
ing on species. This does not alter the physical char-
acteristics of the substances, however, only their re-
lation to the organism, and what aspects the
organisms are likely to include in their mental rep-
resentation. Thus, I argue that the substances with
value do not in themselves need to be mentally rep-
resented. Rather, mental representation is con-
cerned with strategies for finding and avoiding these
substances.
As an illustration of the difference between sense
domains and value domains, please put your hand
on your desk. Push downwards. Further. When you
sense the pain, ignore it and push harder. Did you
get through? No. Again, we take for granted the as-
sociation of the sense dimensions and what I have
called the value dimensions—what prevents your
hand from passing through the table is not the pain,
it is the physical characteristics of the table, which
correspond to the edges of the black world in the
figures.
The organism in figure 2 starts its trajectory at s.
When it comes to x1 it “hits reality.” The knowledge
gained from this experience depends on the sensory
apparatus of the creature. The one in the figure
seems to have noticed the wall, but couldn’t predict
it. It changes direction, hits the “wall” again at x2,
and we leave it for the moment.
Irrespective of the objective layout of the world,
the creature will, if it is complex enough, try to es-
tablish its own subjective map showing which areas
are allowed. A system of inductive heuristics will al-
low the creature to extend its mental map based on
its experience, as pictured in figure 3. The white area
represents the parts of the space that the animal will
treat as if it were safe.
Inside the white areas the animal is less likely to
check carefully. It can switch from the slower at-
tended, context-dependent mode of processing re-
a
b
s
x1
x2
Figure 2: The organism starts at s, “hits reality” at x1 and x2.
a
b
s
x1
x2
Figure 3: The mental map of a timid organism. The white area
represents the subjective safe zone.
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quired when the informational predictability is low,
to automated processing which is more rapid and
error-free and can be performed in parallel with
other tasks (GIVÓN 1989, ch. 7).
We do not so far have to assume anything about
the perception of the organism, it could create a rep-
resentation from dead reckoning (GALLISTEL 1990),
based on the trajectory. But it could also use, for ex-
ample, landmarks or smell gradients (BALKENIUS
1995; 1996).
What says, then, that the creature should delimit
its expected subjective harmful zone to a small area
around the experienced trajectory? Figure 4 shows
the mental map of an “epistemically bold” creature.
Here, the creature still avoids the two places x1
and x2 of the “reality encounters.” (This is the crea-
ture’s response to the stability requirement.9) In this
case, the creature has drawn too optimistic infer-
ences that have extended beyond the limits of the
objectively “possible.” However, as long as it does
not try these possibilities, it will never get the nega-
tive feedback from reality, and will not have to revise
its inferences.10 Furthermore, the bold creature has
the advantage of inductively knowing a far greater
portion of the allowed space than has the timid crea-
ture, and this might counterbalance the negative ef-
fects of over-generalization.11 As I have tried to illus-
trate by the number of intersecting circles, the
creature also gains simplicity in the representation.12
2.1 “Direct perception” and the function 
of the senses
I would like to compare my approach above with
the theory of affordances of GIBSON (1979). A suc-
cinct characterization is given by NEISSER (1987):
“Affordances, as J. J. GIBSON (1979) defined them, are
relations of possibility between animals and their
environments. A particular environment has a
given affordance if and only if it makes a given kind
of action possible, whether that action is actually
executed or not. The claim that a given affordance
exists is an objective claim, always either true or
false: I may or may not be able to walk on that sur-
face, for example.”
This is the first part of GIBSON’s affordance theory,
and the least discussed in a general framework—the
objective character of affordances. Of course, and GIB-
SON also notes this, the affordances are species-spe-
cific. Thin ice supports a mouse but not a cow. The
affordances correspond to the black areas—“real-
ity”—in the figures above.
The second part of GIBSON’s argument is that af-
fordances are directly perceived, and this I would like
to discuss further.13 I have tried above to evoke a pic-
ture where the sensory dimensions are separated
from the value dimensions, and I would like to fol-
low that line of reasoning for a while before return-
ing to GIBSON again.
If we assume direct perception of affordances, this
would yield a perfect match between inner and outer
environment, as in figure 5. GIBSON studied mainly
visual perception, and for vision it might be easier to
obtain a “true image” of the environment, although
some parts of the cave are obscured from certain van-
tage points.
As I said before, the space that the creature inves-
tigates does not have to be spatial. Take a common
example: the creature has to find food that is edible
by exploring two food dimensions. The black space
in the figures now represents the objectively safe
zone, and the organism has to find sensory cues to
get to know the space. Now, the negative feedback is
harder: a “reality hit,” i.e. eating something outside
a
b
x1
x2
s
Figure 4: The white space represents the mental map of a bold
organism.
a
b
s
x1
x2
Figure 5: The mental map of an informed organism. Perfect
correspondence between inner and outer worlds.
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the borders, causes illness or death. The problem is
that there is no a priori correspondence between the
sensory dimensions and the value dimensions. Or is
there?
Sensory organs represent an inductive heuristic
that if we base our actions in the real environment
upon the categories that we can find in the sensory
input, then we survive. The “only” problem is that
there are very many worlds compatible with our sen-
sory input. Evolution, however, has helped us solve
this problem of the adaptation of the senses to our
environment:14 “The single individual is still a pris-
oner in his constructed world, but the system as such
will slowly, over millions of generations, improve its
correspondence between what goes on inside the
brain and outside it” (SJÖLANDER 1995).
GIBSON’s theory is directly appealing in that it
stresses the way we tie perception to action without
reflection. Perception is not seen as passive intake of
information into a storage unit, but as a direct guide
to action. This thought also makes it possible to link
human perception to earlier evolutionary stages, for
example down to bacteria, which base their locomo-
tion on sucrose gradients (STEWART 1996).
As humans we envision the problem as one of
picking mushrooms in the forest. A combination of
visual and olfactory cues guide us, and neither the
visual nor the olfactory information provides infor-
mation enough to form a true map of the space of
edible mushrooms.
For lower organisms, there is the direct link from
perception to action, which in some sense makes the
border between the sense domains and the value do-
mains disappear. Thus, GIBSON’s theory predicts a
state where it is possible to take the sense information
for the value information—i.e. there is a correspon-
dence between the salience in a sensory dimension
and the values that we need for survival. We can
react directly to the sensory stimuli. We don’t spit
out “bitter” food. We spit out “dangerous” food. This
is a heuristic that saves much cognitive effort, and as
long as the species survives it is a viable heuristic.15
For higher organisms, however, the case is more
complicated, as we have cognitive structures medi-
ating between perception and action (see section
2.3).
Evolution has helped us evolve sense organs that
allow us to make distinctions corresponding to use-
ful divisions of our environment. However, there are
several situations where the correspondence does
not hold. “Fruits and berries, for example, have more
food value when they are ripe, and this is specified
by the color of the surface” (GIBSON 1979, p131).
In the quotation from GIBSON, we see again how
the association of the sense domain and the value
domain is taken for granted. But just because we can-
not take the association for granted, the correspon-
dence between sensory properties and values is not
completely arbitrary. In the case of fruits and berries
there are for example chemical reactions in the value
domain that change color when fruits grow ripe and
have more food value. Some changes in skin color in
fruits and berries, on the other hand, can be seen as
a property in the sense domain that has co-evolved
with animal use of the property. Certain plants de-
pend on birds for disseminating their seeds, and thus
the sensory stimulus that the birds use as a cue will
be reinforced by evolution. 
The preceding discussion touches the old prob-
lem of our direct access to KANT’s “Ding an sich,” and
provides an evolutionary answer to the question of
whether we can get to know the world directly: In-
sofar as the sensory organs really have adapted to the
outer reality, what we get from them is knowledge
about reality. Unfortunately, there does not seem to
be any fundamental way of knowing to what degree
this adaptation has taken place. However, the only
conclusion granted by the theory of evolution is of
course that the sensory organs have adapted to a de-
gree where they have let the organisms survive in the
specific environment where they have lived.
Whether this means that we are exploring the bor-
ders of the cave, or stay somewhere in the middle,
remains an open question.
2.2 Availability vs. predictive power
The constitution of our sense organs makes some
properties more available than others. The eye is
sensitive only to a certain frequency range of light,
the ear to another range of sound. Some substances
lack smell for our species. This is of course not
because there is an absence of molecules of the sub-
stances to be picked up by our olfactory system, but
because we have not adapted to this particular sub-
stance during evolution. 
On the other hand, it is not certain that the most
available properties will lead us to the right place in
the value space: their predictive power is not necessar-
ily very great.
To determine the utility of categorization, I pro-
pose to see categorization as a trade-off between
availability and predictive power. In fact, this is a
consequence of discussing categorization in an evolu-
tionary framework: it is necessary to adopt a prag-
matic point of view, where categorization is coupled
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with action, and this real-world action will be the
mechanism of evaluation in evolution. Due to the
limitations imposed by the maintenance of life pro-
cesses, all categorization in nature will be bounded.
So, on the one hand we must investigate what
information is readily available to us, through our
sensory organs, and on the other we must see what
kind of information we need for different purposes.
Availability will thus in practice put a limit on
categorization in many situations. Many edible
mushrooms are left uneaten in the forest, not be-
cause it is not possible to distinguish them from poi-
sonous ones, but because the information needed is
not readily available. The categorization procedure
will change depending on the degree of risk in-
volved.
2.3 Senses vs. brains—the emergence of concepts
We might use olfactory sense information to distin-
guish an edible mushroom from a poisonous one,
and we do this because there are generalizable situa-
tions where it works. The introduction of a “nicely”
smelling but poisonous mushroom into such a situa-
tion will force us to look for another distinguishing
property, either a finer olfactory distinction, or a dis-
tinction in another domain, such as the visual.16 All
such refinements will need additional representa-
tional feats: we will need some primitive “concept.”
The concept is an intermediary layer between sen-
sory input and value domains (see figure 6).17 Con-
cepts in this sense will comprise everything from a
temporary downplaying of salience, due to atten-
tion, to human cognition.
One proposed model to consider here is the sub-
sumption architecture by BROOKS.18 Cognitive repre-
sentations (“concepts”) are seen as layered modules
that can suppress lower layers, for example sensory
input. There is also an element of competition be-
tween different modules, giving the cognitive sys-
tem a certain amount of flexibility.
2.4 Extending the world of values—conditioning
To take but one example of the dichotomy between
categorization with and without concepts, let us
briefly compare the approach of this paper with con-
ditioning. Conditioning is a term borrowed from
behaviorism, traditionally accused of disregarding
the role of internal representations. However, as we
will see, it is also one of the few theories to account
for the immediate association of the sensory
domain and the value domain.19
In classical conditioning, there is a fundamental
distinction between two kinds of stimulus. The first
kind, for historical reasons called unconditioned stim-
ulus (US), is directly connected to the value domains,
and thus has meaning20 for the animal. Uncondi-
tioned stimuli include food, which makes the ani-
mal salivate (PAVLOV 1927), and various stimuli caus-
ing pain, such as electric shocks.
The other stimuli in the environment do not have
this connection to the value domains, but are never-
theless salient: flashing lights, ringing bells and the
like were used in the experiments.
It turned out that if a meaningless stimulus is pre-
sented in connection with a meaningful one, the
animal forms some kind of association—the for-
merly meaningless bell becomes a predictor of the
meaningful food. The bell functions as a conditioned
stimulus (CS). After a sequence of trials, the connec-
tion has grown so strong that the CS alone produces
the response. Observe that the foundation of this
form of learning always rests on the association of
stimuli with the value domain. This is a way for the
animal to create meaning.
From one perspective, the association of an un-
conditioned stimulus with a response must be seen
as direct, as in figure 6 a, and the conditioned stim-
ulus producing a response as mediated, as in figure
6 b. However, as for example the behaviorists main-
tained, there is perhaps no need to postulate cogni-
tive representations at all to describe these processes.
This question will remain open.21
2.5 Evolutionary essentialism
In the literature, the essence of categories is often dis-
cussed as properties of an instance that must be
present for the instance to be an instance of that cat-
egory (GELMAN/COLEY 1991). An albino tiger is still a
tiger, as long as it possesses tiger DNA, for example.
The essence in essentialist theories provides an eval-
uation of the category, but is not postulated against
some criterion outside the system of categorization.
salience
values
a.
sensory input
concept
values
b.
Figure 6: In some cases, we can act directly upon salient sen-
sory input. In others, salience is downplayed by concepts.
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In my framework, where the raison d’être for the
creation of categories is that they orient us towards
the value domain, the essence will be given by the
association with the value domain. The only thing
that we require of a category in its simplest form is
that it points the way to primary values.22 Thus, an
evolutionary essentialism will not require our
knowing what the essences are—they are chiseled
out by the evolutionary pressure on the categories.
Depending on whether a category represents
something that an animal wants to get or to avoid,
we will have to distinguish two cases. A category
that represents a positive primary value, i.e. some-
thing that the individual must have for its sur-
vival, will always have an “essence,” otherwise the
animals with this kind of categories die. If, for ex-
ample, we base our survival on a cereal that does
not give us essential amino acids, we will not sur-
vive.23
Categories representing negative primary values
will not be subject to the same constraints: we can
fear something that is not dangerous without ever
getting negative feedback on this categorization.
We can continue avoiding the dark cave in the for-
est, even though the dragon died many years ago—
we will never know if we don’t see for ourselves.
Thus, for these categories we do not have to postu-
late that they are grounded in an essence, only that
the categorizations are subject to constraints for
reasons of cognitive economy. 
3. The unit of interaction 
and the unit of perception
I have pictured a scene that is common to all living
beings, where the basic primitives are the survival
loop, and the substances with food, danger and
reproduction value. Values are not cognitive, and
when we benefit from them, it is not basically from
sensory stimulation, although even the simplest
organisms have evolved senses as a guide to values. 
The next question in this paper is in what form we
conceive of these substances—as single stimuli
clustering to form objects, as holistic objects being
decomposed into dimensions, as whole environ-
ments or as combinations of the three. I will not
reach a definitive conclusion on these matters,24 I
want rather to put the searchlight on some evi-
dence that has existed for a while but that has not
received the attention it deserves. Although the evi-
dence is inconclusive it comes from a range of cog-
nitive disciplines, and that might help as a
corroboration.25
3.1 A complex unit of perception
As I argued above, the essential interaction of the
organism with its environment is in the value
domains. Due to the physical properties of organism
and environment, this interaction is complex—it is
not possible to imagine the interaction as an inter-
face only letting through one dimension at a time.
Furthermore, there is often much potential sensory
information in the organism’s environment, that the
organism might use as a guide to the value domains.
Given this complexity in the environment, I will
argue that the best level of description of perception
is on a more complex level than in most classical
psychology and philosophy. This is in accordance
with the characterization by CAMPBELL (1966, p82):26
“Both psychology and philosophy are emerging
from an epoch in which the quest for punctiform cer-
tainty seemed the optimal approach to knowledge.
To both PAVLOV and WATSON, single retinal cell acti-
vations and single muscle activations seemed more
certainly reidentifiable and specifiable than percep-
tions of objects or adaptive acts.”
From an evolutionary perspective it is arguable
that the unit of perception would lie closer to the
unit of interaction. I will show evidence of represen-
tations at least on an intermediate level between the
“objects” of interaction and the more primitive an-
alytical level common in psychology. One such ex-
ample is the concept of affordance in GIBSON’s (1979)
ecological theory of perception: “[...] what we per-
ceive when we look at objects are their affordances,
not their qualities. We can discriminate the dimen-
sions of difference if required to do so in an experi-
ment, but what the object affords us is what we nor-
mally pay attention to. [...] If this is true for the adult,
what about the young child? There is much evidence
to show that the infant does not begin by first dis-
criminating the qualities of objects and then learn-
ing the combinations of qualities that specify them.
Phenomenal objects are not built up of qualities; it is
the other way around. The affordance of an object is
what the infant begins by noticing. The meaning is
observed before the substance and surface, the color
and form, are seen as such. An affordance is an invari-
ant combination of variables, and one might guess that
it is easier to perceive such an invariant unit than it is to
perceive all the variables separately.” (GIBSON 1979,
p134–5, my emphasis).
“Invariant combination of variables” should be
read as variables that covary with each other, but not
with other properties. I will therefore examine the
concept of covariation over the next subsections.
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3.2 The covariation heuristic
Even our most basic practices involve complex sen-
sory input. As I have discussed in section 2.2, cate-
gorization is dependent on the predictive power of
the available sensory information. However, if the
organism can detect covariation in the sensory
input, the rudiments of concepts can be formed.
The various combinations of stimuli that are
obtained when covariation is taken into account
have a much greater predictive power than the stim-
uli in isolation. This heuristic can be characterized
as one of inductive inference:
“Inference from clustering of categorial proper-
ties:
(a) ‘Individual members of a natural category do
not share only a single criterial property. Rather,
they most often share many properties, which are
thus the definitional core of their categorial member-
ship.’
(b) ‘Therefore, if known members of a group ex-
hibit properties A, B, C etc., and if a sample sub-
group also exhibits property Z (to a statistically-sig-
nificant degree), then it is highly likely that the rest—
untested—members also exhibit property Z.’”
(GIVÓN 1989, p276) 
However, it seems to be clear that not all animals
utilize all possible covariation information. As re-
ported in SJÖLANDER (1995), snakes, for example can-
not use cross-modal covariation. Snakes use differ-
ent modalities for completing different sub-tasks,
such as catching the prey and swallowing it. This
should not be considered as odd from an evolution-
ary point of view. In the same way as not all potential
sensory information is used by animals, there is a
great potential of covariation information that could
be used. However, it is likely that different sensory
stimuli will provide a basis for covariation for differ-
ent organisms. Covariation detection will be an eco-
nomical solution for categorization, but only up to a
certain breakpoint, which will be decided by the evo-
lution of the organism.
Cross-modal covariation can be used by human in-
fants to integrate different senses. PIAGET (1968/1970,
p90) relates the case of an infant of 3 months at the
developmental stage when the visual system is gain-
ing autonomy. There is a functioning “réaction circu-
laire” consisting of hand movements mainly towards
the mouth. The child uses hand movements as a
source of covariation in connection with vision: the
hand can be moved with relative autonomy, and the
first step for the visual system is to follow the move-
ments of the hand. The opposite is not yet true, so the
infant cannot look at an object, and then reach out
and grasp it, a faculty that it will soon achieve. Thus,
there is a possibility to integrate sensory information
by means of covariation with a sense that already has
meaning in that it can be used to obtain values. Vi-
sion, working at a distance, is not so easy to integrate
with value loops, and thus needs the initial support
of the haptic sense.
3.3 Basic level objects
In psychology we find another account that paral-
lels GIBSON’s approach.27 ROSCH (1978, p31) presents
the basic level of categorization: “A working assump-
tion of the research on basic objects is that (1) in the
perceived world, information-rich bundles of per-
ceptual and functional attributes occur that form
natural discontinuities, and that (2) basic cuts in
categorization are made at these discontinuities.” 
I believe that in the present evolutionary frame-
work it is safe to extend her framework from the
“perceived” world to the “real” world. We could not
have an evolution of a conceptual system without a
counterpart in the value domain.28 (Given this firm
evolutionary conviction, it would also be possible to
try to reconcile the psychologistic position in
ROSCH’s account with the realist discussion about
natural kinds.29)
3.4 Perception of complex properties
What then is the evidence to corroborate that we do
in fact detect covarying properties directly, rather
than by composition from more primitive sense
domains? From semantics, for example, we are used
to thinking about concepts as decomposable into
primitive features that are then processed bottom–up
to form complex concepts by production rules.30 My
argument in this section is that this is not the most
fruitful level of explanation, since it has no connec-
tion to the value domains. Rather, we will look for
representations that correspond more closely to the
level of interaction of the animal. TANAKA (1993)
shows that in the anterior infero-temporal cortex
(TE), we find single-cell activation of complex features:
“The critical features were more complex than orien-
tation, size, color, and simple texture, which are
known to be extracted by cells in V1. Some of the fea-
tures were shapes that were moderately complex,
whereas others were combinations of such shapes
with color or texture. The individal critical features
were not complex enough to specify a particular
object seen in nature through activation of a single
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cell. Activation of a few to several tens of cells with
different critical features seems necessary to specify a
particular natural object” (TANAKA 1993, p686).
Figure 7 shows some of the critical features. The
importance of TANAKA’s results is that they challenge
our view of features as being describable as simple
concepts in EUCLIDEAN geometry that generate more
complex representations by production rules. 
Given the stimuli that the visual system must
distinguish, various intermediate levels could be
imagined. It is very hard to predict the stimulus set
that a combination of such a kind of “moderately
complex” features would be able to distinguish, and
even more impossible to find the best intermediate
set for a given set of stimuli. But what could be
learned from this is (a) that
there exists a level of repre-
sentation that does not bene-
fit from being decomposed
into primitives, and (b) that
this level is not generated by
geometrical primitives, but
by evolutionary pressure on
real-world categorizations.31
The theory that I have developed above proposes
that categorization and perception are closely tied
to our interaction with elements in the environ-
ment, and in particular those elements that carry
values with a direct impact on ourselves. As humans
we share the need for values with lower organisms,
and we are as dependent as they are upon food,
mates and shelter. But we have also evolved higher
representational skills that are not closely tied to our
basic interaction with the world. 
4. Conclusions
In the paper, I have provided an evolutionary
framework to open up a discussion about some fun-
damentals of categorization and cognition. As a
summary, I would give only a few points of refer-
ence to the issues discussed.
B The organism needs substances with primary val-
ue for its survival. These substances are not stimuli
in that their important function is to stimulate the
senses of the organism. Rather the organism merges
with them. Values represent the essence of the cate-
gories. 
B Senses are our means of making contact with the
substances that have value for us. Together with
conceptual representations they let us diverge from
the essential substances for a time and find them
again more efficiently afterwards, but “we must re-
spect our meals,” and be careful not to break the
loop of life processes.
B Evolution has shaped our senses so that for some
categories we can react directly to our sense impres-
sions as if they represented the essence/value. This
explains what is sometimes called direct perception.
B There are both beneficial and harmful values.
There is an imbalance in how we can react toward
them. We can continue to avoid things that are not
dangerous, but we have discontinued eating things
that made us die.
B There is a moment in time when the categoriza-
tion takes place, and it is signaled by the behavior of
the individual. The categorization has to be done
with the available sensory information that does
not necessarily carry the opti-
mal predictive power. Thus,
there is a trade-off between
availability and predictive
power. 
B In many theories of catego-
rization, categories are built
up from singular dimensions.
In the current approach, the
Figure 7: Twelve examples of critical features for the activation
of single cells in area TE. From TANAKA (1993). Some features
are also colored in the original.
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fact that we always act in complex environments is
exploited as an advantage. The unit of perception
will reflect the unit of interaction. In the organism–
value loop there is always a multitude of informa-
tion available that can provide a basis for sensorical
inferences. 
B Both the theory of values and the theory of cova-
riation originate in the assumption that we interact
with real-world objects rather than with singular
sensory stimuli.
B A theory of values is necessary to maintain the
evolutionary continuity between animal and hu-
man categorization, since symbolic (or memetic)
evolution is subject to partly different evolutionary
constraints.
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Notes
1 Early works on evolutionary epistemology include CAMP-
BELL (1974/1987) and LORENZ (1973/1977).
2 Mainly in accordance with GIBSON (1979). See further be-
low. This term is close to von UEXKÜLL’s (1982) concept of
“meaning.” 
3 Cf. the “functional circle” of von UEXKÜLL (1982).
4 Likewise in other languages, e.g. göra ont in Swedish.
5 It is always the situation that must be categorized as benefi-
cial or detrimental, not a singular object. For example, if
the animal finds good food in a dangerous place, it must
have a means of judging advantages against disadvantages.
Not all animals are good at this, when manipulated by
“smarter” animals. A mouse-trap is a familiar example.
6 Readers acquainted with constructivism will recognize
most of the terms and arguments, but will perhaps be sur-
prised at the stress on reality as an important part of the
theory. Constructivist literature includes VON GLASERSFELD
(1976; 1977; 1984; 1995), STEWART (1996), SJÖLANDER (1995;
1998), WATZLAWICK (1984).
7 As von UEXKÜLL (1909/1985) observed, when discussing
the inner worlds of lower organisms, we as researchers al-
ways adopt the perspective of the organism in question. I
will therefore allow myself to use the pronoun “we” even
when I talk of bacteria and other lower organisms.
8 For the sake of familiarity, I will assume that the dimen-
sions are spatial during the discussion.
9 The limits of reality do not generally move. “Agents” are
exceptions (GIVÓN 1989; PREMACK 1996).
10 “Reality is what makes your expectations fail.” (Per JOHANS-
SON, pc)
11 Depending on the negative feedback in the dimension in
question.
12 One possibility is to see the bold creature as generalizing on
a coarser scale (BALKENIUS 1996).
13 This is the most common interpretation of GIBSON’s
thoughts, and the part that provides the foundations of the
theory of “visibility” of NORMAN (1988)—we act directly on
cues in the environment.
14 This idea originates in LORENZ (1973/1977,p 6–7).
15 As a heuristic it is quite fixed, and an evolutionary heuristic
rather than an individual one!
16 Downplaying the most salient attributes of objects is equiv-
alent to postulating the existence of nonobvious properties
as important for categorization. A commonly used example
is the distinction between bird and bat, where overall sim-
ilarity is outweighed by genetic relation. See the brief dis-
cussion of nonobvious properties in GELMAN/COLEY (1991).
17 In this very general discussion, I have chosen the term
“concept” for the intermediary layer, although as will soon
be clear, some of the concepts are very rudimentary. Other
terms that could be used are “theory,” “schema,” or “rep-
resentation.”
18 BROOKS (1991), reviewed in BALKENIUS (1995).
19 See BALKENIUS (1995, ch. 5) for an overview of conditioning,
and RESCORLA (1988) for some relatively late developments
within the behaviorist tradition. Following a suggestion by
Christian BALKENIUS (pc), it is possible to see conditioning
as a performance test rather than a foundational property of
cognition. This view makes conditioning easy to reconcile
with representational theories.
20 Especially in the sense of von UEXKÜLL (1982).
21 As a general epistemological standpoint: in scientific devel-
opments there often arises the need for a dialectical contrast
between positions. The content a concept has will be de-
pendent on what it is contrasted against. If we discuss hu-
man concepts, we may say that they clearly mediate
between perception and values, and then an association
like conditioning will in this simple model be direct. See
ANDERSSON (1994) for this kind of polemic concept forma-
tion.
22 In higher-level cognition there are of course also second-
order categories that are not coupled to a primary value
domain. A simple example is money. It is not useful in
itself, but we “reward ourselves” when we get it.
23 MEDIN/ORTONY (1989) advocates a view almost contrary to
mine: psychological essentialism, described as “not the
view that things have essences, but rather the view that
people’s representations of things might reflect such a belief
(erroneous as it may be).” Also GELMAN/MEDIN (1993,
p163): “Essences are typically not known, almost always
unobservable, and may not exist. So, the essence itself can-
not usually serve as the basis of how people categorize or
identify items.” However, when studying human categori-
zation that is connected to language and intentionality,
this position is more tenable.
24 The debate on category coherence is long and continuing.
See for example KEIL (1989), MILLIKAN (1998), QUINE (1969),
GELMAN/COLEY (1991), MEDIN (1983).
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25 Early developments of this question are discussed in CAMP-
BELL (1966, p89). Cf. also the tradition of Gestalt psycholo-
gy (KÖHLER 1947), and the excellent critique in LEYTON
(1992) in terms of reduction of Gestalts to causal histories
with the aid of symmetry principles.
26 Linguistic semantics has suffered the same decomposition
into minimal features. 
27 There are also other theoretical developments in various
traditions. SHANKS et al. (1996), following a suggestion by
RESCORLA, talk about configural stimuli: co-occurring stim-
uli should be treated as unique and not as the simple sum
of their parts.
28 What we of course cannot say anything about is whether
there are other values that could be utilized with another
conceptual system, or whether there are other combinations
of sensory domains that could provide a better foundation
for categorization.
29 Richard BOYD (1991) provides similar evidence, based on
ideas indicating that natural kinds should be viewed as ho-
meostatic property clusters: this is the same idea about cova-
riation, supplemented with a claim regarding category
coherence by homeostasis. There is a striking resemblance
between this account of homestasis and the description of
life processes in terms of “autopoiesis” in MATURANA/VARE-
LA (1987/1992).
30 E.g. LYONS (1977, ch. 9).
31 See also LETTVIN et al. (1959) for a discussion of the receptors
in the frog’s eye, and that “the language in which they are
best described is the language of complex abstractions from
the visual image. We have been tempted, for example, to call
the convexity detectors ‘bug perceivers.’” (p1951, my em-
phasis)
There is some literature explicitly dealing with covariation
detection, e.g. KAREEV (1995), BILLMAN (1983), BILLMAN/
HEIT (1988), NISBETT/ROSS (1980), but most of the stimuli
used in their experiments require language, and linguisti-
cally based representations are subject to other evolution-
ary laws than the ones discussed in this article (DENNETT
1995/1996, ch. 12).
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K. Lorenz/K. Okawa/K. Kotrschal
Non-anonymous, Collective 
Territoriality in a Fish, the Moorish Idol 
(Zanclus cornutus): Agonistic and 
Appeasement Behaviours
Konrad LORENZ arbeitete lebenslang mit Fischen,
was sich zwar in seiner Theorieentwicklung, kaum
aber in entsprechenden Originalarbeiten nieder-
schlug. Dies gilt besonders für die in seinem Alten-
berger Riffaquarium von April 1976 bis September
1980 durchgeführten Beobachtungen zum Sozial-
verhalten barschartiger Fische. Da die Ergebnisse
dieser Arbeit nicht nur von historischem Interesse,
sondern auch wissenschaftlich relevant sind, lag es
nahe, einen Teil, beruhend auf LORENZ’schen Text-
fragmenten, zu veröffentlichen.
Beobachtungen im Aquarium (1954–1973 an den
MAX-PLANCK-Instituten in Deutschland) und im
Freiland (1976 in Kanehoe Bay, Oahu, Hawaii) erga-
ben, daß Halfterfische (Zanclus cornutus) ein bisher
für Fische unbekanntes, potentiell im Zusammen-
hang mit Befriedung stehen Spektrum an Verhal-
tensweisen zeigen. Wie andere Riffische auch, eta-
blieren Halfterfische anschließend an ein
planktontisches Larvenstadium im Riff zunächst ein
heftig verteidigtes Territorium, patrouillieren aber
später Streifgebiete in Gruppen. Die im Zuge dieser
ontogenetischen Veränderung gezeigten Verhal-
tensweisen wurden zwischen April 1976 und Juli
1978 in einem 4 × 4 × 2m (32m2) messenden Riffbek-
ken in Altenberg/NÖ. protokolliert. Ein offenbar
von Konrad Lorenz im Februar 1979 erstelltes Manu-
skript enthält eine detaillierte Beschreibung der
Ereignisse in Tagebuchform. Aus diesem Fragment
wurde von Kurt KOTRSCHAL eine ausführliche Zusam-
menfassung konzentriert und mit Hilfe von Keiko
OKAWA, einer ehemaligen Diplomandin von Konrad
Lorenz um die fachliche Einbettung und Interpreta-
tion ergänzt.
Fünf postlarvale Zanclus wurden im Februar 1977
eingesetzt. Die Fische etablierten Territorien entlang
von Boden und Wänden des Aquariums. In den dar-
auffolgenden Monaten verschmolzen sie, zunächst
paarweise, sukzessiv ihre Territorien. Neu einge-
setzte Zanclus schlossen sich entweder nach einer
Periode agonistischer Interaktionen der etablierten
Gruppe an, oder sie wurden im Zuge von Beschädi-
gungskämpfen getötet. Eine etwa ein jahr später ein-
gesetzte Gruppe juveniler Zanclus zeigte ein ähnli-
ches Muster der Gruppenbildung. Die älteren und
jüngeren Fische bildeten getrennte, kaum interagie-
rende Kohorten. Die dyadischen Interaktionen
innerhalb der Gruppen, sowie zwischen diesen und
den Außenseitern machen es wahrscheinlich, daß
die beteiligten Fische einander individuell erken-
nen. Das agonistische Verhaltensrepertoire gleicht
dem der meisten Barschartigen Fische. Erstmals
beschrieben wurde hingegen ein Spektrum von Ver-
haltensweisen, welche im Zuge dyadischen Befrie-
dung gezeigt wurden. Dazu zählt etwa “nahes Gra-
sen”, zuerst entlang der gemeinsamen Grenze des
Territoriums, dann davon unabhängig. Das häufig
nach einer Trennung gezeigte “zuschwimmen–
abwenden” ist als Kontaktverhalten zu deuten, wel-
ches aus Angriffsverhalten ritualisierte.”Schlängel-
schwimmen” und “Steinputzen–Scheinablaichen”
entspringen wahrscheinlich dem sexuellen Kontext.
Befriedungsverhalten wurde ist von Tieren mit kom-
plexer sozialer Organisation und erheblicher “sozia-
ler Intelligenz” bekannt, beispielsweise von Prima-
ten. Bei Fischen wurde aber erstmals derart
komplexes Befriedungsverhalten beschrieben.
Anthony Chemero
Teleosemantics and the
Critique of Adaptationism
In diesem Artikel werden die Bezüge zwischen
Adaptionismus – jener Position im Rahmen der Evo-
lutionsbiologie, die organismische Eigenschaften,
Merkmale und deren Funktionen als Produkte
natürlicher Selektion interpretiert – und „Teleose-
mantik“ disktutiert. Darunter versteht man
teleofunktionale Ansätze, die sich vor allem mit
dem Inhalt linguistischer und mentaler Repräsenta-
tionen beschäftigen. Der Inhalt dieser Repräsenta-
tionen wird vor allem als Produkt seiner evolutionä-
ren Vergangenheit gesehen. 
Hinsichtlich der Bezüge zwischen Teleosemantik
und Adaptionismus werden zwei Fragestellungen
Zusammenfassungen der Artikel
in deutscher Sprache
Evolution and Cognition ❘ 198 ❘ 1998, Vol. 4, No. 2
Zusammenfassungen der Artikel in deutscher Sprache
behandelt: (1) Wie exakt muß die Methodologie des
Adaptionismus sein um die Teleosemantik zu unter-
stützen, und (2) ist der Adaptionismus derartig exakt?
Hinsichtlich der ersten Frage wird die Ansicht ver-
treten, daß ein teleologischer Ansatz der Umgangs-
sprache von einem teleologischen Ansatz mentaler
Repräsentationen unterschieden werden kann. Der
teleosemantische Ansatz der Umgangssprache, den
ich vertrete ist völlig unabhängig vom Adaptionis-
mus, während derjenige der mentalen Repräsenta-
tionen stark vom Adaptionismus abhängt. 
Bezüglich der zweiten Frage werden einige
bekannte Formen der Kritik am Adaptionismus über-
prüft (Probleme der Optimierung; „free rider“–Kritik)
um festzustellen, ob diese Kritiken eine Teleoseman-
tik für mentale Repräsentationen als unmöglich
erscheinen lassen. Da jedoch die Teleosemantik der
Umgangssprache unabhängig vom Adaptionismus
ist hat diese Form der Kritik keinen direkten Einfluß.
Ein Kritikstrom aus dem Bereich der „free rider“–Kri-
tik jedoch bereitet einer Teleosemantik mentaler
Repräsentationen beträchtliche Probleme. Dieser
erinnert uns daran, vorsichtige Adaptionisten zu
sein, die zumindest zugestehen sollten, daß wenig-
stens einige Teile von Organismen nicht direkt Resul-
tat selektiver Prozesse sind. Jedoch verlangt die Teleo-
semantik mentaler Repräsentationen eine selektiv –
evolutionäre Vergangenheit für rein theoretische
Gebilde, was weit von einem vorsichtigen Adaptio-
nismus angesiedelt ist – vor allem im Lichte gegen-
wärtiger Versuche der Erklärung von Kognition ohne
Bezugnahme auf mentale Repräsentationen. 
Helena Knyazeva
The Synergetic View of Human 
Creativity
In diesem Artikel wird die heuristische Bedeutung
der synergetischen Modelle evolvierender und
selbstorganisierender komplexer Systeme, sowie
deren Anwendung auf erkenntnistheoretische Fra-
gestellungen erörtert. Im Umgang mit Problemen
der Kreativität, dem Funktionieren menschlicher
Intuition, der produktiven Einbildungskraft und der
historischen Entwicklung von Wissenschaft und
Kultur erweisen sich nichtlineare, synergetische
Modelle als überaus fruchtbar. Das kreative Denken
kann aus synergetischer Sicht als Selbstorganisation
und Selbstergänzung von Gestalten und Gedanken,
als Ausfüllen von Lücken in den Netzen des Wissens
betrachtet werden.
Die „Erleuchtung“, das „Aha–Erlebnis“ bzw. die
schnelle und plötzliche Lösung eines wissenschaftli-
chen Problems, sowie Instabilitäten, die entstehen,
wenn „eine Idee in der Luft ist“ und der Boom der
Forschung in gewissen Fachbereichen werden als
Beispiele der „Blow-up Regime“ im kognitiven
Bereich diskutiert.“
Armando Aranda-Anzaldo
On Natural Selection
and Hume’s Second Problem
David Humes berühmtes Induktionsproblem
beinhaltet eine zweites Problem welches sich auf die
Frage bezieht, ob sich die Gesetze und Prinzipien der
Natur im Verlauf der Zeit ändern. Unter Berufung
auf Daten der modernen Physik und Astrophysik
wird behauptet, daß sich in zeitlicher Hinsicht die
Gesetzte der Physik als Invarianten erweisen. Hier
wird die Frage in den Raum gestellt, ob Prinzipien
bzw. Gesetzlichkeiten in der Natur entstanden sind,
die nicht von den derzeit bekannten Gesetzen der
Physik abgeleitet werden können, bzw. die „nicht
physikalisch“ in dem Sinne sind, als sie einer Erklä-
rungsebene angehören, die völlig unabhängig von
der Physik ist. Wenn das der Fall ist, bleibt Humes
zweites Problem aktuell. 
In diesem Artikel wird die Existenz eines derarti-
gen „nicht physikalischen“ Prinzipes behauptet: die
natürliche Selektion, welche bei der Entstehung des
Universums noch nicht gegeben war, sondern im
Verlauf der Zeit entstanden ist. Um diese Behaup-
tung zu begründen werden einige zentrale Trends im
Bereich der Theorien der Lebensentstehung unter-
sucht, um sodann eine bestimmte Theorie als ein
konkretes Beispiel dafür anzuführen, daß natürliche
Selektion erst später entstanden ist. 
Marie-France Chevron
Man’s Special Position in Nature
The Relationship between Biological 
and Cultural Development
In verschiedenen Wissenschaften, in welchen von
einer Sonderstellung des Menschen ausgegangen
wird, konnte diese wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis
doch bisweilen zu völlig entgegengesetzten Schluß-
folgerungen führen und sogar zu einem Dogma
Evolution and Cognition ❘ 199 ❘ 1998, Vol. 4, No. 2
Zusammenfassungen der Artikel in deutscher Sprache
erstarren, das ein unvoreingenommenes wissen-
schaftliches und interdisziplinäres Fragen nach
dem Wesen des Menschen und der Kultur, aber
auch der kulturellen Entwicklung, unmöglich
machte.
In dieser Arbeit wird einerseits nach den Ansät-
zen und Prämissen der Evolutionären Erkenntnis-
theorie (sprich der evolutionär ausgerichteten bio-
logischen Wissenschaften) und der Ethnologie als
Kulturwissenschaft in Zusammenhang mit den
Theorien der Entwicklung gefragt, andererseits wer-
den die Schwierigkeiten und Fehlerquellen einer
interdisziplinären Auseinandersetzung kritisch dar-
gestellt. Besonders am Beispiel der Analogie als
Instrument der Erkenntnis wird das Problem der in
diesem Rahmen oft vollzogenen „Biologisierung
der Gesellschaft“ angerissen, wobei nicht nur auf
den Mißbrauch, sondern auf echte Anwendungs-
möglichkeiten der „Analogie als Wissensquelle“
hingewiesen wird. Wissenschaftsgeschichtliche
und methodische Überlegungen, aber auch den
Stellenwert der rein sachbezogenen interdisziplinä-
ren Besprechung der Forschungsergebnisse einzel-
ner Disziplinen werden erwähnt. So wird auf die
Notwendigkeit einer interdisziplinären Grundla-
genforschung über den Menschen als Kulturwesen
hingewiesen, wobei aus ethnologischer Sicht die
Erforschung transkultureller Universalien als uni-
versell vorhandene Grundmuster menschlichen
Seins mit ihrem speziellen kulturellen Überbau
wesentlich zur Klärung des Zusammenhangs zwi-
schen biologischer und kultureller Entwicklung vor
dem Hintergrund einer evolutionären Betrach-
tungsweise beitragen kann.
Simon Winter
Evolution, Categorization and Values
In diesem Artikel soll ein evolutionärer Rahmen für
die Kategorienbildung entwickelt werden. Aus-
gangspunkt ist dabei ein Bewertungsmechanismus,
der hinsichtlich primärer, überlebensrelevanter
Bereiche (Nahrung, Schutz, Reproduktion…) die
Evolution von Kategorien wesentlich mitbedingt
hat. Dabei wird zwischen Lebensprozessen und
kognitiven Prozessen insofern unterschieden, als
Lebensprozesse bewertende Komponenten beinhal-
ten, während kognitive Prozesse überwiegend per-
zeptive Eigenschaften aufweisen. Beide gehören
zusammen indem die sensorische Stimulation mit
der Entstehung des kognitiven Apparates zusam-
menhängt, der selbst jedoch keine Bewertungsvor-
gänge vornehmen kann. Kategorisierungsvorgänge
hängen dahingehend sowohl vom „Wertsystem“,
wie auch von der Verfügbarkeit sensorischer Infor-
mation ab. Ausgehend von diesen Bezügen wird
vorgeschlagen, die Einheit der Perzeption nicht wie
bisher in eindimensionalen Stimuluskonfiguratio-
nen zu sehen, sondern den gesamten Kontext mit
seinen Wertdimensionen mit einzubeziehen.
